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**THE  
CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN**





# THE Consequences of Pakistan

by

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*Member of the India Legislative Assembly ( 1934-1937 )*

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To





## PREFACE

Hate, according to Mr. Beverley Nichols, has founded an Empire—Pakistan. True it is as yet an Empire of dreams, but it may suddenly, as Mr. Nichols says, come out of the clouds and place itself on the world's map with a bang!

What is this Empire going to be like? Who is going to be its Emperor? And of what stuff will its Cabinet be composed? What will be its problems, domestic and foreign? Who will be and how will it get on with its neighbours?

Like the ostrich the members of the Muslim League bury their heads in the sand—and dream—and dream.

Sweet is the dream, no doubt—*Sovereignty, Independence, Power*. But dreams have an uncanny aptitude of turning into nightmares.

God forbid that Pakistan should be a nightmare.

Whether Pakistan is going to be Utopia Realised or Hell unloosed, it is certainly going to affect directly the lives of millions on this sub-

continent, and indirectly perhaps, the undercurrents of life of every living soul in Asia.

It is well, therefore, to examine some of its implications and forecast a few of its consequences.

I quite appreciate that there is little in this book that will be liked generally. The Muslim League press will undoubtedly say that I have not been able to get over a Hindu heredity, while the Hindu press may storm over chapter I, and say that I have not been able to get over a Muslim mentality.

However that must be the difficulty of many others who are in the same predicament, who belong to India by birth and to Islam by persuasion. It is true that Muslims number more than one third of the total population of India, but it must be safe to say that 95% of the number of Muslims in India are either converts or the descendants of converts. Not more than 5% of the total can claim to extra-Hindustan origin.

My brother may worship with his face towards the rising sun ; when I bow down to my God my face is towards the setting sun. Do we thus become of different nationalities? Mr. Jinnah says 'yes' because he will eat a cow, while his brother worships it. Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya

## PREFACE

agrees because he reveres the cow that provides him with his daily milk, while Mr. Jinnah is ready to slaughter it for lunch.

Mr. Jinnah denies the right of the Jews to a national home but claims the right of the Muslims to a national home—Pakistan.

But what is the national home that Jinnah would give us. God gave us a continent from the Himalayas to Ceylon, from the Hindukush to the Brahmaputra. Pakistan, whatever its boundaries, must inevitably be a small and inferior part of nature and history's heritage.

The Mussalmans have always been in a minority in India. Babar, Humayun, Akbar and Jehangir built empires besides which the proposed boundaries of Pakistan look shoddy. The Moghals were oppressed by no 'permanent minority' complex. They never quit the fertile plains of the Ganges or of the Nerbudda or the Jumna for the arid deserts of Sindh and Baluchistan from fear of Hindu domination.

The Empire of Pakistan, according to Beverley Nichols, is founded on hate—but not the hate of Aurangzeb, or of Nadir Shah.

The Empire of Pakistan is founded no less on fear—fear of Hindu domination, fear of Hindu



## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

exploitation, fear of Hindu absorption. It is an Empire founded on an inferiority complex.

There have been many books published on Pakistan but looked at from various angles. In the present book an attempt has been made to bring under one cover some of the several matters that must necessarily be in the portfolios of the architects on Pakistan.

The general reader, who is neither a Congressite or Muslim Leaguer may perchance find in these pages some material for quiet reflection. If it fulfils this role the author will consider his labour amply repaid.

*June 15, 1946.*

K. L. G.

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## CHAPTER 1

### **Responsibility for Pakistan—the Hindus**

Hindus are primarily the architects of Pakistan.

Whenever the question of Pakistan arises, Mahatma Gandhi, Dr. Moonje, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and others, to say nothing of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, and, as a matter of fact, the entire Hindu and Nationalist press never hesitate to remind Muslims that they belong to the same race and nationality as the Hindus.

The same strain in emphasis is to be found in the Report of the Sapru Committee, which went far afield into the realms of art, music and literature to find a common culture and common heritage of which both Muslims and Hindus are proud.

But the one-nation theory is in the realm of the theoretical. When we come down to practical issues, we find that Hindu politician is much more communal than his Muslim counterpart. Many a member of the Congress, of whose patrio-

tism there can be no doubt, who has spent many years in jail in the cause of the country, when it is a question between Hindu and Muslim will exhibit the most intense communalism.

Some few instances from real life will suffice.

Pandit Moti Lal Nehru's daughter wished to marry a Muslim, who was the editor of his newspaper the *Independent*. Pandit Nehru threatened he would commit suicide. Mahatma Gandhi, instead persuading Pandit Moti Lal that the gallant editor belonged to the same nation as the Pandit, persuaded Mr. Syed Hussain to give up the lady and to leave the country.

Mahatma Gandhi's own son became a Muslim. The Mahatma at once ostracised him from his fold. He was only reconciled to him when he was brought him back to Hinduism, with (it is alleged) the Birla influence! If Hira Lal Gandhi became a Muslim, what of it? Why should the Mahatma have been grieved? By change of religion he did not cease to be an Indian.

An equally correct charge that may be averred against the majority community is economic exploitation by Hindus of Muslims. In order to draw Muslim capital, it is usual in new Company floatations to include one or two Muslim directors. But Muslims are usually in

such a minority that they have no effective voice in the management, and if they have, they are removed or superseded at an early opportunity. Muslim directors are seldom in any effective position to influence orders for Muslim firms or employment for Muslim personnel. They are the bait for unwary Muslim investors to fall into the net of Hindu capitalists.

Hindu directors of companies may denounce Mr. Jinnah for promoting the two-nation theory. If Mr. Jinnah lays emphasis upon this by words, they prove it by conduct. Take great commercial institutions like the Punjab National Bank, the United Commercial Bank, the Lakshmi Insurance Company, the Bharat Bank and the Bharat Insurance Company. You will hardly see a Muslim anywhere. In the Lahore Electric Supply Company, a Company to whose prosperity Muslim consumers have contributed as much as Hindu consumers, employed no Muslim in its executive or clerical staffs, until faced with the pressure of acquisition by the Punjab Government.

Can it be said that Muslims are excluded generally from these institutions by accident? If Hindus and Muslims belong to one nation and there is community of race and culture between

them, the first step to establish this is for Mr. Gandhi to persuade his financier friends, the Dalmias, the Birlas and the Bhallas to employ at least fifty per cent. Muslims.

I am afraid he will find this more difficult than opening wells to the untouchables.

And if there be one nation, would Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, or Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya view with equanimity the marriage of a girl of their exalted castes to a Muslim? I am afraid every argument of race and culture now advanced by the protagonists of Pakistan would be used by these eminent gentlemen to prevent such a union.

It is futile to argue when it comes to the transfer of political power that Muslims and Hindus constitute one nation, when it is the unhappy truth that it would be the Hindu community which would be most outraged if the theory were translated into fact.

Sir Ganga Ram, the philanthropist, made no secret that he would admit no Muslims to any of his benefactions. He was a kindly gentleman but no good Samaritan.

The *Tribune* newspaper, although founded to promote nationalism, has never had a Muslim Trustee or a Muslim Editor, or a Muslim

Manager. Its reporters and sub-editors are all Hindus. By accident ?

And this is in a national Trust ! It may be argued for the Sir Ganga Ram Trust that the donor was a communalist and wished to exclude Muslims : his wishes are being followed.

But Dyal Singh Majithia was not a communalist. One of his first Trustees was a Christian, but now the *Tribune*, the Dyal Singh Library, and the Dyal Singh College which were never intended to be communal institutions are primarily Hindu institutions.

Millions of Hindus will not drink the same water that a Muslim will drink nor eat at the same table. On thousands of Railway platforms millions of Hindus every day establish the fact of two nations by insisting on *Hindu Cha* and *Hindu Pani*.

The deplorable fact is that the Congress admits to its membership and even to its Working Committee persons who preach the one theory and act upon the other.

Whatever else may be said of Mr. Jinnah it must be admitted for years he was the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. While Jinnah preached Hindu-Muslim unity, Lala Lajpat Rai emphasised Hindu-Muslim differences.



Rai Bahadur Lal Chand in *Self Abnegation in Politics* pleaded that "patriotism ought to be communal and not merely geographical". Lala Lajpat Rai entered a strong protest against the Congress theory of a united nation composed of Hindus, Muslims and others. In 1925, there appeared a Hindi essay entitled *Mere Vichar* by the late Lala Har Dyal, which he called his political testament. This was published throughout the country by the Hindu press.

According to Lala Har Dyal :

" If there is any possibility of the Hindus and the Muslims working together, it is only possible as we see in Hindu States or as was the usage at the time of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. It is that the State should belong to the Hindus and the Muhammadans may live there. But the State cannot be a Muslim State, nor can it be a jointly Hindu-Muslim administered State. The reason is that every State is ultimately dependent on its customs, its national language and its national history.

" There can be two classifications of the present States—the Muslim State and the Hindu State. The Hindus reside in the Muslim States and the Muslims also live in the Hindu ones. A joint Hindu-Muslim State is sheer nonsense, which under no circumstances can exist. We,

therefore, desire to establish States after the fashion of Baroda or Kashmir. To create States like those of Bahawalpur and Hyderabad we are not prepared to offer sacrifices. My point is now clear."

Indeed, it was clear.

Again :

"To attain Swaraj, we do not need the Muslim assistance, nor is it our desire to establish a Joint Rule. Don't look towards the non-Hindu quarters. If you attain Swaraj with the Muslim help, eternal will be your dependence on the Muslims. Leave them, therefore, all alone."

Here is another interesting passage from the same work :

"I declare that the future of the Hindu race of Hindustan and of the Punjab rests on these four pillars : (1) Hindu Sanghathan, (2) Hindu Raj, (3) Shuddhi of Muslims, and (4) the Conquest and Shuddhi of Afghanistan and the Frontiers. So long as the Hindu nation does not accomplish these four things, the safety of our children and great-grand-children will be ever in danger, and the safety of the Hindu race will be impossible. The Hindu race has but one history, and its institutions

are homogeneous. But the Mussalmans and Christians are far removed from the confines of Hinduism, for their religions are alien and they love Persian, Arab and European institutions. Thus, just as one removes foreign matter from the eye, Shuddhi must be made of these two religions. Afghanistan and the hilly regions of the Frontier were formerly part of India, but are at present under the domination of Islam . . . Just as there is Hindu religion in Nepal, so there must be Hindu institutions in Afghanistan and the Frontier territory; otherwise it is useless to win Swaraj. For mountain tribes are always warlike and hungry. If they become our enemies, the age of Nadirshah and Zamanshah will begin anew. At present English officers are protecting the frontiers; but it cannot always be . . . If Hindus want to protect themselves, they must conquer Afghanistan and the Frontiers and convert all the mountain tribes."

The same ideology has governed the policy of the Hindu Mahasabha. The Mahasabha leaders have declared year after year that Hindus alone have the right to rule over India and will establish Hindu Raj in the country. Shankaracharya Dr. Kurtkoti emphatically proclaimed:

“ India belongs to the Hindus ; the Muslims are only guests and should learn to behave like guests.”

Mr. Savarkar, whose authority to speak on behalf of the Hindu Mahasabha cannot be doubted, as he has been the President of that august body for several consecutive years, in fact, ever since he came out of jail, speaking at the Ahmedabad session of the Hindu Mahasabha in 1937, thus enunciated the “ Two-Nation ” theory :

“ Several infantile politicians commit the serious mistake in supposing that India is already welded into a harmonious nation, or that it could be welded thus for the mere wish to do so. These our well-meaning but unthinking friends take their dreams for realities. That is why they are impatient of communal tangles and attribute them to communal organisations. But the solid fact is that the so-called communal questions are but a legacy handed down to us by centuries of cultural, religious and national antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims. When time is ripe, you can solve them ; but you cannot suppress that by merely refusing recognition of them. It is safer to diagnose and treat deep-seated disease than to ignore it. Let us bravely face unpleasant facts as they are.

India cannot be assumed today to be an unitarian and homogeneous nation; but, on the contrary, there are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the Muslims in India."

In the Calcutta session of the Mahasabha held in December 1939, Mr. Savarkar further elaborated his thesis of the Hindus being a separate and distinct nation. He said :

"The whole Congress ideology was vitiated *ab initio* by its unwitting assumption that the territorial unity, a common habitat, was the only factor that constituted and ought to and must constitute a Nation. This conception of a Territorial Nationality has since then received a rude shock in Europe itself from which it was imported wholesale to India, and the present war has justified my assertion by exploding the myth altogether. All Nations carved out to order on the Territorial design without any other common bond to mould each of them into a national being have gone to rack and ruin, tumbled down like a house of cards. Poland and Czechoslovakia will ever serve as a stern warning against any such efforts to frame heterogeneous people into such hotch-potch

Nations, based only on the shifting sands of the conception of Territorial Nationality not cemented by any cultural, racial or historical affinities and consequently having no common will to incorporate themselves into a Nation. These treaty-Nations broke up at the first opportunity they got. The German part of them went over to Germany, the Russian to Russia, Czechs to Czechs, and Poles to Poles. The cultural, linguistic, historical and such other organic affinities proved stronger than the territorial ones. Only those nations have persisted in maintaining their national unity and identity during the last three to four centuries in Europe, which had developed racial, linguistic, cultural and such other organic affinities in addition to their territorial unity or even at times in spite of it and consequently willed to be homogeneous units—as England, Germany, Italy, Portugal, etc., judged by any and all of these tests which go severally and collectively to form such a homogeneous and organic Nation. In India we Hindus are marked out as an abiding Nation by ourselves. The Hindus are no treaty Nation—but an organic National being.”

One more pertinent point according to Mr. Savarkar must be met as it often misleads our Congressite Hindu brethren in particular. The homogeneity that welds a people into a National being does not imply the total absence of all internal differences, religious, racial or linguistic, of sets and sections amongst themselves. It only means that they differ more from other people as a National unit than they differ amongst themselves. Even the most unitarian Nations of today, the British or the French—cannot be free from any religious, linguistic, cultural, racial or other differences, sects or sections or even some antipathies existing amongst themselves. National homogeneity connotes oneness of a people in relation to the contrast they present to any other people as a whole. He says :

“ We Hindus, in spite of thousand and one differences within our fold, are bound by such religious, cultural, historical, racial, linguistic and other affinities in common as to stand out as a definitely homogeneous people as soon as we are placed in contrast with any other non-Hindu people—say the English or Japanese or even the Indian Muslims. That is the reason why today we the Hindus from Kashmere to Madras and Sind to Assam wish to be a Nation by our-

selves.”

Accordingly Mr. Savarkar includes in the term Hindu the followers of all those sects which have sprung from the soil of India,—Jainism, Buddhism, Sikhism, etc., and excludes from it Muslims, Christians, Parsis and Jews.

Whether Mr. Savarkar's thesis is wholly in accord with facts of history and with political theory or not, it is not possible to quarrel with it. Mr. Jinnah and the Muslims express the same ideology. The quarrel arises when the Hindu nationalist becomes inconsistent with his own thesis. The political scientist will say that when two communities have developed the consciousness of being separate nations, as the Hindus and the Muslims have in this country, it is time that, in order to avoid inner tensions, civil wars and the like, they parted company and established separate national governments of their own. That is the contention of the All-India Muslim League. Mr. Savarkar, however, having once repudiated territorial basis of nationhood with considerable acumen, falls back on the geographical motif and claims the whole of India as a heritage of the Hindu nation by calling it the “Holy Land” of the Hindus. He, therefore, visualizes a single government for the whole of India, dominated by the Hindus, in which the Muslims will have a



subordinate and subservient position. In other words, the Hindus will be the ruling race; the Muslims a subject people according to the President of the Mahasabha.

*"In no case can the Hindu majority resign its right which as a majority it is entitled to exercise under any Democratic and legitimate (sic) constitution. The Muslim minority in particular has not obliged the Hindus by remaining in minority, and therefore they must remain satisfied with the status they occupy and with the legitimate share of civic and political rights and that is their proportionate due."*

Some nationalists try to make out a case for a single Hindu-Muslim nation by referring to the cordial relations which subsisted between the communities during the period 1918 to 1921. No doubt during this period the communities were well in each other's embrace. The Hindus were bitter with the Punjab administration, the O'Dwyer regime and the Amritsar massacre. Muslims were agitated over British policy in Turkey and Arabia. It was only events such as the crawling order and the dismissal of the Khalifa that could bring Gandhi, Nehru, Mohamed Ali and Shaukat Ali on the same platform. But unfortunately this happy conjugation did not last long. The short-lived union of the

communities was born of their respective grievances against the rulers of the day. Public demonstrations of inter-dining on the part of Hindu and Muslim leaders, at the time, was believed to be the end of the untouchability which had been practised on the Muslims by the Hindus since the sun of the Mughul Empire had set. An orthodox Hindu like Swami Shardhanand could enter a mosque and drink water from the hands of a Muslim. But it did not take long for the Hindu aversion to the Muslim reassert itself in an uglier form and those very leaders who had been demonstratively inter-dining and preaching union, bitterly attacked each other's religions. Swami Shardhanand made an attack on the personality of the Holy Prophet. A Muslim fanatic stabbed him. The Hindus 'acclaimed Shardhanand as a hero and the Muslims declared their fanatic Maulvi a martyr in the cause of Islam.

Swami Shardhanand was not the only person to make attacks on the Holy Prophet. His example was followed by numberless others, the most notorious being the publishers of *Rangila Rasul* (author unknown), and the authors of *Satyarth Parkash* and *Risala Virtman*. Generally the publishers of such literature get stabbed at the hands of Muslims and richly deserve their

**fate.** They are canonised by the Hindu press.

There is much that could be written in a lurid vein of other religious leaders but one does not find Muslim writers resorting to scurrilous writing. On the contrary they appear to act on the revelation that every people have had their Prophet and these Prophets should be respected.


Hindu pamphleteers seem to take an almost saddest delight in misrepresenting the Holy Prophet of Islam.

Neither the Congress, nor the Mahasabha have anything to say about these scandalous attacks.

It is the bitterness engendered by acts such as these that has laid the foundation of Pakistan.

It has been correctly said that compared with the Muslim masses, the Hindu masses are politically, socially, educationally and economically more advanced. They have developed that mutual understanding and sympathy which is so essential for the formation of a nation. They are a well-knit and compact body with an ability for independent opinions. It is they who really lead their political organizations. If they find that the views of the Mahasabha on a particular issue, in most cases communal, are the same as their own, they follow it unreservedly. If they

# PLATE I



Potential Pakistan Areas



find that the views of the Congress reflect their own wishes, they lend it their full support. When an attempt was made to implement the League-Congress Pact of 1916 the whole of Hindu India was up in arms against it. The Hindu masses went over to the Mahasabha leaving the Congress, which had been a party to that pact, as if it had never enjoyed their confidence. At one stage when Federation was not to their taste though the Mahasabha may cried itself hoarse in its favour, yet they would never listen to it. Let Mr. Savarkar and other Mahasabha leaders shout to them from house-tops to accept the Federation they will never listen to them. They will stand with the Congress and abide by its decision in the matter. No pact arrived at between the Muslim and the Hindu leaders, whether Mahasabhaites or Congressites, can have any sanctity unless it has the approval of the Hindu masses, whose attitude towards the Muslims has generally been communal. For them the Congress is the wing to fight British Imperialism and to snatch power from the hands of the British and the Mahasabha another wing to safeguard their economic interests as also to promote their religious and cultural ideals. In other words, the Congress and the Mahasabha are two fronts, one to fight the

Britisher and to drive him out of the country and the other to fight the Muslims and to enslave them if possible. After the Hindus have secured themselves against British Imperialism, it is quite possible that they may begin to regard the Congress as unnecessary and think of abolishing it in order that the Mahasabha may not be hampered in its work of consolidating the Hindus against the Muslims.

Much the same line of ideology as Lala Lajpat Rai and Mr. Savarkar have made fashionable for the Hindu is advanced by votaries of the Pakistan ideology :

“ The basic principle of the attempts at building a national India rests on a wrong assumption, namely, that India constitutes one country and Indians form a single nation. All the confusion and chaos which is witnessed all round in the ranks of various political groups especially Muslims, is due to this wrong notion about India and its people. The very presence of communalism in all our ranks shows that Hindus and Muslims are not one nation, but two nations. And since all past and present attempts to suppress communalism have miserably failed we cannot expect that some future day shall see the communities united into a single nation.

## RESPONSIBILITY FOR PAKISTAN—THE HINDUS

Communalism is the violent expression of the general will of the two communities that they are two different entities and that they must separate. Communalism as a form of public opinion should be respected rather than flouted." (*Confederacy of India* by a Punjabi.)

Thus it will be clear that Pakistan is the natural heritage of the past and is not an entirely new phase in our political life. When the advocates of Hindu-Muslim unity say that the English are responsible for bringing communalism into existence, they are not by any means wholly correct. If the poison has come from abroad, we certainly owe its dissemination to ourselves. Blaming the English wholly for spreading communalism as an instrument of division is to deny the facts of recent history.

I do not exempt Muslims from the charge of giving way to communalism. But this is by way of retaliation. The main responsibility for the communal hatreds and passions that sweep the country I would, however, lay at the door of the Hindus. It is the Mahasabha and not the Muslim League that has laid the foundations of Pakistan.



## CHAPTER II

### **Pakistan is Born**

The Presidential Address of Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal delivered at the Allahabad Session of the All-India Muslim League in December, 1930, gave indication of the birth pangs of a new ideological conception among Muslims.

“ To address this session of the All-India Muslim League you have selected a man who is not despaired of Islam as a living force for freeing the outlook of man from geographical limitations, who believes that religion is a power of the utmost importance in the life of individuals as well as states, and finally who believes that Islam is itself Destiny and will not suffer a destiny. Such a man cannot but look at matters from his own point of view. Do not think that the problem I am indicating is a purely theoretical one. It is a very living and practical problem calculated to affect the very fabric of Islam as a system of life and conduct. On a proper solution of it alone depends your

future as a distinct cultural unit in India. Never in our history has Islam had to stand a greater trial than the one which confronts it today. It is open to a people to modify, re-interpret or reject the foundational principles of their social structure; but it is absolutely necessary for them to see clearly what they are doing before they undertake to try a fresh experiment. Nor should the way in which I am approaching this important problem lead anybody to think that I intend to quarrel with those who happen to think differently. You are a Muslim assembly and, I suppose, anxious to remain true to the spirits and the ideals of Islam. My sole desire, therefore, is to tell you frankly what I honestly believe to be the truth about the present situation. In this way alone is it possible for me to illuminate, according to my light, the avenues of your political action.

“What, then, is the problem and its implications? Is religion a private affair? Would you like to see Islam, as a moral and political ideal, meeting the same fate in the world of Islam as Christianity has already met in Europe? Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and to reject it as a

polity in favour of national polities, in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any part? This question becomes of special importance in India where the Muslims happen to be in a minority. The proposition that religion is a private individual experience is not surprising on the lips of a European. In Europe the conception of Christianity as a monastic order, renouncing the world of matter, fixing its gaze entirely on the world of spirit, led by a logical process of thought, to the view embodied in this proposition. The nature of the Prophet's religious experience, as disclosed in the *Quran*, however, is wholly different. It is not mere experience in the sense of a purely biological event, happening inside the experiment and necessitating no reactions on his social environment. It is individual experience creative of a social order. Its immediate outcome is the fundamentals of a polity with implicit legal concepts whose civic significance cannot be belittled merely because their origin is revelational. The religious ideal of Islam, therefore, is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of

a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. This is a matter which at the present moment directly concerns the Muslims of India. 'Man,' says Renan, 'is enslaved neither by his race, nor by his religion, nor by course of rivers, nor by the direction of mountain ranges. A great aggregation of men, sane of mind and warm of heart, creates a moral consciousness which is called a nation.' Such a formation is quite possible, though it involves the long and arduous process of practically remaking men and furnishing them with a fresh emotional equipment. It might have been a fact in India if the teaching of Kabir and the 'Divine Faith' of Akbar had seized the imagination of the masses of this country. Experience, however, shows that the various caste units and religious units in India have shown no inclination to sink their respective individualities in a large whole. Each group is intensely jealous of its collective existence. The formation of the kind of moral consciousness which constitutes the essence of a nation in Renan's sense demands a price which the peoples of India are not prepared to pay. The unity of an Indian nation,

therefore, must be sought, not in the negation, but in the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many. True statesmanship cannot ignore facts, however unpleasant they may be. The only practical course is not to assume the existence of a state of things which does not exist, but to recognize facts as they are, and to exploit them to our greatest advantage. And it is on the discovery of Indian unity in this direction that the fate of India as well as of Asia really depends. India is Asia in miniature. Part of her people have cultural affinities with nations in the middle and west of Asia. If an effective principle of co-operation is discovered in India, it will bring peace and mutual goodwill to this ancient land which has suffered so long, more because of her situation in historic space than because of any inherent incapacity of her people. And it will at the same time solve the entire political problem of Asia.

“It is, however, painful to observe that our attempts to discover such a principle of internal harmony have so far failed. Why have they failed? -Perhaps, we suspect each other's intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other. Perhaps, in the higher

## PAKISTAN IS BORN

interests of mutual co-operation, we cannot afford to part with the monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands; and conceal our egoism under the cloak of a nationalism, outwardly stimulating a large-hearted patriotism, but inwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps, we are unwilling to recognise that each group has a right to free development according to its own cultural traditions. But whatever may be the causes of our failure, I still feel hopeful. Events seem to be tending in the direction of some sort of internal harmony. And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declaring that, if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homelands is recognised as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India. The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalisms and communalisms. A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities is low and ignoble.

I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty, according to the teaching of the *Quran*, even to defend their places of worship if need be. Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my life and behaviour ; and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture, and thereby recreating its whole past, as a living operative factor, in my present consciousness. Even the authors of the Nehru Report recognise the value of this higher aspect of communalism. While discussing the separation of Sind they say: ' To say from the larger view-point of nationalism that no communal provinces should be created is, in a way, equivalent to saying from the still wider international view-point that there should be no separate nations. Both these statements have a measure of truth in them. But the staunchest internationalist recognises that without the fullest national autonomy it is extraordinarily difficult to create the international state. , So also, without the fullest cultural autonomy, and communalism in its better aspect is culture, it will be difficult to create a harmonious nation '.

“ Communalism, in its higher aspect, then, is indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India. The units of Indian society are not territorial as in European countries. India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages and professing different religions. Their behaviour is not at all determined by a common race-consciousness. Even the Hindus do not form a homogeneous group. The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified. The resolution of the All-Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi is, to my mind, wholly inspired by this noble ideal of a harmonious whole which, instead of stifling the respective individualities of its component wholes, affords them chances of fully working out the possibilities that may be latent in them. And I have no doubt that this House will emphatically endorse the Muslim demands embodied in this resolution. Personally, I would go further than the demands embodied in it. I would like to see the Punjab, North-West



Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-Government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India."

The idea of Pakistan first came into practical form from a small group of Muslim students of Cambridge University. In January 1933, when the Joint Parliamentary Committee was carrying on its work of examining witnesses, four of these students, Mohammad Aslam Khan, Ch. Rahmat Ali, Sheikh Mohammad Sadiq and Inayatullah Khan issued a small four-page pamphlet, entitled *Now or Never*, in which they advocated the idea of a partition of the country. The theory that the Muslims are a separate nation, and are therefore entitled to a separate state of their own, was for the first time seriously advocated in this pamphlet.

Sir Muhammad Iqbal had as already noted mooted an analogous idea in his address in 1930 to the All-India Muslim League.

So closely has Pakistan come to be associated with Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League that one hardly remembers the man who may really

be regarded as the father of the idea that has aroused so great a controversy in the domain of Indian politics.

This man was Choudhary Rahmat Ali at the time a post-graduate student at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. The son of a *dévout* father, Haji Choudhary Shah Muhammad of Mohar, and the scion of an old family, distinguished for its devotion to Islam, he was already known to his friends as a very sincere man with a creative mind.

The founder of Pakistan has among his admirers attained the role of a demi-prophet.

“To these qualities must be added his mystic faith in his own destiny. It is said that when he was only five, a *Faqeer* foretold a brilliant future for him and bade him prepare himself for the great role which was preordained for him by Allah.

“His prediction is widely believed to have been the making of Rahmat Ali. As a matter of fact, he himself still admits that ultimately it led to his spiritual rebirth, and gave his life a new meaning which determined him to keep himself free from all worldly ties, to live and work in the hope of finding his destiny, and to hold himself ready for

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

the supreme call that he felt was sure to come.

" Now, in this crisis, nearly 30 years after the *Faqeer's* prediction, he saw its fulfilment. Fanatically convinced that his hour had struck and that his Allah had at last called upon him to save the Millat's cause in the sub-continent, he answered the summons with a fervent *Labbaik* and gave himself to alter the fundamental course of Muslim political life and to release Islam for ever from the yoke of Indianism.

" In other words, he undertook the all-fateful task of transforming the cult of Indianism into the creed of Islamism, the course of 'minority communalism' into the call of Muslim nationalism, the perilous position of Muslim territories as provinces of India into the safe status of Muslim fatherland of Pakistan, of Bang-i-Islam, and of Usmanistan in South Asia, and, finally, the old sense of frustration into a new hope for the fulfilment of Islamic mission.

" And all this he achieved in the course of a few years.

To understand and appreciate this miracle, for one can call it nothing less, let us go back

to the time when, in 1932, the Muslim delegates were getting ready to accept the All-India Federation."

In pursuance of this decision, Rahmat Ali is said to have neglected his studies and started the struggle. Coming out into the open, on the one hand, he boldly challenged the Anglo-Hindu entente and warned them of the relentless opposition of Muslims to Indian Federation and, on the other, he cried a halt to the policy of the delegates to the Joint Select Committee, devised the name Pakistan for the predominantly Muslim strongholds of the Punjab, Afghanistan (North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan, created the Pakistani ideology, and called upon them to follow it or else to face the verdict of posterity.

This transformation—its method and its magnitude—has made Rahmat Ali amongst his friends into a legend and invested his name with an extraordinary appeal to a group of Pakistani students. They have come to look upon him as one of their greatest heroes and have shown their love and loyalty for him in various ways. Some have done so by dedicating their lives to the service of Pakistan, others by devoting themselves to the religious revival among Muslims, and still others—in a touching manner

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

—by giving his name to their children. Nor is that all. Prompted by their feeling of hero-worship towards him, they are keen to know more about the size and strength of the organisation with which he has brought about this momentous change affecting the destinies not only of Islam and Muslims but, also, of all other religions and nations in South Asia.


Until Jinnah eclipsed Rahmat Ali had claimed for himself the authorship of Pakistan. Rahmat Ali was Pakistan, and Pakistan Rahmat Ali. He was also responsible for the creation of Bang-i-Islam and of Osmanistan.

Let no one be surprised at this. History shows that, down the ages, an individual of inspiration, of devotion, and of execution has worked miracles and, in the moments of their dangers and difficulties, has inspired his people, imparted to them his own creed and courage, and led them to safety and salvation.

From the time when Rahmat Ali foresaw the dangers of "Indianism", until today when Pakistan is a lion's issue, Rahmat Ali has, day in and day out, renewed his message urging the Muslim to awake and arise, to unite and act for the Millat's future.

Thanks to his faith in his own mission and in

PLATE II



Pakistan and Hindustan Industrially Viewed



the Millat's destiny, despite the apathy, in difference, and opposition of Muslim leaders, he never never wavered in his conviction and boldly proclaimed that the day would come when Muslims would finally turn their backs upon "Indianism" and firmly set their faces towards "Islamism".

The above are some extracts from a pamphlet, "The Founder of Pakistan Through Trial to Triumph" by Khan A. Khan, published by Messrs. W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., Cambridge.

From the above it is clear that the founder of Pakistan is credited with miracles—namely, Pakistan, Bangistan, etc.,—and his status is that of a prophet inspired by Allah Himself.

The scheme at first did not arouse much interest or enthusiasm. Hindus were frankly hostile. British politicians were dubious and even Muslim opinion apathetic.

Professor Gulshan Rai writing in the "Tribune" of October 12, 1935 said of the Pakistan scheme :

"The present-day mentality of the Muslims is formed by the lands watered by its tributaries into what they are pleased to call Pakistan, or the land where the holy Muslim law is to prevail. Unless the Government



rigorously enforces the existing British Indian Law, there can be no communal peace in the country. The developments of this . . . Pakistan mentality in the North-West are as dangerous to the Hindus and the Sikhs as undoubtedly they are to the Government."

The Duchess of Atholl, M.P., writing on the Indian problem thus showed her apprehensions of the Pakistan scheme :

" The determination of some Muslims not to submit under any conditions to a Hindu yoke at the Centre is shown by the proposal to set up an independent Federation of the five mainly Muslim areas, *i.e.*, the Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier, Kashmir, and Baluchistan. In view of the fact that such a Federation would include the bulk of the fighting races of India, that it would control her most vulnerable frontier, and that beyond that frontier lies a continuous belt of Muslim states stretching to the Mediterranean, a greater political and military danger to India could hardly be imagined. It might well mean civil war in India and an Afghan invasion with Soviet support.

" Muslim witnesses described this to the Joint Committee as only a students' scheme,

but the anxiety shown by a leading Muslim delegate to cut short questions on this matter suggests that the proposal has aroused interest in more responsible quarters. A later witness, an ex-District Magistrate, told the Joint Committee that the idea of a great Islamic State, to include not only the area in question, but also Afghanistan, was being discussed in Muslim circles in the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province. It is also being spoken of in Chinese Turkestan, which is rapidly being penetrated by Islamic ideas, though Soviet representatives, since the conclusion of a commercial treaty in 1931 with the Chinese authorities, are said to have become the actual rulers of this huge province, a fact which incidentally brings Britain and Soviet Russia in direct contact with each other for four hundred miles along the northern border of Kashmir.

“It should not be forgotten that in the middle of the eighteenth century, Kashmir and four provinces in question, referred to today by supporters of the scheme as ‘Pakistan’ actually formed part of an Afghan kingdom. The recovery of this great territory, given favourable political conditions, might well be the aim of future Afghan

policy, as it was in the war of 1919."

The opposition to the Pakistan idea at the Joint Select Committee came not so much from the British or Hindu representatives as from representatives of the Muslim community.

"Before we quote their evidence (and the remarks thereon of Sir Zafrulla) to show how they tried to strangle the ideal of Pakistan, we must record here that this deputation, consisting of Mr. A. Yusuf Ali, Sir Muhammad Yakub, Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy, Dr. Khalifa Shujauddin, and Khan Sahib Haji Rashid Ahmad, represented both the All-India Muslim League, the President of which at the time was none other than Sir Muhammad Iqbal, and the All-India Muslim Conference, which had for its supreme head a person of the position of His Highness the Agha Khan.

"This is how some of these worthies thought fit to discharge their duty to the future of the Millat and deliver themselves before the Select Committee when asked their opinion of the Pakistan scheme :

Q. 9598.—Sir Reginald Craddock: I will pass on. If any of the delegates or the witnesses would like to answer: will they tell

me whether there is a scheme for Federation of Provinces under the name of Pakistan ?

“ A. 9598.—Abdullah Yusuf Ali, C.B.E. : As far as I know it is only a students' scheme, no responsible people have put it forward.

Sir Reginald Craddock : They have not so far, but, as you say, you advance very quickly in India, and it may be when those students grow up it will be put forward ; that scheme must be in the minds of the people, anyhow.

Mr. Zafrulla Khan : What is the question ?

Sir Reginald Craddock : I wanted to know whether the witnesses had acquaintance with a scheme which was drawn up for what is called Pakistan.

Mr. Zafrulla Khan : We have already had the reply that it was a students' scheme and there is nothing in it. What is the further question ?

Q. 9599.—Mr. Isaac Foot. What is Pakistan ?

A. 9599.—Mr. Zafrulla Khan : So far as we have considered it, we have considered it chimerical and impracticable. It means the Federation of certain Provinces.

*Q. 9600.*—Sir Reginald Craddock: I have received communications about the proposal of forming certain Muslim states under the name of Pakistan.

*A. 9600.*—Dr. Khalifa Shujauddin: Perhaps it will be enough to say that no such scheme has been considered by any representative gentleman or association so far.

Surely Muslim history, heritage and hopes could hardly wish for more doughty defenders.

Jinnah was no easy convert to the idea of Pakistan. An interesting account of the conversion has been given by Mr. Khan Ahmad in his book "Founder of Pakistan".

"Lastly, we come to the question of party rivalries that cloud personal judgments and compromise political relations. Here perhaps an apt illustration is provided by the All-India Muslim League. Up to 1935 the year when the new Government of India Act was passed the policy of its President, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, could fairly be described as that of a politician who considered himself 'Indian first and everything else afterwards'.

"Though eternally fatal to the Muslims, this policy was in those days foolishly considered the hall-mark of progressiveness

and a passport to popularity. Consequently, while it gravely injured the national cause of Muslims by leading them to look upon the service of 'Indianism' as the goal of patriotism, it established Jinnah's political career and made him the darling of Hindu circles which honoured him with the title of the apostle of united India.

"In these circumstances who can doubt that to a politician of his creed Rahmat Ali's message came as a bolt from the blue. Like that of the League, it compromised his past record inspired by 'Indianism'. More, it endangered his political future both as a politician and as President of the League. This started a political rivalry between the two most powerful personalities and their parties in Muslim India."

Seeing the growing menace of Pakistan to his party, Jinnah took steps to meet it. He went further than that and, in defending his old policy, decried Rahmat Ali, dubbed him an irresponsible person and characterised his plan as a crazy scheme.

This diatribe, he hoped, would finish both Rahmat Ali and his movement. But it did not work that way. For Rahmat Ali was the last to

take a challenge lying down, retorted with a slashing attack on Jinnah and on the League and forced them on to the defensive.

Describing Jinnah as the *boozna* of Bombay, who was incapable of creating anything himself, had spent his whole life, partly in opposing, partly in defacing and partly in aping every new idea in the politics of the sub-continent, he denounced his policy as the product of his English cum Indian cum Islamic past. Then, pillorying the All-India Muslim League as a crowd of mealy-mouthed careerists and its Council a clique of manipulators, some of whom owed their political, and others, their material, positions to British patronage, he accused the Leaguers of sticking in the past thirty years to their discredited policies, of reducing the Muslims to the position of a minority community, of 'Indianising' them as a people, and of betraying their heritage to the Anglo-Hindu entente.

This certainly was a blow at the very heart of the League. It shook it from head to foot, lowered its prestige, and weakened its hold on popular support.

The League realising that, in Rahmat Ali and in his Pakistani ideology, it was facing a serious danger to its life, decided to fight it out

with the Pakistan National Movement. To launch the campaign, it mobilised its "yes-men" and its paid publicists and thus sent the whole party machine into action. And, while its agents and underlings turned out their drum beaters to silence the Pakistani's voice and to scare away their supporters, its big bosses went so far as to issue instructions to their controlled press not to let Rahmat Ali's name and that of the Pakistan National Movement slip into their columns. The idea being, the less the public hears of them, the less it will think of them.

"In this connection the Leaguers adopted such mean tactics that one hates to mention them except to point out that they did everything possible to make the public forget the Pakistan National Movement and its founder."

However, they did not succeed in their aims. For, Rahmat Ali, not to be daunted by this puerile display of pugnacity, addressed himself to the Muslims and called upon them to choose, once and for all, between the "Islamic future" as envisaged for them by the Movement and the "Indian fate" as accepted for them by the League. Nor did he leave the matter there. Issuing instructions to his followers and supporters



to accept the League challenge, he asked them to carry the Movement's message to every town and village, to every mosque and *maktab* in Pakistan and thereby beat the League at its own game. That is to say, make the new ideology the sole and supreme national policy of the people—a policy that will finally seal the doom of the “communal cult” of the League and herald the consummation of Pakistan as their homeland and the consolidation of the Muslims as a Millat throughout the sub-continent.

For six years, in one form or the other, behind the scenes or in the open, this clash went on between two personalities, Rahmat Ali and Jinnah, representing two principles, two policies, and two parties, *i.e.*, the Movement and the League. But, thanks to his new faith and fervour, throughout this period the initiative in the formulation of Muslim opinion and in its guidance towards Islamic future remained with Rahmat Ali and the Pakistan National Movement. What he said today, Jinnah echoed tomorrow. What the movement did on one day, the League adopted on the next.

Until 1940 the idea of Pakistan was no serious issue in Muslim politics. It formed no part of the League's programme. Then came a revolution.

## CHAPTER III

### **Pakistan**

Pakistan, to its sponsors, meant the land of the *Paks*. The word *Pak* (pure) is not adequately translatable into English. It is translated for all that is noble and sacred in the life of a Muslim. The name Pakistan, which has come to be applied not yet officially to the five Muslim Provinces in the North-West of the present-day India is, as we have seen, composed of letters taken from the names of its components—Punjab, North-West Frontier (of which the inhabitants are mainly Afghans), Kashmir, Sindh, and Baluchistan. These territories were christened Pakistan by Rahmat Ali, founder of the Pakistan National Movement, in 1933, with a view to preserving their historical, national, and cultural entity as distinct from Hindustan proper. But Pakistan has gradually developed to mean not only the four territories but also to include the Province of Bengal where generally on the whole there is a Muslim majority (*Bang-i-Islam*),

so called *Osmanistan* or the territories of the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Port of Calcutta, where the large non-Muslim population is explained by Mr. Jinnah to be composed of commercial travellers. Mr. Jinnah has recently claimed corridors between the component parts of Pakistan. These too should now be included in the prospective Pakistan.

Pakistan as an ideal has become fashionable, but very few have any clear notion of even its territorial limits. Different ideas prevail also on the important question of sovereignty. Is Pakistan to be a single sovereign State or a Confederacy of sovereign or semi-sovereign Muslim States? Is Pakistan to be a dominion of the British Empire or a totally independent State? Is it to be ruled by assemblies or by the Qaid-i-Azam as a Khoja Emperor? Is Pakistan to be subject to a Central Government or is to be only in treaty alliance with Hindustan? Is Pakistan to maintain the Durand Line or be absorbed into the Afghanistan? Is Pakistan to include or exclude the Ambala division? Is Pakistan to include Baluchistan, or is Baluchistan to be ceded to Afghanistan as a price for Pakistan security.

From the sponsors of Pakistan and the propagandists of the League one fails to find any con-

sistent ideas of Pakistan. Four main conceptions have held the field.

### **I.—The Rahmat Ali Pakistan.**

Extremist views are to be found in the Rahmat Ali Pakistan. Of the four signatories of the Cambridge pamphlet the idea seems to have gone like wine into the brain of this young man, for he returned to it in July 1935, when he brought forward a new pamphlet in which he repeated the arguments of the old, and expressed a surprise as to why, if Burma could be separated from India, Pakistan could not be constituted into a separate state. In 1940, he published another pamphlet : *Millat of Islam and the Menace of Indianism*, in which he condemned Indianism and pointed out that the Millat could be saved only by severing of ties with India which never was and never would be the motherland of the Muslims. In the meantime, Rahmat Ali had extended the scope of his movement. He now talked not of a single Muslim State but of a number of Muslim States :—The North-Western Provinces, of course, were to be constituted into Pakistan, but Bengal, with its hinterland of Assam, was to become *Bang-i-Islam* ‘ by the supreme right to self-determination ’, and the State of Hyderabad was to become *Osmanistan* “ as

a part of our patrimony", and these three independent Muslim States were to form a triple alliance.

In the *Millat and its Mission* Rahmat Ali set out the *Seven Commandments* for the "Seventh" "Continent of Dinia".

These *Commandments* were :

1. Avoid Minorityism.
2. Avow Nationalism.
3. Acquire Proportional Territory.
4. Consolidate the Individual Nations.
- 5 Co-ordinate them under "Pak Commonwealth of Nations."
6. Convert "India," into "Dinia."
7. Organise "Dinia" and its dependencies into Pakasia."

In communicating the above ideas to the *Millat*, Rahmat Ali argued :

"On the other hand, it is certain that if we think and act in terms of the Faith, the Fraternity, and the Fatherlands, we shall achieve the sovereign freedom of the *Millat* and the supreme fulfilment of her mission throughout the Continent of *Dinia* and its dependencies. That is the twin ideals that have been bequeathed to us by our ancestors

and the achievement of which is vital to both our history and our hopes in Pakasia.

“ Let us, therefore, in this spirit of eternal dedication, try to do this duty and begin with the first revolution.

“ We know to our costs that the first revolution reduced our Fraternity from the position of a mighty force to that of a medium factor in the power politics of the world. Further, it punished our *Millat* for the blunder of following ‘ Dynasticism ’, of fraternizing with ‘ Indianism,’ and of establishing a heterogeneous state in the continent of *Dinia*. Furthermore, it eclipsed our nations in *Pakistan*, *Bangistan*, and *Osmanistan*; extinguished our empire in *Dinia*; upset the equilibrium of Asia to our disadvantage as a people; and started a new cycle in the history of the world.”

Small wonder, therefore, said Rahmat Ali that at the end of this revolution, while our Pak nations were sinking into the obscurity of defeat and downfall, new ones were rising to eminence in the comity of nations; again, while our composite, ramshackle domains were crashing into the abyss of “ Indianism,” those of other peoples were developing into compact, homogeneous countries

of independent nationalism ; and, finally, while we were discarding our civilization even in our own Continent of Dinia, others were spreading theirs throughout the world.


“ As to the second revolution, some idea of its outcome may be formed from the fact that, among other things, it further degraded our Fraternity from a medium force to a minor factor in the power politics of the world, revived ‘ Indianism ’ to an amazing degree, and, reducing the *Millat* throughout *Dinia*, broke up her social cohesion and turned her intelligentsia into a mass of wage-slaves and blind careerists.”

The two maps [Plates III and IV] will indicate the difference in the ideas of delimits of Pakistan as envisaged by Rahmat Ali before and after the Sikh reaction.

The minority problem, ignored at first, was the main theme in the pamphlet *The Millat and its Mission*, which was first published in October 1942. It set out a Pakistan very different to the Pakistan conceived in 1933. The following extracts will explain Rahmat Ali's main difficulties :

“ What is the fundamental truth about minorities ?

PLATE III



Rehmatali Pakistan  
( Original Version )





“ It is that there are times when minorities are the heralds of their original nations, and others when they are the symbols of their helplessness. Again, there are times when nations can fully assimilate minorities, and others when minorities can fatally sabotage such nations. Finally, there are times when to leave your minorities in foreign lands, or to keep alien minorities in your own lands, is a sound policy, and others, when to do either is childish folly ; also, when to do neither is saving statesmanship, but when to do both is sure suicide.

“ It is this last contingency which concerns us in the current phase of our life and calls upon us to remember that, in the past, ‘ Minorityism ’ has ever proved itself a major enemy of our Millat ; that at present it is sabotaging us religiously, culturally, and politically even in our national lands ; and that, in the future, it would destroy us throughout the Continent of Dinia and its dependencies.

“ Hence the Commandment : Avoid ‘ Minorityism,’ which means that we must not leave our Minorities in Hindu lands, even if the British and the Hindus offer them

the so-called constitutional safeguards. For no safeguards can be substituted for nationhood which is their birth-right. Nor must we keep Hindu and/or Sikh minorities in our lands, even if they themselves were willing to remain with or without any special safeguards. For they will never be of us. Indeed, while in ordinary times they will retard our national reconstruction, in times of crisis they will betray us and bring about our redestruction.

“That is the gist of the Commandment. It may be expanded into the factual statement that

“(a) To leave our minorities in Hindu lands is:—

“(1) To leave under Hindu hegemony 35 million Muslims who form no less than 1/3 of the whole Millat, which in her struggle for freedom has no allies in the Continent.

“(2) To deny their resources to the cause of the Millat at a time when she needs the maximum contribution of every one of her sons and daughters.

“(3) To devote their lives and labours to the cause of the Hindu *Jati*. Those people

who argue that an equal number (35 million) of Hindu and Sikh minorities in Pakistan, Bangistan, and Osmanistan will be working for the Millat overlook the fact that the work of one can never compensate for that of the other.

“(4) To expose them, generation after generation, to the denationalizing influences of ‘Indianism,’ which ever has been and ever will be after absorbing us all in its own system and society.

“(5) To forget the tragic fate that overwhelmed Muslim minorities which—in more favourable times than these and with better guarantees than now possible—were left in Sicily, Italy, France, Portugal, Spain, Austria, and Hungary. Where are they now? To ask that question is to answer it in the most poignant terms.

“(b) To keep Hindu and/or Sikh minorities in our own lands is :

“(1) To keep in Muslim lands 35 million Hindus and Sikhs who form no more than 1/8 of the total strength of the forces opposing the Millat in the Continent of Dinia.

“(2) To condemn to permanent servitude our 35 million brethren living in Hindu

Dinia, i.e., outside Pakistan, Bangistan, and Osmanistan. The reason is that unless and until we accept this commandment we cannot liberate them from the domination of 'Indianism.' To realise their true importance to both the Millat and the Fraternity we must remember that in numbers these 35 millions represent two Turkeys, more than two Irans, three Afghanistans, ten Iraqs, eighteen Syrias, or twenty Palestines.

" (3) To expose our civilization to those Indian influences which seriously undermined it in the past but would completely annihilate it in the future.

" (4) To perpetuate our subjection to 'Imperialism' which thrives on 'Minorityism' and makes 'Minorityism' live on, and for, itself (Imperialism). That is why the super-and sub-agents of British Imperialism—the Congressites and the Leaguers, respectively—are trying to keep all the countries of the Continent of Dinia full of minorities, whether or not Dinia is partitioned between its nations. These worthies are encouraging both the simple-minded Muslims and the hare-brained Hindus in the fatal notion that by keeping

the other minorities in their strongholds they will be able to lord it over them.

“(5) To forget even the unforgettable lesson taught to us by the disappearance of our own Pak Empire and of the Turkish Empire, namely, that one of the major causes of their decline, defeat, and downfall was the treachery and treason of their religious, racial, or political minorities.”

Such is the fundamental and the factual truth about minorities as viewed through Pakistani lenses :—

“(a) From the point of view of our immediate interests, to leave 1/3 of the Millat under Hindu hegemony in the seven Hindu Majority Regions of Dinia and its dependencies in exchange for 1/8 of the *Jati* under Muslim supremacy in Pakistan, Bangistan, and Osmanistan will be an act not of sanity but of insanity.

“(b) From the point of view of our interim policy, to prepare the Muslim Minorities to remain in the Hindu Majority Regions of Dinia and its dependencies and to persuade the Hindu and Sikh minorities to stay in Pakistan, Bangistan, and Osmanistan will be

an act not of fidelity but of treachery to the Millat.

“(c) From the point of view of our ultimate purposes, to compromise with ‘ Minorityism ’ will lead not to an eternal triumph but to irreparable tragedy for the Millat.”

So, in the end, the direct or indirect acceptance of “Minorityism” will mean not the recognition of Pakistan, Bangistan, and Osmanistan but the rejection of them; not the birth of Siddiqistan, Faruqistan, Haideristan, Muinistan, Maplistan, Safiistan, and Nasaristan but the miscarriage of all hope of them; not the conversion of the Sub-continent of India into the Continent of Dinia but its confirmation as the country of India; and not the organization of Dinia and its Pakasia but the reformation of India and its dependencies into Indasia. This appears to be both correct and inevitable.

“ II. *Avow Nationalism.*—This commandment is complementary to the previous one and means that Muslims must assert, and demand the recognition of the distinct national status of their minorities in the Hindu Majority Regions and reciprocally offer to give similar status to the Hindu

and Sikh minorities in Pakistan, Bangistan, and Osmanistan.

“ Undoubtedly, therefore, their salvation lies in ‘ Nationhood,’ which we must demand for our minorities in the Hindu Majority Regions of Dinia and its dependencies, and do that in the assurance that whatever the result it can do nothing but good to the Millat. The reason is that, if the British and the Hindus accept our demand, it will liberate our 35 million brethren now caged in Hindustan (the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh), Bihar and Orissa, the Central Provinces, Bundhelkhand and Malwa, Rajistan, the Bombay Presidency and South India, Western Ceylon, and Eastern Ceylon; transform them into seven nations: free Pakistan, Bangistan, and Osmanistan from the dangers of ‘ Minorityism ’, and, above all, ensure the spiritual purity, the fundamental unity, and the national homogeneity of the Millat.

“ It is true that, until 1940, there were colossal difficulties in the way of making such a demand for our minorities, but now they have been removed by the Sikh claim to separate national status in Pakistan. So we



must make the most creative use of this claim and, on the principle of proportional territory, offer to meet it—as meet it can be—in the area of the three Sikh states of Patiala, Nabha, and Jind, on the absolute condition that our demand for similar status for our Minorities in the seven Hindu Majority Regions of Dinia and its dependencies (Siddiqistan, Faruqistan, Haideristan, Muinistan, Maplistan, Safiistan, and Nasaristan) is met simultaneously by the supporters of the Sikhs, *i.e.*, the British and the Hindus who, by holding out the threat of the Sikh claim, have throughout the past 85 years tried to stifle our aspirations.

“ Need one add that this demand for seven states for our Minorities will constitute as historic an answer to the Sikh claim to separate nationhood in Pakistan as was ‘Pakistan’ in 1933 and ‘Bangistan’ and ‘Osmanistan’ in 1940 to the Hindu claim to the whole Continent of Dinia.

“ Let it, therefore, be realized by all Muslim political parties, including the All-India Muslim League, that for us to deal with the Sikh claim in the way the Hindus dealt with ours is to court the Hindu fate, *i.e.*,

twelve centuries of subjection ; that new situations can be met not by destructive criticism, but only by constructive action ; and that of the present aspirants to the great and glorious prize of Dinia it will ultimately go to the nation that is the first to achieve her spiritual purity, fundamental unity, and national homogeneity and build her future on their solid and secure foundations.

“ Allah willing, that nation will be the Millat, the nation of nations, which is accepting the Pak Plan, born of the eternal truths of the Faith, Fraternity, and Fatherland ; and rejecting the denationalizing schemes born of the fallacies of ‘ Indianism.’

“ III. *Acquire Proportion Territory to create Siddiqistan, Faruqistan, Haideristan, Muinistan, Maplistan, Safiistan, and Nasaristan.*—To say that land is to nations what homes are to individuals and fields to farmers is to do no more than direct attention to the elemental truth that it is land that makes their fatherlands, sustains their physical life, and symbolises their wealth, prestige, and power ; and that, therefore, they ever fight to acquire it, to keep it, and to pass it on to their posterity.

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

“Hence the commandment which means that we should acquire our share of the territories of the Continent of Dinia and its dependencies and convert it into countries for our nations.

“Now in the orbit of Pakasia we form about one-fourth of the total population and, according to the laws of Nature and nations, are entitled to about one-fourth of its area. Out of this we shall get in Pakistan, Bangistan, and Osmanistan<sup>1</sup> about 325,000 square miles—after giving the Hindu and Sikh Minorities their proportional share of the area of these lands. So, roughly speaking, the area we shall actually receive in Pakistan, Bangistan, and Osmanistan will be about 75,000 square miles less than that which is really due to us. It is the acquisition of this area and its conversion into Muslim countries that are made our obligation by the commandment.

“The only way to meet that obligation is to claim the proportional area for our Minorities in the Hindu Majority Regions of Dinia and

It is estimated that, after the preliminary construction of Pakistan on a national basis by voluntary exchange of population, a minority of some three million Hindus will for a time be left within boundaries.

its dependencies on the assurance of reciprocity to the Hindu and/or Sikh Minorities in Pakistan, Bangistan, and Osmanistan. For instance, in Hindustan (the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh) our Minority forms about 15 per cent. of the population and we are, therefore, entitled to 15 per cent. of her area. That is about 17,000 square miles, which we must acquire and convert into Haideristan. To appreciate the true importance of our share of Hindustan we must remember that, in terms of our mission, it is invaluable; and, in terms of space, it is nearly one and a half times the area of Albania, and twice that of Palestine.

“ In the same way, the proportional areas for our Minorities in the Central Provinces, Bundhelkhand and Malwa, Bihar and Orissa, Rajistan, the Bombay Presidency and South India, Western Ceylon, and Eastern Ceylon must be claimed and converted into our new national countries of Siddiqistan, Faruqistan, Safiistan, and Nasaristan respectively.

“ It is clear that only thus can we get our full share of the area of the Continent and also found national homes for our Minorities in Hindu Dinia and Ceylon, where their

position, already precarious, is bound to become perilous in the future. It is true that while some of these 'National Homes' will be quite sizeable strongholds, others will be no more than footholds; but in this connection we must remember two things. First, that so far as the size of these strongholds is concerned, it will be proportional to our numbers in every region; and second, that, so far as our security is concerned, to be free in our own national footholds is better than to be slaves in alien lands." (*The Millat at the Mission*, pp. 10-14)

## II.—Dr. Latif's Pakistan

Before Rahmat Ali could thus give an amended version of Pakistan an ex-Professor of the Osmania University, Dr. Latif, brought the idea from the region of sentimentalism to that of realism. In 1938, he published two very scholarly pamphlets: *The Cultural Future of India* and *A Federation of Cultural Zones for India*. In 1939, Dr. Latif systematised his ideas in a book called *The Muslim Problem in India*. In the course of these tracts Dr. Latif suggested a division of India into fifteen cultural zones, four Muslim and eleven Hindu, and provided each zone the freedom of constituting itself into a homogeneous state *with a highly*

*decentralised form of government within.*

In *Muslim Problem of India* Dr. Latif gave the following reasons for his scheme :

1. " India is a land where several cultures subsist side by side. There are, broadly speaking, two great cultures, the Muslim and the Hindu, each of which very often require separate treatment of legislation and otherwise. The Hindu culture is in reality a loose federation of several cultures marked by differences in languages and customs, social habits and laws. For instance, a Nambudiri Brahman of Malabar has nothing in common with a Machwa Brahman of Bengal or a half-Muslim Brahman Pandit of Kashmir. Each in his own individual jurisdiction supplies a background to the social life of the Hindus peculiar to the part of the country where he lives. Such examples can be easily multiplied to demonstrate the vertical as well as the oblique fissures cutting and separating the Hindu society throughout the country. If, suppose a subject of cultural bearing should be adopted by legislation at a centre, it will mean forcing on the whole country a culture which would be, to say the least, quite inconsistent with the cultures of several units prevailing at the same time in numerous places.

And when the fact is taken into consideration that a great community like the Mussalmans will come under the purview of such a legislation, it is bound to result in a conflict and its accompanying stress and strain. The object and aim of the proposed scheme is to avoid such unpleasant contingencies and social disturbances. The provision holds good as much in the economic field as in other fields.

“2. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Indian States are afraid to join the federation chiefly because they apprehend that the federal interference would operate adversely in their internal independence. As no federation would succeed unless and until the Indian States willingly and cheerfully join to work it, it would be the height of statesmanship to allay fears of the States in every respect. Under the proposed scheme they will have the necessary sense of security such as would make them willing and contented units of the federation.

“3. From the standpoint of Muslims, as of other minorities, it is necessary that the residuary powers should vest only in the units and in the proposed regional boards to the necessary extent. As minorities in most

federal units, the position of, the Muslims would be one of comparative dependence on the Hindu majority. If the Centre also should exercise its jurisdiction in matters which might as well be dealt with by the constituent units, the position of the Muslims and other minorities will become difficult, because under the constitution of the Act of 1935, the majority community of India would not fail to dominate at the Centre, as well as in the units, subjecting the minorities to the treatment, as it were, of a double-edged sword. Such autonomy as the Muslims might have under the Act in a few provinces would become useless to them by reason of the domination of the great Hindu majority in the important subjects of the concurrent list. Should the 'federal list' be confined to a bare minimum of items, it would certainly be a great relief, as it would give a sense of a security to minority communities, as well as to hundreds of Indian States both large and small. After all, in a country where a single homogeneous nation is impossible to evolve any attempt on the part of a majority community to seize power at the Centre in the name of nationalism would be undiluted high-handedness which the Mussalmans who



had long ruled that community could not brook under any circumstances whatsoever."


*Zonal Boards* were advocated on the Latif scheme.

" With full autonomy conceded to federal units by reducing the federal list of subjects to a bare minimum, and by eliminating in consequence the concurrent list altogether, the need will be felt for co-ordinating the activities of such contiguous units as enjoy common affinities in respect of subjects of cultural and economic importance common to them. To meet this need zonal original boards are suggested to enable such groups to evolve common policies on common problems, leaving the individual federal units, whether Indian States or Provinces, to legislate in the light of the common policies so evolved. The formation of such regional boards will dispense with the need of resolving such groups into sub-federations which will simply multiply administrative and legislative paraphernalia in the country."

The following points constituted the outstanding features of Dr. Latif's proposals:

The transitional constitution for India will have to fit into the conception of the ultimate

# PLATE IV



Rehmatali Pakistan ( Revised Version )



federation and must lead to it. This will necessitate the creation of certain new Provinces on cultural or linguistic lines without involving immediate exchange of population. The new Provinces be constituted even piecemeal, but one of them, at any rate, should be carved immediately out of the present United Provinces. It should be formed with a view to resolving it eventually into a Muslim zone, and permanent home for all the Muslims living at present in U. P. and Bihar.

### **Transitional Federation**

It is for "constitutional" lawyers to work out the details of the transitional constitution, but any such constitution should embody the following provisions :

1. In the Preamble, it must be clearly brought out that the aim of the transitional federal constitution laid down is to lead India to a federation of culturally homogeneous states.

2. Legislation. (a) The Federal Legislative list should be reduced to a minimum number of items and be confined only to

subjects which concern the common political and economic interests of India as a whole.

(b) All other subjects should form the Provincial list subject to the following proviso :

### **Regional Boards**

There may be subjects of cultural and economic importance common to contiguous federal units and it will be found useful to have for them Regional or Zonal Boards to evolve common policies, leaving the individual federal units to legislate in the light of the common policies so involved.

Three of the zones may be constituted as follows :

1. North-West Zone composed of Sind, Baluchistan, N-W.F.P., Kashmir, Khairpur, and the Indian States of the Punjab Agency.

2. North-East Zone composed of Bengal and Assam.

3. The Dominions of Hyderabad.

The rest of India may be resolved into linguistic zones even as the Congress may wish.

The above arrangement has two advantages :

- (i) it will remove Cultural Legislation from Federal control ;

(ii) it will develop a zonal or original sense necessary to evolve culturally autonomous states, which the transitional constitution is to lead to.

## **Safeguards for Muslims**

Whatever be the nature of the transitional federal constitution, whether consisting of newly formed units as suggested above or of units in their existing form, the Muslims will need the undermentioned safeguards to be incorporated in the constitution.

### **A.—Representation on Legislature**

1. The system of separate electorates for Muslims should be maintained, as well as the existing proportion of Muslims in the several Legislatures.

2. The inclusion of the Indian States in an All-India Federation should be made dependent upon their returning to the Central Legislature a sufficient quota of Muslims so as to allow to their community, in view of their political importance, and particularly of their predominant share in the defence of the country, at least a third of the seats at the Centre.

3. If the proposed Zonal or Regional Boards are established, the Muslims should be allowed adequate and effective representation commensurate with their total strength in the Legislatures of the several units composing each zone.

### **B.—Legislation**

All subjects touching their religion, personal law and culture will be the exclusive concern of the Muslim members of the Legislature concerned, constituted into a special committee for the purpose. The strength of the committee should be augmented by a third by co-opting representative Muslims, learned in Muslim Law and Religion. The decisions of such a committee should be accepted by the whole Legislature. If such decisions, should they seem to affect the interests of other communities, might on reference made by the head of the Administration be reviewed by the Legislature as a whole but no amendments shall be permissible which should affect the basis of the legislative enactment.

### **C.—Executive**

The Executive Government of the Minis-

ters in each Province or at the centre should not be drawn from the majority party alone as is the vogue in homogeneous democratic countries like England. Here in India it is the majority community which permanently returns the majority of members to the Legislature and, inasmuch as the majority community, namely, the Hindus, unfortunately differ from the Muslims, the next largest community in the country, in almost every detail of domestic and social life, the governance of the country by a permanent majority in the Legislature resolves itself into the governance of the country by the majority community and cannot be expected to be a Government of the whole people.

The executive that needs to be chosen for every Province and the centre should, in the present stage, be a composite executive representing Hindus and Muslims with an agreed policy acceptable to both, and not liable to be turned out by the Legislature. That should be the arrangement, at any rate, until India resolves itself into a federation of culturally autonomous states, when alone true democracy may take its birth in the country,



and responsible Government justified.

Under the transitional constitution, therefore, the executive should be not a "parliamentary executive in the English sense, but a "stable executive" independent of the Legislature as in the great democracy of the United States of America but the Prime Minister instead of being elected directly by the people as the President in U.S.A. should be elected by the entire Legislature, and should remain in office during the life of the Legislature, and will not be removable by it. He will choose his colleagues as ministers in the interests of good government from the members of all groups in the Legislature, an equitable number of whom should be Muslims enjoying the confidence of the Muslim members of the Legislature concerned and should be selected from a panel suggested by them.

Of the two provinces into which U.P. will be divided the Prime Minister for the Muslim Province should be a Muslim, as this area will have in the transitional period to prepare itself to resolve into a Muslim zone, and will have its policy to be directed by a Muslim.

In the case of the portfolios affecting Law and Order and Education which have to deal with problems over which cultural differences arise, provision should be made to have a Minister and an Assistant Minister and to appoint a Muslim to either of the two posts, in order that the Government may have the benefit of his steadying influence.

*Machinery to effect exchange of population.*— One of the objects of the transitional constitution is to facilitate and prepare the ground for the migration of Muslims and the Hindus into the zones specified for them so as to develop them into culturally homogeneous states. During the transitional period migration should be on a voluntary basis. For this the necessary legislation will have to be passed for each region, and a machinery set up to organise and regulate this voluntary migration. The proposed constitution will therefore have to provide for the appointment of a Royal Commission to lay down a suitable programme of gradual exchange of population.

The result of voluntary migration may be reviewed from time to time and if it should be found that it has eliminated the cultural

clashes between the Muslims and the Hindus to an appreciable extent and given them a sense of security whatever they need it, or has brought about a change of heart in either camp, the question of compulsory migration may be put off indefinitely, and the voluntary method adhered to for a further term.

### **III.—Sir Sikander's Pakistan**

By 1938 and 1939, Pakistan was becoming a fashionable idea.

Anxious not to alienate the Hindus, to whose kindness and support Sir Sikander Hyat Khan owed his political fortunes, and also equally anxious to ride the growing tide of Muslim opinion and to justify his continuance in the League as its member, the late Premier of the Punjab sponsored what is generally known as the Regional Federation Scheme.

Its author proposed to treat the Punjab inclusive of Hindu tracts of the Ambala Division, Kangra district, Una and Garhshankar tahsils of the Hoshiarpur district and all the non-Muslim Punjab states as one regional unit.

The scheme neither found favour with Muslims, nor did it commend itself to the Hindus. Sir Sikander himself got associated with the

Muslim League demand as set out in Lahore Resolution of March 1940 and did not seriously press the Regional Federation Scheme.

#### IV.—The Mamdot Pakistan

The late Sir Mohammad Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot sponsored a more reasoned scheme in a "Confederacy of India." Although published anonymously, its authorship was no doubt that of the Nawab himself. The fourth scheme which claims our attention is therefore the result of the combination of the proposal of a tripartite confederation of three federations, namely, the Muslim North-West, the Muslim Bengal and the Hindu India, and the improvements suggested by Nawab Sir Mohammad Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot to the effect that two more federations, one comprising the Rajistan states and the other constituted by some of the Deccan states, may also be created in addition to the three federations mentioned above so that there may be a quinquepartite instead of a tripartite confederacy. According to this scheme, the sub-continent of India could be split up into various countries on the following lines and re-assembled in a confederacy of India thus :

(1) *The Indus Region's Federation*, comprising the Punjab (minus its Eastern Hindu tracts),

the Sind, the N.-W.F.P., Kashmir, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur, Amb, Dir, Swat, Chitral, Khairpur, Kalat, Las Bela, Kapurthala and Malerkotla as its federal units.

(2) *The Hindu India Federation* with the United Provinces, Central Provinces, Bihar with some portions of Bengal, Orissa, Assam, Madras, Bombay and the Indian States other than the Rajistan and Deccan states included in the States' Federation, as its federal units.

(3) *The Rajistan Federation* with the various states of Rajputana and Central India as its federal units.

(4) *The Deccan States' Federation* comprising the Hyderabad, Mysore and Southern States.

(5) *The Bengal Federation* —The prominent Muslim tracts of the Eastern Bengal and Goalpara and Sylhet districts of Assam as its provincial units and Tripura and other states lying within the provincial unit or cut off by its territories from the Hindu India, as its state units.

Reshaping the map of the Indian sub-continent in accordance with the above suggestion would according to the author necessitate :—

(1) either creation of a new province consisting of the Ambala Division, Kangra district, Una

and Garhshankar tahsils of the Hoshiarpur district, and the Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi, etc., or inclusion of all these Hindu areas in the United Provinces ;

(2) inclusion of the prominently Hindu parts of the Western Bengal in Bihar or Orissa ;

(3) inclusion of the districts of Goalpara and Sylhet of Assam in the Muslim Bengal ;

(4) leaving a corridor in the North of the present district of Goalpara of Assam in order to connect the Hindu province of Assam with the Hindu Federation of the Hindu provinces ;

(5) giving a similar corridor to the Deccan States' Federation through the Hindu Federation in order to link Hyderabad State with Mysore State ; and

(6) giving a corridor to the Rajistan Federation to connect with it its federal unit of the Patiala State. Half of this corridor can be taken from Hindu India and the other half from Indus-tan.

In a Federation of India on the lines chalked out above, each federation joining would have a Governor-General with the Governors of its provincial units under him, responsible to the central confederal authority in relation to the confederal subjects and matters relating to the

rights and obligations of the Crown in respect of the Indian States within the federation. The confederal authority can be vested in the Viceroy, assisted by a confederal assembly consisting of members drawn from the various Indian Federations. The number of such members to be drawn from a federation to be fixed according to its importance judged from the point of view of its significance to the confederacy as regards its geographical situation in the sub-continent, population, area and economic position, etc. Foreign relations, defence, and matters relating to water supply from common natural sources, and rights and obligations of the Crown in relation to the Indian states (which may join any of the British Provinces' Federations), could be entrusted to their Governor-Generals, who would be responsible to the Viceroy. The various federations joining the confederacy could either directly contribute towards the revenues of the confederacy or assign some portions of their revenues from some specific heads towards its expenses.

This idea of a binational, trilingual and quinquupartite confederation, may be novel and unprecedented in history but it was not impracticable. Strange maladies yield to stranger remedies. The political problem of India is unique. The

solution, therefore, must in any event be unique. A reduced Hindu minority and Kashmir State with a Muslim population and a Hindu Raja in the federated North-West, could form a guarantee for the security of the Muslim minority ; and Hyderabad State with Hindu population and a Muslim Nizam in Hindu India, and *vice versa*. By it the Muslims could hope to enjoy security against Hindu aggression in their own parts, while Hindus could have their own regions fully reserved for themselves and so too most of the native states who at present hesitate to join an Indian Federation on account of the fear of too much control from the centre (in other words control of the Congress over them), could be immune against it in their own federations.

The author of the above scheme addressed a warning to the Hindus, to Europeans and to their own Muslim brethren as well.

To the Hindus, the author said :

“ It is open to the Hindus to agree or to disagree with the proposal of a confederacy of Hindu India and Muslim India. But certainly they are not entitled to oppose separation of the Muslim Regions from Hindu India. Confederation depends upon the will of the parties concerned but in case one of



them happens to disagree with the plan of confederation, this does not mean that it is morally within its rights in standing in the way of the other's seeking complete separation of its regions. Self-determination in their own regions is the birthright of the Muslims. Constitutionally as well as morally no power can deprive them of this right. In the case of there being unreasonable opposition even to the separation of the Muslim Regions from Hindu India, the Muslims will be within their rights in going to all extremes and in trying all methods open to them to achieve it.

As to the relationship with the British, the Mamdot scheme did not lay much reliance on the promises or the fidelity of Albion :

“ The English have realized that they cannot keep India under them for all time to come. Now strategy and diplomacy only help them in getting their lease over India extended by decades and not by centuries, as was the case in the beginning of the British rule. The Muslims, therefore, should be ready for any emergency at any time and should not depend upon the English for all time to come to protect them against Hindu

aggression. If the English had been sure of their strength against the Hindus, certainly they would not have let down the Muslims, in the way they did, when the 1935 constitution was being framed. In a way the 1935 constitution is a bargain between them and the Hindus at the cost of the Muslims. By it the Hindus (British subjects and state subjects) secured control against the Muslims at the centre and the English secured the aid of the Indian states in insuring an abiding influence over India."

To Muslim separationists, who have their eye on external support, the Mamdot advice was clear and complete and deserves repetition :

"We should also make it clear to those Muslim separationists who want separation in order to link their destinies with states outside the Indian sub-continent, that in demanding separation we should not be inspired by any such extra-territorial ideals, ambitions, or affinity. We should be separationists-*cum*-confederationists, and if the Hindus disagree with the idea of a confederacy of Hindu India and Muslim India, then we should be simply separationists, demanding secession of our regions from Hindu India


without any link between them. We should desire separation simply because we want to evolve a happier and more contented India, whether it be by separation of the Hindu cultural zones and Muslim cultural zones to be linked together in a confederacy, quite independent of and separate from each other except for the confederal bond, or complete separation in order to constitute our regions into federated states independently and separately from Hindu India. The foreign element amongst us is quite negligible and we are as much sons of the soil as the Hindus are. Ultimately our destiny lies within India and not out of it. And it is for this reason that we have abstained from using the word 'Pakistan' and have instead used the word 'Indusstan' to denote the North-West Muslim *bloc*. 'Pakistan' is a term which has, somehow or other, gathered round itself some unwholesome and alien associations which are far from our minds.

"We should also warn the Muslims that in the beginning of every movement, there always creep in political adventurers, who exploit the movement for their own personal ends and objects. If it happened in our case also, then it would mean playing into the



PLATE V

MAP SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF INDIA ON THE BASIS OF QUINQUEPARTITE CONFEDERACY.



REFERENCES

- (1) Indusian Federation.
- (2) Hindu India Federation.
- (3) Rajputan Federation.
- (4) Deccan States Federation.
- (5) Bengal Federation.



the attitude of stiffness adopted by the Congress and its President Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. Mr. Jinnah refused to convert the League into an under-study of the Congress and firmly upheld the position of the League.

The Congress, for its part, found as the result of the elections that it did not have the support of the Muslim community. Very few Congress Muslims were put up as candidates for the elections, and even they failed. The Congress therefore set about roping in the Muslims by an appeal to their economic conscience, explaining that the Congress was out to alleviate the sufferings of the masses, Muslims as well as Hindus, and to uplift the nation as a whole. In this process the League and its leaders came in for a great deal of violent criticism at the hands of the Congress political managers.

On behalf of the League Mr. Jinnah retorted :

“ The Congress have not the monopoly, nor are they the sole custodians of Indian nationalism. As I have always maintained, the Muslim League is prepared to join hands with any progressive party in the fight for the country's freedom, but to achieve this the question of minorities must be settled

satisfactorily. Here I am not talking of only Muslims but all minorities. Further, we are not prepared to merge ourselves into any organisation, however great it may be, and however advanced its programme and policy may be unless it is determined by common consent."

Paying little heed to these words of warning, the Congress leaders went their own way. Puffed with the success at the polls, they affected to ignore the claims of Muslim leaders. In what may be described as non-Muslim provinces—that is, those in which the Muslims are in a minority—the Congress formed Ministries without consulting and securing the co-operation of the Muslim League, but they failed mainly on account of the Congress demand that whatever such an understanding was reached the Muslim League should cease to be a separate parliamentary body and merge itself into the resultant Congress-League party.

The League, for its part, was willing to co-operate but not on the terms imposed by the Congress. In the result the negotiations failed, and the League remained in the opposition.

Although the bulk of the Muslim representatives returned to the provincial legislatures by



the electorate were in opposition to the Congress the latter proceeded to constitute Governments with Muslim Ministers who did not represent Muslim opinion in the legislature. Nowhere in any of the so-called Congress provinces did the Muslim Ministers have the support of the majority or even a decent number of Muslim legislators. Thus these Muslim Ministers in the Congress provinces were the objects of repeated displays of Muslim hostility.

Having failed to reach an agreement with the League and its leaders, the Congress tried to crush the League and its leaders by making a direct approach to the Muslim masses through an economic and national programme. For a time this appeared to succeed, but eventually failed to achieve its object. The League leaders counteracted the Congress propaganda by pointing out to the Muslim masses that their true interests lay in their organisation under the banner of the League which alone could serve them truly. The League's counter drive succeeded in a large measure added by allegations that in provinces where the Congress was running the Government the Muslim minorities were not treated well. The Congress, on the other hand, inspired movements to undermine the authority of the Ministers in Bengal, the Punjab, Assam and Sind, and in

the last named it actually succeeded in overthrowing the Ministry. The widening gulf between the Congress and the League gave an additional stimulus to the consolidation of the Muslim forces under the League which found fruition at the Lucknow session of the League in the autumn of 1937.

Such was the remarkable success achieved by the Muslim League in consolidating the strength of the community under its banner that it very soon compelled attention at the hands of the Congress. Shortly after the Lucknow session of the League Mr. Gandhi and Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru, the then President of the Congress, made overtures to Mr. Jinnah with a view to bringing about an understanding between the Congress and the League if not between the Hindu and Muslim communities generally. They entered into elaborate correspondence which was mostly acrimonious in tone. Curiously enough, the large number of letters exchanged between Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah related to ascertaining the points in dispute. Each wished the other to clarify the position and to make demands or offers as the case may be. It was with considerable difficulty that the Congress leader managed to ascertain from Mr. Jinnah a list of the Muslim points.

These, as understood by the Pandit, were :

(1) The fourteen points formulated by the Muslim League in 1929. (2) The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award and should not describe it as a negation of nationalism. (3) The share of the Muslims in the State services should be definitely fixed in the constitution by statutory enactment. (4) Muslim personal law and culture should be guaranteed by statute. (5) The Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Shahidganj Mosque and should use its moral pressure to enable the Muslims to gain possession of the mosque. (6) The Muslim right to call *azan* and perform their religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way. (7) Muslims should have freedom to perform cow slaughter. (8) Muslim majorities in the provinces, where such majorities exist at present, must not be affected by any territorial redistribution or readjustments. (9) The *Bande Matram* song should be given up. (10) Muslims want Urdu to be the national language of India and they desire to have statutory guarantees that the use of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged. (11) Muslim representation in the local bodies should be governed

by the principles underlying the Communal Award, that is, separate electorates and population strength. (12) The tri-colour flag should be changed or, alternatively, the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance. (13) Recognition of the Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organisation of the Indian Muslims. (14) Coalition Ministries in the Provinces.

Gradually these fourteen points of the League died and were buried. Some with and some without ceremony.

A new idea and a new ideology took hold of the League.

There could be no agreement with the Congress. Hence a state without the shadow of Congress domination.

The *infant terrible*, of a Cambridge undergraduate, which had hitherto been the subject of ridicule by Muslim leaders and scoffed at by Mr. Jinnah himself became the pet of the League and the favourite of its President.

The League's counter drive everywhere succeeded in a large measure aided by allegations that in provinces where the Congress was reigning it was primarily seeking the country's freedom in the interests of the Hindus. The widen-

ing gulf between the Congress and the League gave an additional stimulus to the consolidation of the Muslim forces under the League.

A thick curtain descended on the vision and understanding of the Muslim community. The armchair hangers-on of the *Qaid-i-Azam* became the arbiters of the destiny and fortunes of nearly 80 million Mussalmans. The Muslim League emerged thus as the strongest and most influential political organisation of the Muslim community.

The Lucknow session changed the creed of the League to :

“ The establishment in India of full independence in the form of a federation of free democratic states in which the rights and interests of the Muslims and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded in the constitution.”

With the outbreak of the war and the changes it wrought in Indian politics, the League found itself in an extremely advantageous position. The Indian National Congress withdrew its ministries from the Provinces where it had held sway for nearly two and a half years. As a result of this the League came to be on a par with the

**Congress** in that both were now out of office and without the power and influence which went with it. Whereas the Congress lost through the resignation of its ministries such bargaining power as it had while in office, the League acquired some more power through the international complications that resulted from the war.

To spite the Congress, Mr. Jinnah was prepared to go any lengths. He was ready to keep India enslaved to the British for a thousand years than share a freedom won by Congress efforts. Again, whereas the Congress had alienated the sympathies of the Indian Princes by sponsoring and encouraging agitation for responsible government for the State people, the League sought the friendship of the Princely Order by condemning such activities and upholding the rights and privileges of the Indian Princes in any revision of the Indian Constitutions. In yet another direction the League manœuvred itself into a comfortable position ; whereas, the Congress categorically withheld its co-operation from the war, the League abstained from taking any such attitude and merely insisted on the satisfaction of its claims prior to making up its mind. Even this was only the official attitude of the League as an organisation. Most of its individual members

were in favour of whole-heartedly aiding in the prosecution of the war. And the League winked at this.

A fortnight after the declaration of the War, the Working Committee of the League passed a resolution which illustrates the tact and firmness with which the League steered the Muslim ship.

“ If full, effective and honourable co-operation of the Mussalmans is desired by the British Government in the grave crisis which is facing the world today and if it is desired to bring it to a successful termination it must create a sense of security and satisfaction among the Mussalmans and take into their confidence the Muslim League, which is the only organisation that can speak on behalf of Muslim India.”

In a resolution passed in September 1939, the Working Committee of the League said :

“ The developments that have taken place, especially since the inauguration of the Provincial constitution based on the so-called democratic parliamentary system of government and the recent experiences of over two years, have established beyond any doubt that it has resulted wholly in a permanent communal majority and the domination by

the Hindus over the Muslim minorities, whose life and liberty, property and honour are in danger, and even their religious rights and culture are assailed and annihilated every day under the Congress Governments in various provinces.

“ While Muslim India stands against exploitation of the people of India and has repeatedly declared in favour of ‘a free India’, it is equally opposed to domination by the Hindu majority over the Mussalmans and other minorities and vassalisation of Muslim India and is irrevocably opposed to any federal objects which must necessarily result in a majority community rule under the guise of democracy and parliamentary system of government. Such a constitution is totally unsuited to the genius of the people of the country, which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national state.”

This attack on Provincial autonomy and on majority rule was an altogether new line which was struck almost for the first time by the League. Till then the Muslim demand had always been for effective safeguards for the protection of the Muslim community's religious, cultural and other



rights; now the Muslims began to question the very basis of democracy and declared that the Western democracy in the sense of rule by majority was unsuitable. This was developed in the summer of 1940 into a demand for the separation of Muslims on the ground that they constituted an integral nation and not a minority in the Indian population.

Meanwhile, discussion on the political field continued and early in October 1939 the Viceroy called into consultation leaders of all sections of opinion in India with a view to ascertaining their wishes in the matter of constitutional reform. On the conclusion of these consultations, the Viceroy issued an exhaustive statement on Britain's war aims *vis-a-vis* India.

It gave the Muslim community the requisite assurance concerning its status in future adjustments. This is evident from the resolution passed by the Working Committee of the League which met in Delhi towards the end of October 1939. The Committee hailed the Viceroy's statement as a new charter of hope for the minorities and as a recognition of the League's right to full say in the future constitutional arrangements. From this resolution one can infer that the League found in the Viceregal declaration an acknowledgment of

the League's status as an essential factor in any political development on an all India basis.

To return to the Muslim League. As already stated the idea of Muslims being a nation gathered strength during 1939-40 in which period a number of schemes for the formation of a Muslim *bloc* of autonomous states were being mooted. For a time they were not regarded by the League seriously, but from the proceedings of the annual session of the League held in April 1940 it became clear that the Muslim League was serious about this partition business.

The Muslim community, as represented by the Muslim League, declared for Muslim independence.

The principal resolution of the session, which was carried unanimously, ran—

“ While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, as indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th of August, the 17th and 18th of September and 22nd of October, 1933, and the 3rd of February, 1940, on the constitutional issues, this session of the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the scheme of

Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.

“ It further records its emphatic view that, while the declaration dated the 18th October, 1939, made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in so far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act, 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered *de novo* and that no revised plan will be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.


“ Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims, unless it is designed on the following basic principles, namely, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'independent states' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign and that adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them, and, in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

" This session further authorises the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as Defence, External Affairs, Communications, Customs and such other matters as may be necessary."

# PLATE VI



The Eastern Districts of Punjab  
and proposed Eastern Border.



This created a stir in the country, among nationalists and Hindus alike and also among some Muslims. True, the novelty of the thing caught the Muslim imagination, but even among Muslims there were many who questioned the wisdom of the step suggested in the Lahore Resolution. Apart from destroying Indian unity which had been built up after years of strenuous effort, it was argued by many, the Lahore scheme would place the Muslim minorities in Hindu provinces in a very unenviable position.

The evolution of Muslim League thought in 1940-41 followed the lines laid down in April 1940 when the Pakistan resolution was adopted at Lahore. Percentages and weightages, proportion of representation and share in services, guarantees and safeguards— notions which had held the political field for decades—were clean swept aside. Mr. Jinnah was not thinking in terms of these trifles, outworn gadgets of a democracy held to be unsuitable to an oriental people and totally inapplicable to the peculiar conditions of India. All these devices presupposed the continuance of Muslims as members of a state, more or less secured and safeguarded, enjoying greater or less share of power, but scarcely likely as a community ever to occupy a dominant position. Mr. Jinnah refused to think of an arrangement which would

not give the Muslims equal power and authority with the majority community. He would not be party to making the Muslims subordinate to the Hindus. Being a numerical minority they as a community would perforce be the junior partners in any composite State.

As in a composite State the Muslims could not in the nature of democracy expect to be reckoned as equals with the majority community, much less as the dominant force. Mr. Jinnah went away from the idea of a composite State and proposed that India should be divided into two spheres—Muslim and Hindu. Each was to be autonomous internally and for purposes of a Central Government with minimum powers the two should collaborate as equals.

The Pakistan ideal began to exercise the Muslim mind. It provided the League and Mr. Jinnah with a new plank, gave the Muslim community a new goal, a new vista free from what was described as "the danger of Hindu Raj". Every development affecting the future of India in any way was viewed against the background of Pakistan: how will more power for the future Indian State affect the Muslims? Therefore the League claimed the right to approve or reject every proposal calculated to affect the country



and its population. The threat was put forth that "any move by the Congress to widen political power in India without the League's approval will meet with the League's resistance".

The widening gulf between the League and the Congress was carried a step further at the annual session of the League which was held in Madras amidst scenes of great enthusiasm in the middle of April 1941. Mr. Jinnah, who presided, urged the British Government to give up their policy of appeasement towards those who were bent upon frustrating the war efforts and to get on with those who wanted to get on with them.

Outlining the policy of the Muslim League, he said :

" The goal of the All-India Muslim League is that we want to establish a completely independent State in the north-west and eastern zones of India with full control on defence, foreign affairs communications, customs, currency, exchange, etc. We do not want under any circumstances a constitution of an All-India character with one Government at the Centre. We will never agree to that. If you once agree to it, let me tell you that the Muslims would be absolutely wiped out of existence. We shall never be a feudatory of

any power or of any Government at the Centre so far as our free national homelands are concerned. Muslim India will never submit to an All-India constitution and one Central Government. The ideology of the League is based on the fundamental principle that the Muslims of India are an independent nationality and that any attempt to get them to merge their national and political identity and ideology will be resisted. The policy of the League is to endeavour to promote goodwill and harmony among other peoples on the basis of equality, fair-play and reciprocity. This can be secured by agreement with other peoples and parties and states with the object of achieving collective security and orderly development of the people living in different states as well as among the different free states as members of a comity respecting each other's rights."

The most important resolution of the Madras session was that which changed the creed of the League :

" (1) The establishment of completely independent States formed by demarcating geographically contiguous units into regions which shall be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary

that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-western and Eastern zones of India shall be grouped together to constitute independent states as Muslim free national homelands in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

“(2) Adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the above-mentioned units and regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

“(3) In other parts of India where the Muslims are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.”

## **CHAPTER V**

### **The Problem of Territorial Readjustment**

Pakistan as we have seen elsewhere is intended to be the land of the pure. It may signify the pure Islamic State. In order to achieve this we must cut away all the un-Pak elements. We will then get a Pak Pakistan.

Territorial Readjustment is implicit even in the Lahore Resolution.

The very first problem therefore to be considered is the territorial limits of Pakistan.

We have already seen that the Pakistan of the Rehmat Ali Scheme is not the same as the Pakistan envisaged by Dr. Abdul Latif. Let us consider the question of territorial readjustment.

We need first to remember the broad general figures of comparative population.

According to the 1941 Census figures there is in Punjab a total population of 2,84,18,819 excluding Indian States. Of these total numbers, Muslims constitute the largest bloc with 1,62,17,742. The Sikhs are 37,57,401. Hindus 84,44,067 including scheduled castes 15,92,320. Taking the figures districtwise, Muslims are in

a majority in seventeen districts (Gujrat, Shahpur, Multan, Lyallpur, Lahore, Gurdaspur, Jhelum, Rawalpindi, Attock, Mianwali, Jhang, Montgomery, Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan, Gujranwala, Sialkot and Sheikhpura), and in a minority in twelve districts. Territorial readjustment on the basis of population, the position of the Communities in the two areas thus demarcated would be as follows :—

**North-West Punjab**

T = 16,870,909    M = 12,363,669    H = 2,833,267    S = 1,683,855  
                          = 73·3%                                = 16·7%                                = 10·%

**South-East Punjab**

T = 11,547,919    M = 3,853,593    H = 5,620,800    S = 2,073,546  
                          = 32·6%                                = 49·6%                                = 17·5%

A division on these lines would be in accordance with the formula propounded by Mr. C. Rajagopalachariar.

But these figures convey only an imperfect idea of the situation. The table on page 116 shows community-wise the population of the areas of those districts of the Punjab in which the Muslims are in a minority as against non-Muslims.

From the figures it will be seen that the total Sikh population in the Punjab (British territory) is mostly concentrated in the central districts.

The same table also demonstrates :

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

1. The Sikhs constitute the strongest single group in the Ludhiana district, in tahsil Phillaur of district Jullundur, tahsil Moga of district Ferozepore, tahsil Tarn Taran of district Amritsar.

2. In tahsil Nawanshahr, district Jullundur; tahsil Muktsar, district Ferozepore; tahsil Amritsar, district Amritsar and tahsil Gurdaspur, district Gurdaspur, the Muslims form the strongest single group and

3. In tahsils Garhshankar and Una of district Hoshiarpur, the Hindus are the strongest single group.

4. The Muslims are in a minority in four districts.

If tahsils Una and Garhshankar of district Hoshiarpur were to be excluded from the Punjab in order that the Hindus of these tahsils may "not be subjected to the hardship of living with others of a different religion and of different language" as Mr. Nanak Chand Pandit put it, during the Round Table Conferences held in England, it will be in ten tahsils of the province that the Hindus and Sikhs combined will exceed in numbers the Muslims. On a plebiscite in these areas, Pakistan will certainly be deprived of them, valuable as they are agriculturally and economically.

As regards the rest of the province the

Muslims are far larger in numbers than the Sikhs and Hindus combined, and accordingly by the rule of numbers, Pakistan would not be coextant with the Punjab as we now know it, but only with a Punjab where Muslims are in a majority.

The geographical situation of the Sikh areas in the Punjab is such that they cannot be easily excluded from it as would have been possible if they had been all located to one side, like the Ambala Division or the Kangra district.

Moreover, their exclusion cannot be effected without sacrificing a large number of Muslims who are in majority in most of the areas of the central Punjab even against the combined population strength of the Hindus and Sikhs. Then there are districts where the Sikhs, although small in number against the Muslims compared to their own population in other districts, are sufficiently strong. For example Lahore, with a Sikh population of 2,44,304 as against 8,15,820 Muslims; Sheikhupura with 1,19,477 Sikhs as against 4,45,996 Muslims; Sialkot with Sikh population of 94,955 and a Muslim population of 6,09,638 and Lyallpur with 2,11,391 Sikhs and 7,20,996 Muslims. Exclusion of the definitely Sikh areas of the Central Punjab will be inevitable. In no case will the Sikhs agree to fragmentation of their community by the exclusion of the more

definitely Sikh areas from the Punjab. They may agree to an exclusion of their tracts with an exchange of population, and, on conditions that they may be concentrated around Amritsar and that all the towns where there are prominent Sikh shrines may be declared as cosmopolitan areas. This they will do in the interests of having a strong minority in the new province to which their areas will be joined and securing their religious rights, etc.

But, can Pakistanis ever agree to any such proposal, namely, the exclusion of the central districts from the Punjab? Most of the Muslim *intelligentsia* is concentrated here; trade and commerce of the province is also centred here; further the soil of these districts is the best in the whole of the Indus Regions. If these are excluded, Pakistan will be a federation of the sandy tracts of Bahawalpur and Khairpur States, the barren and rocky hills of the Rawalpindi Division, the sunbaked stretches of the Multan Division, already water-logged, and the sand dunes of Baluchistan and Sind.

And giving any other areas to appease the Sikh minority, however fertile, will not be agreed to by them. All their holy shrines and temples are in the Punjab. They originated here and



their religious and martial traditions were also built here. All these factors bind them to the soil of the Punjab. They cannot go anywhere else. This is their homeland even if it is not that of the Qaid-i-Azam.

**Table showing areas in which the Muslims are in a Minority.**

District.	Tahsil.	Area in sq. miles.	Hindus.	Sikhs.	Muslims.	Total population.
Hoshiarpur ...	{ Garhshankar	511	92,724	60,224	59,956	2,12,904
	{ Una	690	1,69,940	22,633	33,163	2,25,736
	Total ...	1,201	2,62,664	82,857	93,119	4,38,640
Ludhiana ...	{ Ludhiana	686	44,752	1,47,252	1,22,696	3,14,700
	{ Jagraon	419	17,267	1,06,539	70,760	1,94,566
	{ Samrala	291	21,407	59,038	42,234	1,22,679
	Total ...	1,396	83,426	3,12,829	2,35,690	6,31,945
Jullundur ...	{ Nawanshahr	299	41,166	62,592	63,318	1,67,076
	{ Phillaur	289	27,823	68,199	63,050	1,59,072
	Total ...	588	68,989	1,30,791	1,26,368	3,26,148
Ferozepore ...	{ Moga	625	19,124	1,44,606	52,930	2,16,660
	{ Muktsar	934	23,772	90,814	94,980	2,09,566
	Total ...	1,559	42,896	2,35,420	1,47,910	4,26,226
Amritsar ...	{ Amritsar	546	1,13,892	1,83,198	2,75,825	5,72,915
	{ Tarn Taran	597	17,677	1,61,173	1,30,682	3,09,532
	Total ...	1,143	1,31,569	3,44,371	4,06,507	8,82,447
Gurdaspur ...	Gurdaspur ...	497	41,088	62,415	98,778	2,02,281
	Total ...	497	41,088	62,415	98,778	2,02,281
	Grand Total ...	6,384	6,30,632	11,68,683	11,08,372	29,07,687

## CHAPTER VI

### **The Problem of Khalistan**

But the foregoing table is only a faint indication of the problem involved. A separation of the Ambala Division from Punjab would mean the division of Sikhs of the Punjab into two provinces. Are the Sikhs willing to be so divided ?

It is true that the Sikhs are a bare minority. Even in Punjab they are hardly more than 15% of the total population. But they are a virile community and their wishes cannot be lightly ignored.

The Sikhs have been a powerful factor in the politics of the Punjab. Since the annexation of their empire with British India, they have played a most noteworthy part in the making of the Punjab of today, and have made contributions towards the defence of India, and towards its economic and political life, which are out of all proportion to their numerical strength. They claim to be the best agriculturists and colonists in India. They have more than seven hundred *gurdwaras* in the Punjab, with rich endowments

and undying memories of their *Gurus*, saints and martyrs attached to them. They have set up, and are financing, over four hundred educational institutions, colleges, schools, girls seminaries and technical establishments. They own the best and the most fertile lands of the province, and contribute more than 40% of the provincial revenue. Their political importance has always been recognised. During the working of the Montford Reforms, one of the Executive Councillors always used to be a Sikh, and from 1926, when an additional Muslim member was added, till 1937, the Sikhs retained 25% representation in the Provincial Cabinet. Even when the Unionist Ministry had been formed, it was not considered as strongly entrenched as long as Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan had not entered into a pact with the Akali leader, *Sardar* Baldev Singh.

The Sikhs to the last man are opposed to Pakistan. They have refused to agree to the Muslim claim that Punjab is a Muslim Province. They challenge it on the ground that non-Muslims own in Punjab more than eighty per cent of the urban property and pay more than eighty per cent of the Income-tax and Urban Property Tax, an overwhelmingly major proportion of the industrial enterprises, mills, the insurance companies, the film industry

and business, shop-keeping, trade and commerce is in non-Muslim hands, and the cultural life of the Province is primarily created and determined by impulses coming from non-Muslim sources. They were the first to raise the battle-cry against Pakistan. The Sikh All-India Committee was the first to reject the Cripps proposals, on the ground that they had given the option of non-adherence to an All-India Union to majorities in the provinces. "We shall resist," they announced, "by all possible means separation of the Punjab from an All-India Union." As the Sikh leaders pointed out in their memorandum to the Conciliation Committee, the Sikhs are irrevocably opposed to a partition of India on a communal basis. They consider the demand to be unnatural, reactionary and in opposition to the best interests of India, as well as of the portions and regions sought to be partitioned off. They see in it the death warrant of the future of the Sikh community as a whole, and are prepared to fight to a man against it.

The Sikh opposition to Pakistan cannot be lightly brushed aside. If Pakistan comes into existence in spite of the Sikh opposition, a homeland for the Sikhs, a Khalistan would have to be created in the Punjab. The Sikhs have at least as strong a claim for such a homeland as the Muslims. They have their own list of

grievances against the Muslim rule in the Punjab, which is in no case less imposing than the list of the Muslim grievances against the Congress rule. Their main complaint against the Act of 1935 is that by giving them 33 seats in a House of 175 in the Punjab, 3 seats in a House of 50 in the N.-W.F.P. and 6 seats in a House of 250 in the Federal Legislature, it has reduced them to complete ineffectiveness in all spheres of the political life of the country. The Muslims who formed about 13% of the population in the U.P., as the Sikhs did in the Punjab, have been given 35% seats in the U. P., whereas the Sikhs had been given only 19% in the Punjab. But their greatest complaint is against the working of the Provincial Autonomy in their Province. Their proportion in the Executive Government has been reduced. All the key-posts that fell vacated or were vacated, became the monopoly of the Muslims—the Sikhs had been designedly excluded from effective participation in the administrative machinery. The Unionist Ministry had done everything in its power to thwart the work of Sikh educational institutions by reducing the Government grants-in-aid in some, and by refusing to recognise others, for the purpose of such grants-in-aid. Again, Punjabi was admittedly the spoken language and the mother-tongue of

the Sikhs, Hindus and the Muslims in the Province, and yet the administrative work of the Government was conducted in Urdu, written in Persian script, and Urdu had been enforced as the medium of instruction even at the primary stage. The Unionist Ministry had done everything in its power to thwart the teaching of *Punjabi* even if carried on solely or primarily by private enterprise. The Unionists had done everything in their power to degrade and demoralise the Sikhs by interfering in the practice of their religion arbitrarily and merely with a view to make them feel that they were a subject and subjugated people in their own homeland. By executive acts, they had stopped the preparation and use of *jhatka* in Government and semi-Government institutions. In fact, they alleged, the whole Government machinery under the Muslim majority rule was biased in favour of the Muslims and against the non-Muslims. A planned and sustained policy of discriminating against, and brow-beating, Sikh officials in the Government services had become an undisguised feature of the autonomy regime in the Punjab. All this had resulted in the deterioration in the status and integrity of the public service, thus creating a state of affairs in which the elementary rights of neither the non-Muslim public nor the

public services were safe.

The Sikh claim of nationhood also is not less strong than the Muslims who claim Punjab as their homeland. "I place my claim," wrote Master Tara Singh, "upon the fact that the Punjab is not a Muslim Province. I do not even admit that the Muslims are in majority in population." "Punjab history," he further wrote, "is the Sikh history. It is the birth-place of the Sikh religion and the Sikh gurus. Most, if not all, of the Punjab martyrs are Sikh martyrs. The Sikhs are the only people who take pride in Punjab culture and language . . . A Muslim poet will sing of Mecca and Medina, a Hindu poet will sing of Ganga and Benares, but it is the Sikh poet who sings of the Ravi and Chenab. The Sikhs alone are true Punjabis." On a less responsible plane, the All-India Sikh Students' Federation, Lahore, could express itself even more strongly :

"If there is a separate nation in India, it is the Sikhs. They are unique in the world, they have a common appellation suffixed to their names—at once both a sign of their homogeneity and exclusiveness. Alone in the world, they wear sword as a religious injunction and an article of faith. Alone in the world, they have a script which is exclusively



their own. Alone in the world, they throw the challenge of solidarity even in matters of dress and appearance . . . Internally, we are a compact, well-knit and disciplined people. We have our own ceremonials, we have our own seat of authority, *Sri Akal Takht Sahib* . . . By all tests, we are a separate nation, with our ideology of life."

Ideas sometimes grow with terrible rapidity. If the idea of Pakistan, originating in the minds of some irresponsible Cambridge youths could take to its present dimensions, the idea of Khalistan also can become equally powerful. If Pakistan finds its goal, Khalistan cannot be far behind.

But apart from the opposition of the Sikhs, let us try to find answer for the question whether Punjab can at all be partitioned. If the Sikhs do not agree to Pakistan, and one can be sure that they would never agree, then the only alternative would be to concede a homeland in Punjab to the Sikhs also. That would mean a partition of the Punjab, but is a partition of the Punjab practicable? The idea of a partition of Punjab is not new. Sir Geoffrey Corbett had placed it before the Round Table Conference. It was discussed in October 1942 by a number of Hindu and Sikh leaders at Delhi. It may be suggested

at first that if a dividing line is drawn from north to south right across the Lahore Division, it would place the Divisions with overwhelmingly Muslim majority, Rawalpindi and Multan, on the west and the Divisions with overwhelmingly non-Muslim population, *viz.*, Ambala and Jullundur, on the east, and that it would also be a fair distribution of the Muslim majority and the non-Muslim majority districts of the Lahore Division between the two parts.

But it is much easier to draw a line on the map than lay down the frontier posts. To which of the two parts of the Punjab would Lahore belong? If we draw the dividing line east of Lahore we shall be placing Lahore and Amritsar into different areas. Can a proper frontier line be drawn anywhere between Lahore and Amritsar? A look at the physical map of the Punjab will be enough to point out that there is no natural line of demarcation anywhere in this area. If an artificial line is drawn this will be so unnatural as to cut up even the canal system of the area into two parts. In fact, the Punjab is deeply united by a number of ties, regional, economic, communal, lingual, educational and cultural, the whole thing gathered up in a long tradition of administrative unity. Moreover, we have to keep this fact in mind that

we have to draw a line not between two provinces but between two states, the State of Khalistan and the State of Pakistan, which might very well be on fighting terms in the future.

It is not likely that the Sikhs are going to agree to any reasonable settlement. Their attitude over the Shahidgunj Mosque, was an indication of their mentality. If they would not part with a disused and dilapidated mosque, they are unlikely to surrender the most fertile tracts of the province to the Lahore Government (or is it to be the Rawalpindi Government ?).

The attitude of the Sikh community towards separation was emphatically expressed to the Sapru Committee in a memorandum signed by twenty top representatives of the community. This is a document that cannot be ignored :

“ The position of the Sikhs in India is so unique that it is impossible to find even a distant parallel to it. They are six million in population, out of whom over four million live in British India. Thus on a population basis, they constitute the third largest community in British India, the other two being Hindus and Muslims. But their political, historic and economic importance is out of all proportion to their numbers.

“The rise of Sikhism was coeval with the emergence of the Moghul power in India in the fifteenth century, till by the end of the seventeenth century, after having tried all peaceful and legitimate means of persuading the aggressive Muslim conquerors to let them and the Hindus live a life consistent with their self-respect and dignity, they constituted themselves into a military and militant organisation called the *Khalsa*. Throughout the eighteenth century, they faced a relentless war of extermination and faced it so well and heroically that it is impossible to find a comparison in the whole history of mankind, where a weak and oppressed people resolutely stood in dignified protest against the greatest Empire of the time and carried the torch of resistance and revolution from generation to generation till by their matchless sacrifices and superhuman determination they emerged as the foremost political power in Northern India. The Empire they built was destroyed by the diplomacy of the British added by the fatality of circumstances, in the middle of the nineteenth century, but even their worst enemies will not assert that the Sikhs surrendered abjectly to the British or laid down arms without a struggle.

“ Since the annexation of the Sikh empire with British India, the Sikhs have played a most noteworthy part in the making of the Punjab of today, and have made contributions towards the defence of India, and towards its economic and political life, which are out of all proportion to their small numerical strength, but which are in keeping with their historic role in the political and cultural life of India.

“ The Note prepared by S. Harnam Singh, M.A., B.Sc., LL.B., Advocate, under the title ‘ *Homeland of the Sikhs* ’ may be treated as part of this memorandum. The facts and figures on this point are so clear and overwhelming that nothing but sheer audacity can account for any claim to the contrary, including the facetious claim that the Punjab is a Muslim Province, or that it comprises one of the homelands of the Muslims. The Sikhs have more than seven hundred historic Gurdwaras in the Punjab with rich endowments, and undying memories of their Gurus, saints and martyrs attached to them. The Sikhs have set up and are financing over 400 educational institutions, colleges, schools, girls’ seminaries and technical establishments, thus making a contribution towards the

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

educational progress of the Province out of all proportion to their numerical strength and far in excess of any such contribution made by other communities, particularly the Muslims. The policy of, and the atmosphere prevailing in, these institutions are more liberal and non-communal than in any similar institution run by other communities."

The major heads of the Provincial Receipts are land revenue, excise, stamps and water rates, which in themselves constitute seventy-six per cent of the total revenues. Of these, it can be asserted, the Sikhs contribute more than forty per cent. One has only to refer to the difficulties experienced in the early colonisation days and see how the Colonisation Officers are full of praises for Sikh Colonists. By sheer dint of hard work, the Sikhs have not only made barren and waste lands fertile but also have created an insatiable desire amongst Punjabis for canal irrigated land which has incidentally raised the price of land. The Sikhs own the best and most fertile lands of the Province, the fertility of which is not so much the result of accident as the result of sustained labours of the Sikh cultivators themselves.

The claim put forward by the Sikhs to the

**Cabinet Mission** was a Sikh state extending from the Chenab to the Sutlej, subject to modifications. It would, however, be difficult to resist the claim to a line between Lahore and Amritsar, Lahore being the seat of Pakistan, and Amritsar the seat of Khalistan.

This matter on examination leads to the following conclusions :

In the twelve tahsil areas shown in the table at page 115 the Sikhs and Hindus combined are in excess of the Muslims. In order to let the Sikhs have Amritsar, their religious centre, as also some other prominent towns, wherein are situated important Sikh shrines, and also in view of the concentrated Sikh population consideration, these tahsil areas will have to be excluded from Pakistan. These tahsil areas along with the Sikh states of Phulkian, etc., will give to the Sikhs a cultural home. The boundary line between the Muslim Punjab and the adjoining non-Muslim cultural region comprising the twelve tahsils shown in the table, the Sikh states, the Kangra district and the Ambala Division, will run as shown in the map (Plate IV). We have not touched upon the question as to whether these areas after their exclusion from the Punjab should form part of Hindustan or constitute a separate sovereign

state. That would need a book on Khalistan, its pros and cons. We are at present concerned with Pakistan and its consequences, of which Khalistan is the very first.

The total area thus excluded from the Punjab (British as well as States) will be 38,878 sq. miles and the Punjab without these areas will comprise only 74,328 sq. miles.

The community-wise population of these areas is—Hindus 46,54,962, Sikhs 23,58,351 and the Muslims 29,24,408. After their exclusion from the Punjab the community-wise population of the province will be as follows :—

Hindus	23,24,172
Sikhs	16,64,557
Muslims	1,11,05,093
Others about	7,00,000

Total ... 1,57,93,822

In case a purely Muslim Pakistan is considered desirable, exchange of population between the Punjab, as constituted after the exclusion of the said areas, and the same Hindu and Sikh areas will extend to 29,24,408 Muslims of the latter areas and 39,88,729 Hindus and Sikhs living in the former. In other words exchange of population will involve about 69,13,137 people and their property. And in case exchange of population



is not effected between them, the population percentage of each community in the Punjab will be—Muslims about 70.31 per cent, Hindus 14.71 per cent and Sikhs 10.53 per cent.

Now if we compare these population percentages of the communities with those which will prevail in the case of keeping the ten tahsils other than Una and Garhshankar of Hoshiarpur district (as shown in the table) within Pakistan, we find that the results achieved by their exclusion along the Ambala Division, etc., is not very substantial and will not affect the communal problem materially.

Of course, it is up to Mr. Jinnah to concede the Sikh demand, as it is up to Master Tara Singh to waive it. Mr. Jinnah visualises a sovereign Islamic State. Master Tara Singh visualises a sovereign state of the Khalsa. Both may be right and justified, but history and Providence have placed Muslims and Sikhs in such a position that argument alone cannot solve differences which are irreconcilable. When matters come to such a pass, war is the only right and complete arbiter.

The boundaries of Pakistan must be settled by war.

But now we are anticipating another of the consequences of Pakistan.

## CHAPTER VII

### The Loss of Osmanistan

Osmanistan, it is contended by Pakistan protagonists is a "part of our patrimony, and as such, her future is inseparably bound up with the *Millat*."

The basis of this claim is the following argument :

"At the very outset of this discussion it is advisable to state the pivotal fact that we derive our right to Osmanistan from those canons of International law from which other nations deduce their claims to their domains ; that this right includes her *de jure* sovereignty which is solemnly acknowledged in the treaties originally entered into between the British Government and the 'Ala Hazrat of Osmanistan,' the 'Faithful Ally' ; this status is unique in the sub-continent, in that no other state enjoys it, in the same sense and to the same extent, as does Osmanistan."

True it is only the Rehmat Ali Pakistan that

takes account of Osmanistan. Mr. Jinnah is discreetly silent. He perhaps hopes to trade the Nizam Dominions over to Hindustan in return for 50,000 Gurkha rifles. Rehmat Ali, however, is distressed at the peril in which Osmanistan would be placed in the midst of a powerful and hostile Hindustan. Accordingly, Rehmat Ali pleads for the defence of Osmanistan :

“ It must, therefore, be stated plainly that if, in the bedevilled circumstances of today, Osmanistan is to be saved, the Osmanistanis must start an organisation to work for the *de facto* recognition of her *de jure* sovereignty by the British as well as by presumptive heirs, the Hindus, both of whom profess to be most devoted supporters of the sanctity of international treaties.

“ This is the only way to safeguard Osmanistan and along it lies the greatest opportunity for Osmanistan. But the time to seize it is now because, once gone, it may never occur again. May they grasp it at once and turn it to their own good and to the greater good of Osmanistan.”

Neither of these arguments appear to be sound. If the basis for the preservation of Osmanistan, namely, the Dominion of His Exalted

Highness is (a) the patrimony of the Millat, (b) the sanctity of treaties, what about Kashmir, the very heart of Pakistan itself? On the same argument it could be said that Kashmir is the patrimony of the Dogras and the sanctity of treaties requires the maintenance of the dynasty of Gulab Singh.

Read this :

Is this not an equally " sacred " undertaking ?

" In consideration of the services rendered by Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu and Kashmir State, towards procuring the restoration of the relations of amity between the Lahore and the British Government, the Maharaja (Dalip Singh) hereby agrees to recognize the independent sovereignty of Raja Gulab Singh in such territories and districts in the hills as may be made over to the said Raja Gulab Singh by separate agreement between himself and the British Government with dependencies, thereof, which may have been in Raja's possession since the time of Maharaja Kharak Singh and the British Government in consideration of the good conduct of Raja Gulab Singh also agrees to recognize his independence in such territories and to admit him to the privilege of a separate treaty

with the British Government.” (Clause 12 of the *Treaty of Amritsar*).

Can the British transfer the sovereignty of the Dogras to the suzerainty of the *Qaid-i-Azam*?

There is, however, one alternative :

*Maharaja* Hari Singh should become *Maharaja of Hyderabad* and Sir Osman Ali Khan, *Nizam of Kashmir*.

Offhand, the bargain may seem quite a satisfactory one.

But ask His Exalted Highness.

The net result of Pakistan must sooner or later mean two things—the liquidation of Osmanistan and war with the Dogras of Kashmir.

## CHAPTER VIII

### **The Problem of Pakistan Frontiers**

Not the least of the problems that beset the question of Pakistan is that of its international frontiers.

The North-West Frontiers of Pakistan, if they should coincide with the present North-West Frontier of India would involve a line approximately 2,000 miles in length commencing at a point on the Persian Gulf some 300 miles from the port of Karachi to the Pamir uplands. Persia, Afghanistan and Russia would all be the immediate neighbours of Pakistan

The Western Frontier of India can, therefore, be divided into four main groups :

1. *Baluchistan.*
2. *Waziristan.*
3. *The North-West Frontier.*
4. *The Coastal Frontier.*

In order to visualise some of the problems that confront Pakistani statesmen as to these

PLATE VII







frontiers, it will be necessary to have some idea of their ethnological and historical backgrounds. Co-related with the question of the Western Frontier is the long stretch of coast bordering the Arabian Sea, about 300 miles in length. This may be classified and considered as the fourth group.

### BALUCHISTAN

Baluchistan is almost wholly mountainous and covers a great belt of ranges connecting the *Sufed Koh* with the hill system of Southern Persia. It thus forms a watershed the drainage of which enters the Indus on the east and the Arabian Sea on the south, while on the north and west it makes its way to the inland lakes which form so large a feature of Central Asia. Rugged, barren, sun-burnt mountains, rent by high chasms and gorges, alternate with arid deserts and stony plains, the prevailing colour of which is a monotonous sight. But this is redeemed in places by level valleys of considerable size in which irrigation enables much cultivation to be carried on and rich crops of all kinds to be raised.

The political connection of the British Government with Baluchistan dates from the outbreak of the First Afghan War in 1839. It was traversed by the army of the Indus and was after-

wards occupied until 1842 to protect the British lines of communication. The districts of Karachi, Quetta and Mastung were handed over to the Amir of Afghanistan and Political officers were appointed to administer the country. At the close of the First Afghan War, the British withdrew and these districts were assigned to the Khan of Kalat.

The founder of the Baluchistan Province, as it now exists, was Sir Robert Sandeman who broke down the close border system and welded the *Baluch* and *Brahui* Chiefs into a close confederacy. In the Afghan War of 1879, Pishin, Shorarud, Sibi, Zawara Valley and Thal Chotiali were handed over by Yakub Khan to the British Government and retained at Sir Robert Sandeman's strenuous insistence.

The political feature of Baluchistan is that of an oblong stretch of country occupying the extreme western corner of India. It is divided into three main divisions :

- (1) British Baluchistan proper.
- (2) Agency territories.
- (3) The State of Kalat.

(1) British Baluchistan has an area of 9,476 square miles consisting of tracts assigned to the

British Government by the treaty of 1879 with Afghanistan.

(2) The Agency Territories have an area of 44,345 square miles and comprise tracts which have, from time to time, been acquired by lease or otherwise and have been brought under control and placed directly under British officers.

(3) The Native States of Kalat and Las Bela have an area of 80,410 square miles and are ruled by the *Khan* of Kalat.

The province embraces in all an area of 1,34,638 square miles and according to the census of 1941 contains nearly a million inhabitants.

From the above facts, it will be clear that Baluchistan was once a part of Afghanistan and was wrested by the force of British arms.

The effect of British policy has been to cramp Afghanistan into the high lands of the *Hindu Kush* and to concentrate in Baluchistan some of the most formidable out-posts of the Empire.

Through Baluchistan, Afghanistan had access to the sea.

There can be little doubt that Afghanistan has not yet forgotten, that Baluchistan not so long ago was a part of its domains—hardly less than three quarters of a century ago! If

Afghanistan has not the audacity to demand its return from the British Government, it will not have the same hesitation in demanding restoration from a Pakistan Cabinet.

The *Qaid-i Azam* or his successor in office would then be faced with the unenviable alternative of war with Afghanistan or ignominious surrender of the Baluchistan Province.

### WAZIRISTAN

In Waziristan we have the real frontier problems of the day.

Geographically, Waziristan is a rough parallelogram averaging 60 miles from east to west and 160 from north to south. The eastern half consists of the *Suleiman Range* gradually rising up to a ridge from five to ten thousand feet high, which forms the watershed between the Indus and the Helmund Rivers and corresponds with the Durand Line separating India from Afghanistan. This is the western boundary. On the east is the Indus. North is the watershed of the Kurram River running east and west about 30 miles north of Bannu separating Waziristan from the Kohat district. In the South is a zigzag political boundary from the Durand Line running between Wana and Fort Sandeman

in Baluchistan with a turn southwards to the Indus.

The western half is a rugged and inhospitable medley of ridges and ravines straggled and confused in hopeless disarray. The more inhabited portions lie well up the slope at heights of four to six thousand feet. Here are the outposts of Wana and Ladha some 15 and 20 miles, respectively from the Durand Line. In the centre of the grazing district, the latter within five miles, of important villages of Kaniguram and Makin.

The submontane tracts from the hills to the Indus vary from the highly cultivated and irrigated land round Bannu to the sand desert in the Marwat above Pezu.

Where irrigation or river water is obtainable cultivation is attempted under conditions which can hardly be encouraging. Other tracts like that between Pezu and Tank, usually pastoral, can only hope for an occasional crop after a lucky rainfall.

The inhabitants of these tracts are unable to support their existence from the soil which is poor and have to make up the margin by armed robbery of their richer and more peaceful neighbours.

The name *Waziri* originates, according to tradition, from one *Wazir*, two of whose grandsons were the actual founders of the race. Of the four main tribes *Darweshkhel*, *Mahsuds*, *Dawars* and *Batanni*, only the first two are true Waziris. Their villages are separate though dotted about more or less indiscriminately and inter-marriage is the exception—in fact all traditionally are in open strife, a circumstance which, until some political event like the Afghan War of 1919, joined them together has materially aided British dealings with them.

Unlike other parts of India, however, these wild people acknowledge little allegiance to *Maliks* or headmen. No one except perhaps the *Mulla Powindah*, till his death to 1913, could speak of any portion of them as his following.

The policy of the British was at first one of non-interference with the tribes. Even now only part of the country is administered. Gradually it was found, however, that more and more supervision was necessary so as to control raiding. This has been done by expeditions into portions of the country by the Regular Army, and by building posts and brick towers at various places manned by local Militia.

These posts were placed at the points where

raiders usually debouched. Political officers, supported by the Army, built up from 1904 onwards a force of some 3,000 Militia with British officers at their head who were backed up by the garrisons at Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. In addition certain allowances were made to the tribes for good behaviour, prevention of raids and surrender of offenders when required; also for tribal escorts as were necessary. Gradually, as occasion required, these posts were occupied. Wana was occupied in 1895 at the request of the *Wana Waziris*. Similarly the *Tochi* in 1896. In the comprehensive expedition of 1895-96 when this policy was put into effect, British arms were shown in every remote valley in the vain hope of taming the Mahsuds. It was hoped the various posts would prove a pacifying influence and rallying ground for Government supporters. From 1904 to 1919 they were held by the Militia. Roads and communications were improved and tribal allowances augmented by sales of produce to the troops on a liberal scale . . .

A full statement of the policy finally adopted by Government in view of the situation left upon their hands after the Mahsud rebellion was made by the Foreign Secretary. Sir (then Mr.) Denys Bray, in the course of a budget discussion in the

Legislative Assembly on 5th March 1923, outlined neither a Forward policy nor a Close Border policy. Both these terms had, in fact, ceased to be appropriate. Circumstances had so changed that neither the one plan nor the other remained within the bounds of reasonable argument.

The Foreign Secretary explained that the ingredients of the Frontier problem at the present day are essentially three, namely,

- (i) the Frontier districts,
- (ii) the neighbouring friendly State of Afghanistan, and
- (iii) the so-called Independent Territory, this last being the belt of unsettled mountain country which lies between the borders of British India and India. He proceeded specially to show that this belt is, in fact, within India. . .

“ Its boundary pillars mark off Waziristan from Afghanistan; its boundary pillars include Waziristan in India. We are apt to call Waziristan independent territory; and it is only from the point of view of our British district that the tribes are trans-frontier tribes. From the point of view of India, from the international point of view that is, they are cis-frontier tribesmen of India. If



Waziristan and her tribes are India's scourge, they are also India's responsibility—and India's alone. That is an international fact that we must never forget."

Sir Denys next referred to the triumph of the Sandeman policy in Baluchistan. He pointed out that some people long ago believed that the same policy would prove effective in Waziristan.

"But what was a practical proposition, 20 or 30 years ago, is not necessarily so now. The task is infinitely more difficult today, chiefly because the tribesmen are infinitely better armed; their arms having increased at least tenfold during the last 20 years." Dealing with the Close Border prescription he showed that if one erected a Chinese Wall of barbed-wire fence along the plain some distance below the hills, "all the time the problem in front of us would be going from bad to worse, with the inevitable increase of arms in the trans-border and with that inevitable increase, in the economic stringency in this mountainous tract, which would make the tribesmen more and more desperate, more and more thrown back on barbarism.... A rigid Close Border policy is really a policy of negation, and nothing more...

We might gain for our districts a momentary respite from raids but we would be leaving behind a legacy of infinitely worse trouble for their descendants."

The settled policy of Government in Waziristan, Sir Denys showed, was the control of that country through a road system, of which about 140 miles would lie in Waziristan itself and one hundred miles along the border of Derajat, and the maintenance of some 4,600 *Khassadars* and of some 5,000 irregulars, while at Razmak, 7,000 feet high and overlooking northern Waziristan, there would be an advanced base occupied by a strong garrison of regular troops. Razmak, he showed to be further from the Durand Line than the old-established posts in the Tochi. In the geographical sense, therefore, the policy was, in one signal respect, a backward policy. None the less, it was a forward policy in a very real sense, for it was a policy of constructive progress and was a big step forward on the long and laborious road towards the pacification, through civilization, of the most backward and inaccessible, and therefore the most truculent and aggressive tribes on the border.

"Come what may, civilization must be made to penetrate these inaccessible mountains.

or we must admit that there is no solution to the Waziristan problem and we must fold our hands while it grows inevitably worse."

The policy thus initiated for a period proceeded with results according to the highest reasonable expectations and exceeding that most sanguine hopes of most people concerned in its formulation.

In 1932, during the Red Shirt rising in the Peshawar area, the *Upper Mohmands* decided to join in the disturbances and raids followed in the administered territory immediately northward of Peshawar. The *Lower Mohmands* are described as Assured Tribes. The meaning of the description is that the British Indian authorities assure them protection against the attacks of the Upper Mohmands and they, on the other hand, are bound by promises of good behaviour. The Assured Tribes in 1933 interfered with the programme of the *Upper Mohmands* for raiding the plain and the *Upper Mohmands* in 1933, when spring and early summer once facilitated their methods of campaigning, commenced retributory raids upon the *Halimzai* and other Assured clans. The attacked clans appealed to the political authorities for help and that help they were obliged to give.

The Upper Mohmands made another descent in the summer of 1935. The Lower Mohmands quarrelled among themselves over the distribution of road maintenance contracts and the Upper Mohmands decided to fish in the troubled waters. Successful military operation ended in the Upper Mohmands suing for peace—and in the *Ghalanai* road being carried forward over the *Nahakki* Pass and down beyond it on to the Main which extends to the natural road junction where the Upper *Bajaur* Valley meets the Upper Mohmand country.

Not until the fall of winter towards the end of 1937 were the *Tori Khel* and the bands of irreconcilables under daring leaders whom the *Faqir* of Ipi inspired by his agitation, beaten by extensive military operations into asking for peace. The *Faqir* was never caught and continued a troublesome influence.

The summer campaign in 1937 involved the employment of 50,000 troops. Before they were withdrawn in the following winter 106 miles of new roads opening up some of the hitherto inaccessible country in and about the upper reaches of the *Shaktu* River were made. The *Faqir*, however, assisted by several notorious 'outlaws' continued to keep Waziristan, particu-

larly in the north, in a disturbed condition throughout 1938 and on into 1939. It was, therefore, found necessary to keep an extra brigade in the territory and spasmodic operations against recalcitrant gangs proceeded by land and air. This did not have much success in restoring normal conditions. In the summer of 1938 a temporary complication was provided by the appearance amongst the Mahsuds of a Syrian called the Shami Pir who was only just prevented from leading a tribal incursion to support a rebellion against the Government of Kabul. The persistence and expanse of the trouble in Waziristan, constituting as it does a heavy setback to the "policy" had seemed for fifteen years to be achieving material results.

This has provoked renewed discussion of Frontier policy especially in regard to military commitments which were examined by a Defence Committee, under the chairmanship of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, when it visited India on behalf of His Majesty's Government towards the end of 1938.

Although hostile sections still persisted with mischief there was thought by April 1939 to be sufficient justification for the hope that the period of major military operation was over and

Waziristan was in consequence returned to the charge of His Excellency the Governor of the N.-W. F. P. in his capacity as A. G. G. for the Tribal areas.

In these tribal areas the King's Writ does not run. It is unlikely that the Writ of the *Qaid-i-Azam* will command any more respect.

The tribes are at present kept from coalescing for war by a policy in which the revenues of India play a large and important part. An equally important part will have to be played by Pakistan revenues if the very large and vigorous tribes of these territories are to be kept in good humour. The *Waziri* is as earnest and sincere a Muslim as there is any in the world, but the sovereign state of Pakistan will mean little to him unless it brings food and raiment for himself and his family. He will get this from Pakistan either directly or in the shape of subventions from the Lahore treasury, or in payment for roads of dubious utility.

Pakistan will have to foot this bill or the *Waziri* will grow his crops on the estates of Sir Firoz Khan Noon.

### THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

The questions relating to the Frontier Province, the Durand Line and the Tribal Belt

have been more or less a sealed book. The Political Department has never permitted anything but the barest details to filtrate out to public opinion.

It was round-about 1930 that the stirring of a new life became evident in the N.-W. F. P. and the veil of mystery began to lift. With the advent of reforms in 1932, the people's point of view saw the light of day for the first time.

The North-West Frontier Province extends from the *Suleiman* Mountains and the Gomal Pass in the south, to Chitral and the Pamirs in the north. The British Tribal Belt covers the area between the administrative boundary, that is, the foothills and the Durand Line as far as Kashmir. Thereafter the Kashmir State takes over as the eastern boundary. The Tribal Belt covers an area of 24,986 sq. miles, with an estimated population of 23,77,599. The area of the settled districts is 14,263 sq. miles and the population 30,38,067. These figures are from the latest census report of 1941. According to these figures the total population of the province and the Tribal Belt is 54,15,666. The figures for the Tribal area cannot however be regarded as very accurate nor exhaustive. Some estimates place the population of the Tribal Belt alone at about three and a half million.

The N.-W. F. P. and its Agencies therefore form an irregular strip of country lying north-east by south-west between the parallels of 31·4 and 36·57 North latitude, and 69·16 and 74·7 East longitude; its extreme length is 408 miles and extreme breadth 279 miles. On the north it is shut off from the Pamirs by the Hindu Kush Mountains. On the south it is bounded by Baluchistan and the Dera Ghazi Khan district, on the east by Kashmir State and the Punjab and on the West by Afghanistan. The cultivable area of the Province is 67·5 per cent, but the net cultivated area is only 39·2 per cent.

The bulk of this land is covered by mountains with narrow valleys in between. The plains extend between the Indus and the foothills on the west and cover the Peshawar, Mardan, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan districts, and the *cis*-Indus plain of Haripur. Of these the Peshawar, Mardan, Haripur and Bannu plains are extremely fertile. The valleys beyond the foothills are watered by springs, or else by hill streams. Some of these valleys, like the Kurram and the Swat, are extremely beautiful and fertile with green paddy fields on either side of the Swat and Kurram rivers which run through them. The Peshawar and Mardan plains are also very fertile. A well established irrigation system, comprising canals



and watercourses, helps to irrigate this fertile plain. Wheat and sugar-cane are the two principal crops and very good rice is also grown. But the fame of this plain rests largely on the excellent fruit that is grown in abundance—wonderful peaches and plums, luscious grapes of different kinds, pears and oranges.

The Frontier has played a very important part throughout the long course of Indian history. Through it lead the passes—the *Khyber*, the *Gomal*, the *Tochi*, to mention the principal ones only—through which the Aryan hordes poured into India, driving the Dravidians and the aboriginal tribes before them.

Through the self-same passes have passed armies of Tartars, Mongols, Turks, Iranians, and Afghans, either to colonize or to found empires at Delhi and beyond. It would be true to say that before the advent of the European races generally, and the British in particular, India proved vulnerable from the sea, all the invasions of India were from the North-West. From the ninth century onwards, each series of invaders brought with them new culture, new social codes, different types of art and architecture, and in general, varying conceptions of life. They brought about tremendous changes in the social

and political systems, they found and changed the outlook of life, and its values.

The invaders fighting their way through the passes and the valleys of the north-west, were always in the first instance bound for the Indus, then the Land of the Five Rivers (which we now want as Pakistan).

Some waves of invaders swept past Delhi into Central India, past the Vindhya right into the uplands of the Deccan.

Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam have in turn claimed spiritual allegiance from these fighting men of the north. The remains of numerous Buddhist stupas and monasteries scattered all over this area bear testimony to the spiritual hold which the religion of the great Gautama once enjoyed over the entire region, only to give place to the temples of Prithvi Raj and the mosques of Jehangir and Aurangzeb.

Under what is called the Durand Agreement with the Amir of Afghanistan, the boundary between India and Afghanistan influence was settled, and it was delimited in 1903 except for a small section which was delimited after the Afghan War of 1919. But the Government of India have never occupied up to the border. Between the administered territories and the

Durand line there lies a belt of territory of varying width extending from the Gomal Pass in the south, to Kashmir in the north—generally known as the Tribal Territory. Its future has been the keynote of the interminable debate of frontier policy for nearly half a century.

This is a country of deep valleys and secluded glens, which nature has fenced in by a chain of inaccessible mountains. It is peopled with wild tribes of mysterious origin, in whom Afghan, Tartar, Turkoman, Persian, Indian, Arab and Jewish intermingle. The intermixture has produced in its men and women, the finest specimens of the human race.

These people have lived their own lives for centuries, with little intercourse even amongst themselves, and as Sir Valentine Chirol truly said, "the only bond that ever could unite them in common action was the bond of Islam." It is impossible to understand the Frontier problem unless two facts are constantly borne in mind. The strongest sentiment amongst these strange people is—or was, until comparatively recently,—the desire to be left alone. They value their independence much more than their lives. The second factor is that the country does not suffice even in good years to maintain the population. They must

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

find the means of subsistence outside, either in trade, by service in the Indian Army or in the *Khassadars*, or else in the outlet which hill-men all the world over have utilised from time immemorial, the raiding of the wealthier and more peaceful population of the plains. The internal peace enforced among them by British control has in late years led to an increase in their numbers and this has aggravated their economic problems.

## CHAPTER IX

### The Problem of Defence

The policy of the Government of India towards the independent Territory has, as we have already noted, ebbed and flowed in a remarkable degree. It has fluctuated between the *Forward School*, which would occupy the Frontier up to the confines of Afghanistan, and the school of *Masterly Inactivity*, which would leave the tribesmen entirely to their own resources, punishing them only when they raid British territory. Behind both the policies lay the menace of a Russian invasion. Russia has constantly coloured British frontier policy. This induced what was called *Hit and Retire* tactics. In the half century which ended in 1897 there were nearly a score of punitive expeditions each one of which left behind a legacy of distrust, and which brought no permanent improvement in its train. The fruit of the suspicion thus engendered was seen in 1897. Then the whole Frontier from the Malakand to the Gomal, was ablaze. The extent of this rising and the magnitude of the

military measures which were taken to meet it compelled a reconsideration of the whole position. The broad outlines of the new policy were laid down in a despatch from the Secretary of State for India, which prescribed for the Government the "Limitation" of interference with the tribes, so as to avoid the extension of administrative control over tribal territory. It fell to Lord Curzon to give effect to the policy. The main foundations of his action were to exercise over the tribes the political influence requisite to secure imperial interests, to pay them subsidies for the performance of specific duties, but to respect their tribal independence and leave them, as far as possible, free to govern themselves according to their own traditions and to follow their own inherited habits of life without let or hindrance.

As a first step, Lord Curzon took the control of the tribes under the direct supervision of the Government of India. Up to this point they had been in charge of the Government of the Punjab, a province whose head is busied with many other concerns. Lord Curzon created in 1901 the North-West Frontier Province, and placed it in charge of a Chief Commissioner, with an intimate Frontier experience, directly subordinate to the Government

of India. This was a revival of a scheme prepared by Lord Lytton in 1877, and often considered afterwards, but which had slipped for lack of driving power. Next, Lord Curzon withdrew the regular troops so far as possible from the advanced posts, and placed these forts in charge of tribal levies, officered by a handful of British officers. The most successful of these was the Khyber Rifles, which steadfastly kept the peace of that historic Pass until 1919. At the same time the regular troops were cantoned in places whence they could quickly move to any danger point, and these bases were connected with the Indian Railway system. In pursuance of this policy Frontier railways were run out to Dargai, and a narrow-gauge line, since converted to the broad gauge, was constructed from Kushalgarh to Kohat, at the entrance of the Kohat Pass and to Thal in the midst of the Kurram Valley. These railways were completed by lines to Tank and Bannu. By this means the striking power of the regular forces was greatly increased. Nor was the policy of the economic development neglected. The railways gave a powerful stimulus to trade and the Lower Swat Canal converted factious tribesmen into successful agriculturists. This policy of economic development is receiving a great development through the completion

of the Upper Swat Canal. Now it is completed and there are other works awaiting attention. For many years this policy was completely justified by results.

While the Moghul Empire was strong, right up to the death of Emperor Aurangzeb, the North-West Frontier, Afghanistan and India formed one single Empire. After the death of Aurangzeb, all the factors which make for disintegration became evident in Delhi. When the riots set in, and the central authority ceased to be strong enough to enforce its orders in the outlying parts, revolts began all over the country. The Moghul hold over Afghanistan and the Frontier became weaker and weaker, till the Northern Provinces slipped out of their hands or were wrested by powerful War Lords who carved out Kingdoms for themselves in the north-west.

About this time, a shepherd boy of Turkish origin, named Nadir Shah, seized the Persian throne and became strong and powerful. Nadir Shah soon overran Afghanistan and marched on Delhi. His stay at Delhi was memorable in a frightful massacre. Before returning to Persia, Nadir Shah forced the helpless Moghul Emperor Mohammad Shah to cede vast territories in the north-west to his kingdom. Afghanistan, which



included Sind, Multan, the Frontier Province and the Punjab districts near the Indus, was torn off from India and henceforth formed part of Nadir Shah's Pakistan. After Nadir Shah's murder in 1747, the empire, which his strong hand had welded together, fell to pieces.

One of his nobles, Ahmed Khan Abdul, an Afghan, soon rose to prominence and found a wonderful opportunity of establishing an Afghan Empire. Such an Empire had never yet existed separately from India. He was a 'Sadozai' and the ruling Afghan clan came to be known by the name and style of 'Durrani.' The Frontier Province now formed part of the Afghan Empire, which included Afghanistan, Sind, Multan and Kashmir. About this time the Maratha hordes were sweeping north from the Deccan. It seemed as though India would fall into the hands of the Marathas who were making a bid for the Imperial throne of the Moghuls. Ahmed Shah moved south to stop the Maratha bid for power. The great battle of Panipat was fought in 1761, and the Maratha armies, though they fought valiantly, were decimated by the more powerful armies of the Afghans. Once more north and south had met in mortal combat and victory had crowned the former.

The Durranis ruled the Frontier Province till the rise of the Sikhs in the Punjab under Maharaja Ranjit Singh, by which time the Afghan Government in Kabul had become very weak and degenerate.

Ranjit Singh invaded the Frontier Province. The effete and weak descendants of Ahmad Shah Abdul were no match for the Sikhs.

Unlike their earlier history of the seventeenth century when the tribes of the Frontier plains had been able to unite against the Moghul Emperor Aurangzeb, and after a long struggle had wrested terms from the Moghuls which left them almost as independent as their kinsmen in the hills further west, the tribes were now disunited and constantly at war with one another. This helped the Sikhs to gain a footing in the Province—they were able to beat one by one the tribes in the plains who were not in a position to make anything like a united stand against their well-disciplined armies.

The Sikh invasion began in 1818. Dera Ismail Khan was overrun in that year and five years later, the Marwat plains shared a similar fate. In 1834, two years after the defeat of the Pathan tribes near Nowshera by the Sikhs, General Hari Singh seized Peshawar Fort and the rule of the Afghan

Sardars came to an end. In 1836 the Dera Nawabs were divested of their authority, and a Sikh 'Kardar' was appointed to govern the district. Bannu Fort was built, and after terrific fighting the Bannochis were conquered by Herbert Edwards for the Lahore Durbar, and Maharaja Ranjit Singh became the suzerain of the Frontier Province. It must be remembered, however, that even though Sikh garrisons were stationed in the plains between the Indus and the Tribal foothills on the west, the Sikh government had to send out troops every time they felt the necessity of replenishing their treasury by collecting taxes.

But Maharaja Ranjit Singh's successors had neither vision nor character and after the Maharaja's death the Sikh State was torn asunder by intrigues and internal strife. There followed the first and second Sikh wars with the British in 1846 and 1849, and the Sikh power was annihilated. By the proclamation of 29th March, 1849, the Frontier districts, along with the Punjab, were incorporated within the British Empire. The British lost no time in consolidating their hold on the Frontier. They concluded a treaty of amity and peace with the Amir of Kabul. During the rising of 1857, Indian troops, which were then

styled the 'Native Army,' were suspected of being in sympathy with the rebellion. All Indian troops on the Frontier were disarmed. The British proceeded to enlist Pathans in their place, and it speaks volumes for the success of the British administrators on the Frontier that the great storm of 1857 was successfully weathered. Pathans marched to Delhi and fought heroically on the side of the British against their own countrymen.

From 1849 to 1901 the N.-W.F.P. consisting of the four *trans*-Indus and one *cis*-Indus districts, formed part of the Province of the Punjab. Having seized the province, British administrators turned their eyes towards the Tribal Belt, Afghanistan, and even beyond the Oxus. Russia, it was feared, was steadily advancing towards the Afghan frontier on the Oxus, and had successfully absorbed the Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara. The British professed to have a holy horror of Czarist Russia, and were anxious to have a strong and independent Afghanistan as a buffer in between. But while professing so much concern and regard for Afghan independence, their action clearly showed that they were quite willing to help themselves to as much of Afghanistan as they could. In vain did Abdur Rehman, the Emir-el-Kebir or the Great Emir, plead with

them to leave the Tribal Belt severely alone. Afghanistan was not strong enough to fight the rising might of Britain in India, or to prevent the absorption of these tribes in the British political system. In vain did Abdur Rehman write :

“ If you cut them off from my dominions they will never be of any use to you or me. You can hold them down in peace but if at any time a foreign enemy appears on the borders of India, these tribes will be your worst enemies.”

The British would not listen.

There were three wars with Afghanistan—in 1839, 1878 and 1919. Each one of these—so British historians would have us believe—was provoked by Afghanistan. Less biassed people, however, doubt if a weak Afghanistan could ever provoke a war against the might of Britain, and know, rather, that these wars were caused either by the British desire to have a puppet of their own on the throne of Kabul, or to tear off more and more limbs from the body of the Afghan State. In the first war of 1839 to 1841, the British wanted to drive out Emir Dost Mohammed Khan and to put their own puppet, Shah Shuja, on the throne of Kabul. They did succeed in this, but the fury of

the Afghans was naturally roused. In 1841 the entire British force, while returning to India, was set upon and annihilated. Only Surgeon Brydon was left to tell the tale of the massacre. The avenging campaign put back the former enemy, Dost Mohammed Khan (who had fled to India), on the Afghan throne.

The relations of Afghanistan with the Indian Empire were for long dominated by one main consideration—the relation of Afghanistan to a Russian invasion of India. All other considerations were of secondary importance. For nearly three-quarters of a century the attitude of Great Britain toward successive Emirs was dictated by this one factor. It was in order to prevent Afghanistan from coming under the influence of Russia that the first Afghan War of 1878 was fought—the most melancholy episode in Indian Frontier history. It was because a Russian envoy was received at Kabul, whilst the British representative was turned back at Ali Masjid. After that the whole trend of British policy towards Afghanistan was to build up a strong independent state friendly to Britain, which would act as a buffer against Russia, and so to order British Frontier policy that the Government of India should be in a position to move large forces up, if

necessary, to support the Afghans in resisting aggression.

A knowledge of the trans-frontier geography of India has always brought home to Frontier administrators the conviction that there are only two main gates to India—through Afghanistan, the historic route to India, along which successive invasions have poured by way of Seistan. It has been the purpose of British Policy to close them, and of Russia to endeavour to keep them at any rate half open. To this end, having pushed her trans-Persian railway to Samarkand, Russia thrust a military line from Merv to the Kushklinsky Post, where railway material stands collected for an immediate prolongation to Herat. Russia has connected the trans-Siberian railway with the trans-Caucasian system, by the Orenburg-Tashkent line, thus bringing Central Asia into direct touch with her European magazines. Nor has Great Britain been idle. A great military station has been created at Quetta. This is connected with the Indian railway system by lines of railway which climb to the Quetta plateau by the Bolan Pass and through the Chapper Rift, lines which rank amongst the most picturesque and daring in the world. From Quetta the line has been carried by the Khojak tunnel through

the Khwaja Amran Range, until it leads out to the Afghan border at Chaman, where it opens on the route to Kandhar. Material is stocked at Chaman which would enable the line to be carried to Kandhar in sixty days. In view of the same menace the whole of Baluchistan has been brought under British control. Quetta is now one of the great strategical positions of the world and nothing has been left undone which modern military science can achieve to add to its natural strength. In the opinion of many military authorities it firmly closes the western gate to India, either by way of Kandhar, or by the direct route through Seistan.

*But will Pakistan be able to keep the door ?*

Further east, the Indian railway system has been carried to Jamrud and up the Khyber Pass to Landi Kotal and down the other side of the Pass to Landi Khana. A first class military road sometimes double, sometimes treble, also threads the Pass to the British advance post at Landi Kotal, and then descends until it meets the Afghan Frontier at Landi Khana. A commencement has been made with the Loi-Shilman Railway, which starting from Peshawar is designed to penetrate the Mullagori country and provide an alternative advance to the Khyber. For



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unexplained reasons, this line has not been completed and is now thrust in the air. In this wise two great powers have prepared for the great conflict which may some day be fought on the Kandhar-Ghazni-Kabul line for the green pastures of Pakistan.

Of the problems and implications of Pakistan not the least important therefore is that of defence. If Pakistan is to be established, it must also be maintained. We have examined some of the financial implications elsewhere. From every stand-point as we shall see, Pakistan is not economically a rosy proposition. One looks in vain for a careful consideration of the problem of finance in the mass of literature produced on the Pakistan issue by the Committee of writers of the All-India Muslim League. The other aspect which has also not come in careful and disinterested consideration is that of the defence. Typical of the Muslim League attitude towards the question of defence is to be found in Mr. Z. A. Suleri's book, *The Road to Peace and Pakistan*.

“We would say that defence again is no longer an isolated question for different countries to solve. Like economics it must be tackled jointly. And we hope if economics

is tackled jointly, the question of defence will be automatically solved.

“ But answering the objection raised in the jarring strain Pakistan will not be able to do this and do that, it may with quiet confidence be asserted that defensively Pakistan will be better off than Hindustan for a variety of reasons. Enumerating some of them, (a) Pakistan will not have the North-West Frontier problem : a huge sum of money is expended on that account. It will be at peace with the neighbouring Muslim States. (b) Its man-power will not be wasted on defending the long stretches of Hindu India coasts. (c) Its man-power will be first class in abundance. The famous Muslim soldier, the backbone of Indian Army, will be available to enter the service of Islam. Hindustan will take some time to engender quite the same spirit that a Muslim displays on battle-fields. That spirit is the result of centuries of tradition. And due to the permanent climatic conditions and other considerations it will be well-nigh impossible for Hindustan to produce the fine physical stature of Pakistani soldier ; and (d) Pakistan's economy will be reasonably

strong to equip its soldiers well."

But surely is this not all a case of special pleading? If wishes were horses, Pakistanis would mount!

What is the basis for saying that Pakistan will have no need to spend largely on defence by reason of friendly Islamic nations? Has Afghanistan no army? nor Persia? nor Iraq? nor Egypt? Is there any federation between existing Islamic Nations and are there any prospects of any such federation in the future on which Pakistan could rely? Why did the Arabs break away from Turkey and what stands in the way of a return to the rule of a Turkish Caliph? Has Turkey to maintain no army, no air force, or a navy? What has been the fate of Persia recently and can one be sure that the danger to Persian existence has passed? Would Pakistan be guaranteed against invasion by Afghanistan or Persia and even if guaranteed, what value is of this guarantee to an effete and defenceless Pakistan?

And suppose there be no immediate danger from the West. What of the Eastern defenceless frontiers of Pakistan? Khalistan of any magnitude would form from its inception, a *kirpan* at the very heart of Pakistan itself.

Says Mr. Durrani in *Meaning of Pakistan*,

“Pakistan will be a well-knit, highly organised modern State, capable of offering united opposition to any would be conqueror from the east. What is more Hindu India is herself vulnerable from land and sea. If it ever came to a trial of arms, we would smash the country from end to end within three months.”

Before Pakistan can achieve this strength it must be in the words of Mr. Durrani a highly organised modern State. This would need both time and money. Pakistan would appear to be surely in need of both.

There is little also in the optimism of Pakistan as to the friendliness of neighbours. There is no reason why Afghanistan should guarantee the security of Pakistan and maintain its own present cramped boundaries. Every sovereign country likes a direct route to the sea. What if Afghanistan asks for Baluchistan on racial, ethnological, and economic grounds? What if it wants a corridor to Karachi? The territorial ambitions of Afghanistan have been restricted by a powerful Russia on one side and a powerful British Empire on the other. Pakistan would have to adopt one of three unenviable alternatives :

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*(1) Depend for defence on the finances and goodwill of Hindu India.*

*(2) Maintain a British army of occupation and entrust its defence to the British.*

*(3) Pave the roads for an invasion from the North-West.*

Pakistanis forget one other contingency—Russia. Or perhaps they do not. Sir Firoz Khan Noon has threatened to go to Moscow for Pakistan if he cannot get it from London. Perhaps that will not be a bad thing in the long run. Russians do not believe in God. God already seems to have forsaken Pakistan. The Muslim League is dominated by communists and atheists. The advent of Russia into Pakistan will have one salubrious result. It will strip the pseudo-communists of their wide acres.

## CHAPTER X

### **The Problem of Finance**

A careful study of the financial aspects of Pakistan was made by two distinguished economists (Sir H. P. Mody and Dr. John Matthai) and they came to the conclusion that excluding the cost of defence a state of Pakistan was a feasible proposition. In this connection they appended a note to the Report of Sapru Committee in the following terms :

“ Although in our opinion a division of the country is to be deplored, we should be prepared to consider it if there was no other basis for an agreed settlement. The extent to which, in our opinion, political separation may be accepted as a means of conciliating Muslim sentiment without serious risk to the country, is as follows :

(1) Areas in which there is a Muslim majority of the population to be segregated to form a separate state or states. This may mean district-wise Pakistan, but our study

has shown that it is feasible, under such an arrangement, to have large contiguous blocks of territory demarcated as separate Muslim zones.

(2) These areas to be determined in such manner as to constitute a single contiguous block within the province in which they are situated.

(3) A definite agreement to be entered into by the state or states so formed with the rest of India for co-operation in matters of defence and economic development.

The main objection to separation is that it would hinder the development of the country, and imperil its safety."

The cautious and qualified support to the proposition of Pakistan given by Sir H. P. Mody and Dr. Matthai found its source in the difficulty in which these two gentlemen found themselves on the problem in question :

"Our view is that if a scheme which presupposed the political unity of India was not acceptable to the Muslim community, and if the results of the forthcoming elections were to vindicate generally the Muslim League position separation as a means of

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ending the present deadlock should not be ruled out."

The nett implications of the above views are twofold: *firstly* if the burden of its defence is saddled upon Pakistan it ceases to be a feasible proposition and, *secondly*, even without having to bear the cost of defending itself against external aggression and, internal commotion, Pakistan is no more than a *feasible* proposition. The most enthusiastic sponsors of the scheme have not been able to claim for it any outstanding economic and financial merits.

Let us examine the question in some of its more important aspects.

For the purposes of the present argument let it be assumed that Pakistan will comprise the whole of Sind, and the N.-W.F.P., whole of the Punjab *not excluding the Ambala Division and the Districts of Ferozepore, Amritsar and Gurdaspur.*

### (a) *Finances of Punjab.*

(1942-43 revised Estimates).

Revenue 15,77 lakhs including Punjab's share of Income Tax according to the Niemeyer Award. Expenditure 15,71 lakhs.



There is annual surplus therefore between 6 lakhs and 60 lakhs.

*(b) Finances of N.-W.F.P.*

The Province is in receipt of an annual subvention of Rupees one crore from Central revenues to enable it to meet the excess of expenditure over revenue.

In this connexion it would be of interest to reproduce some remarks made by the Finance Minister of the Muslim League Ministry in the N.-W.F.P., in a recent budget speech :

“The estimate of revenue receipts for the Province for 1944-45 is Rs. 226.82 lakhs, while the anticipated expenditure is Rs. 229.47 lakhs. The Central subvention constitutes almost half of our annual receipts. I am convinced that, placed as we are, our sheet-anchor in the future is an increase in the amount of our subvention, which is by far the largest single item in our revenue budget.”

The same exponent of a ‘No Centre’ programme proceeded :

“The reason is that our revenue is inelastic, because the bulk of it is a fixed subvention from the Central Government of India, and

there is little possibility of expansion of the remainder. It is barely enough to meet our standing charges and affords but meagre scope for development, whether in agriculture, education, medical relief, or any other direction which may lead to the greater happiness of the people of this Province."

Mr. Jinnah will not deny that the late League Ministry made pressing representations to the Viceroy and the Government of India for an increase in the subvention to the N.-W.F.P. It cannot, therefore, be argued that the N.-W. Province will be anything but a burden on the revenues of Pakistan.

### *The Finances of Sind*

The Province of Sind is also a deficit province and is in receipt of an annual subvention to meet excess of expenditure over revenues. These subventions also come from Central revenues and at present amount to about 105 lakhs annually.

### *The Finances of Bengal*

The finances of the Eastern partner in Pakistan are equally impressive.

After a sequence of deficit budgets for several

years, Bengal looked forward hopefully to an improvement in her financial position as a direct result of the special steps taken by the Central Government and by Parliament through the India Act to alleviate Bengal's plight. Under Provincial autonomy she was better off to the extent of Rs. 75 lakhs a year than before. In the year 1935-36, despite the grant from Central revenues of an amount equal to half the proceeds of the jute export duty, the budget showed a deficit of Rs. 51½ lakhs. The Niemeyer report, however, as subsequently implemented, gave a further sum of Rs. 42 lakhs annually from an increased share in the jute export duty, and also annual relief of Rs. 33 lakhs by cancelling the Province's accumulated debt to the Centre. Thus Bengal was able to face the future with more confidence. The budget for the year 1937-38 was a surplus budget. The year 1938-39, however, marked the beginning of another sequence of deficit budgets. The budget for 1941-42 revealed a deficit estimated at more than a crore of rupees. Although the finances of the Province, as revealed in the revised estimates and actuals of the preceding years, show a continuous improvement, the expenditure of the Province appears to have reached a stage where it may be said, the Government are living well beyond

their means. The year 1943-44 was marked by a considerable rise in income but unfortunately flood and famine not only served to hamper normal development but resulted in heavily increased expenditure on relief and reconstruction measures. Another deficit resulted but discussions were instituted for assistance from the Central Government, as the outlook was even worse for 1944-45. The assistance received, however, proved inadequate to stop the rot, which was aggravated by economic conditions. A further request for assistance from the Centre has been made, but meantime the Province continues to budget for a deficit in 1945-46.

From the above it will be clear that Punjab will not by itself be able to meet the deficits of Bengal nor the annual contribution to the Sind and Frontier exchequers.

But of course Pakistan would retain in full the revenues raised in its domains which now go to Central revenues.

Let us now glance at the present budgetary position of the Central Government.

# THE PROBLEM OF FINANCE

## General Statement of the Revenue and Expenditure in Lakhs of Rupees

	Revised Estimates 1944-45	Budget Estimates 1945-1946
<b>Revenue</b>		
Customs ...	40,00	85,25
Central Excise duties ...	39,07	48,59
Corporation Tax ...	1,06,11	89,67
Taxes on Income other than Corpora- tion Tax ...	1,03,89	1,00,83
Salt ...	9,30	9,30
Opium ...	1,05	1,27
Interest ...	1,74	1,44
Civil Administration ...	2,22	2,26
Currency and Mint ...	12,55	12,28
Civil Works ...	61	66
Receipts from Indian States ...	63	63
Receipts connected with the War ...	21,28	16,42
Other sources of revenue ...	3,67	3,18
Post and Telegraphs—Net contribu- tion to general revenues ...	9,32	11,85
Railway—Net contribution to general revenues ...	32,00	32,00
Deduct share of Income-tax revenue payable to provinces ...	26,56	23,29
Total Revenue ...	3,56,88	3,62,34
Deficit ...	1,55,77	1,55,29
Total ...	5,12,65	5,17,63

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### Expenditure

	Revised Estimates 1944-45	Budget Estimates 1945-46
Direct Demands on the Revenue ...	8,52,67	8,86,38
Irrigation Embankment, etc. ...	13,32	10,77
Posts and Telegraphs— Capital outlay charged to revenue ...	0,54	1,60
Debt Services ...	22,60,77	33,95,19
Civil Administration ...	24,59,00	27,55,00
Miscellaneous ...	11,21,23	16,20,78
Currency and Mint ...	2,20,77	1,70,49
Civil Works ...	2,50,14	2,46,58
Defence Services Nett ...	3,97,23,01	3,94,23,39
Contributions and Miscellaneous Ad- justments between Central and Pro- vincial Governments ...	8,75,55	1,73,81
Extraordinary payments ...	34,89,00	30,79,00
Total Expenditure charged to Revenue Surplus ...	...	...
Total ...	5,12,64,92	5,17,62,99

The deficit of 155 lakhs in the above estimates was due to the abnormal expenditure of 397 crores on the defence services. The advent of peace and consequent demobilisation of the army, navy and air force, the peace-time expenditure considering present-day world conditions would not be much below 100 crores.

The defence expenditure met largely from

Customs, Income-tax receipts, Corporation taxes and borrowings in the open market have been met in the past very largely from sources that cannot be said to be Pakistan sources.

It would be fair to credit the revenues of Pakistan with 15 crores annually being the share of income-tax, customs and railway surplus. But there would hardly be 10 crores left annually for defence after the annual subvention and deficits have been met.

As indicated elsewhere Pakistan would have an international frontier from the Arabian Sea to the Pamir tableland of 1,700 miles, internal frontiers of approximately the same length and a North-Eastern Frontier of more than 500 miles.

Ten crores of the most optimistic protagonists of Pakistan could hardly contend as sufficient to secure the safety of the sovereign State, so hardly won.

There is one more aspect of the defence-*cum*-financial problem. Hitherto about 60 per cent of the Indian Army has been recruited in the Punjab. Hence a very large slice of the defence expenditure has found its way to the Punjab through the expenditure on the Army. As already indicated, the bulk of the sources from

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN


which the Army has been financed has been other than Muslims.

Pakistan will not be able to maintain any large army. Many who found lucrative employment will have to look for other employment.

In Hindustan, on the other hand, many who have been content to break stones by the wayside will now carry rifles for *Jai Hind.* !



PLATE VIII



Pakistan and the Ports



## CHAPTER XI

### **Some Economic Problems of Pakistan**

The total length of railways opened in British India and Indian States on 31st March, 1934 amounted to 42,42,953 miles of which 21,132 miles were of the standard gauge (5' 6") 17,644 miles of the metre gauge (3' 3 $\frac{3}{8}$ ") and 4,177 of other gauges (2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ' and 2'). These figures include the West of India Portuguese Railways (51 miles) running for all but two miles of its length in Portuguese territory and the Pondicherry and Peralam Karaikal lines (22 $\frac{1}{2}$  miles) which are partly in French India. The total mileage under construction or sanctioned for construction on the same date aggregated 462 miles.

The Government of India exercises under the Indian Railways Act, 1890, certain general powers in respect of all the railways in India and has a preponderating financial interest in nearly all of them. Up to 1922 all Railway administrations for which the Government of India had to provide funds had to submit an annual programme to the

Railway Board, which prepared a general programme of capital expenditure for the ensuing year for the sanction of the Secretary of State, and the Government of India and made budget provision for the needs of each railway according to the programme finally sanctioned. In the year 1924 the Railway Finances were separated from the General Finances of the Government of India, and in 1926, the powers of the Governor-General in Council were greatly enhanced by the Secretary of State for India in Council in railway matters, the most important of these enhanced powers being the power to sanction capital expenditure on New and Open Lines, up to £1,125,000. A very extensive programme of improvements and developments was taken up but it had to be curtailed, though steadily, in later years on account of financial stringency. The funds for capital expenditure on railways were obtainable only at rates of interest substantially higher than those procurable in earlier years. On account of this rise in the rate of interest some projects either for extension to the Railway system, or for improvements to existing system, became unremunerative and had to be abandoned.

During this period some of the Company-managed Railways, such as Burma, *E.I.*, *G.I.P.*,

and *Southern Punjab*, etc., were taken under State management. The programme which up to 1929-30 was on the basis of five years and later, on the basis of three years, is being prepared annually at present.

The diversity of conditions governing the relation of the State to the railways in India is due chiefly to the variations of policy adopted from time to time towards railway construction. Broadly speaking, the principal railways fall under three categories, firstly, five railways owned and worked by the State, *viz.*, the *North Western*, the *East Bengal*, the *East Indian*, the *Great Indian Peninsula* and the *Burma Railways*; secondly, those owned by the State but worked on its behalf by companies enjoying a guarantee of interest from Government, five in number, *viz.* *Bombay*, *Baroda and Central India*, *Madras and Southern Mahratta*, *Bengal Assam*, *Bengal Nagpur* and *South Indian Railways* and thirdly, lines the property of private companies and worked some by the owning companies and some by the State or by companies working State-owned system, the principal being the *Bengal and North Western* and *Rohilkund and Kumaon Railway* system. Besides there are a number of lines which are the property of Indian States or District Boards, or constructed under a guarantee of minimum

interest given by such Boards. Of the total mileage, open on 31st March, 1944, of 42,953 miles, 31,696 miles or about 74 per cent were State-owned, and 19,125 miles, or 45 per cent directly managed by Government.

Under the separation convention the railways are required to pay to the General revenues of Government of India 1 per cent on the capital at charge of commercial lines (excluding the capital contributed by Railway companies and Indian States) at the end of the penultimate financial year plus  $1/5$ th of any surplus profits remaining after payment of this fixed return. If any surplus remaining after this payment to General revenues exceeded in any year £2½ million, one-third of the excess over £2½ million is also required to be paid to the General revenues, and the balance is to be credited to the reserve fund to meet deficits in the years of adversity. Under this convention, the Railways made this payment from current surpluses in the first five years, *i.e.*, from 1924-25 to 1928-29; in the 6th year partly from the year's surplus and partly from previously accumulated reserves; and in the 7th wholly from the latter source. In the last three years they were unable to make any contribution. Nearly 100 crores were contributed by the railways

to Central Revenues in the years 1940-41 and 1943-1944.

Very great changes in the financial condition of railways thus came about during the war. Colossal amounts were earned by the elimination of road competition by reason of the petrol shortage and curtailment of repair and replacement of locomotive and rolling stock equipment. The accumulated depreciation funds at the end of the War of State Railways amounted to the stupendous total of 600 odd crores. But if Pakistan architects have their eyes on these balances to pay for the foundations of Pakistan, they are likely to be disappointed as the bulk of this large sum is frozen in sterling debt !

A Sovereign Pakistan would no doubt be entitled to the bulk of the *N. W. Railway* but will have to concede the *G.I.P.*, *B.B.C.I.*, *E.I.R.* and the other lessee lines already referred to.

The extent of the *N. W. Railway* system that could be retained for Pakistan would depend in the boundaries eventually settled. In the event of the amalgamation of the prepondering Hindu and Sikh districts with Hindustan and the creation of a sovereign Khalistan a very important slice of the open lines and important junctions such as Delhi, Jullundur, Amritsar, Ambala, the Delhi-Simla section and the Hoshiarpur-Doaba section

would be detached from the Pakistan system. In the Bengal area, Pakistan would lose the important junction of Howrah and the bulk of the Assam railways.

The total capital outlay on Indian Railways before World War II was £635,000,000. It would be safe to say that not more than £100,000,000 of this would be transferable to Pakistan. Hindustan would have the benefit of about £535,000,000.

If the Sikh demand of *Chenab to the Sutlej* be conceded, Pakistan railways would be crippled by the loss of the important Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon workshops and marshalling yards at Lahore.

### *Commercial Organizations*

The principal non-official organizations connected with trade are mainly non-Muslim. The Chambers of Commerce at Calcuttta, Bombay, Madras, Rangoon, and Karachi and other important centres have a membership, except in Bombay, preponderatingly European, though open to Indians also. Closely connected with these and not infrequently employing the same secretariat staff are the associations representing particular branches of trade such as jute mills, cotton mills etc.

The Trades Associations represent the retail



traders in the principal cities, and lately other associations representing general interests have grown up with an exclusively Indian membership. The Associated Chambers of Commerce of India represent mainly the European interests, while the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry perform the same functions in respect of Indians. These Chambers and Associations though they differ from time to time on questions of policy, are in no sense antagonistic to the older associations. The membership of most of these bodies is confined to the province or city where their headquarters are situated, but they maintain close touch with similar organizations at other trade centres. In the case of jute which is grown chiefly in Bengal, the associations connected with it are representative of the entire industry.

These associations and the leading Chambers of Commerce in particular keep the Government apprised from time to time of the problems affecting commercial development in India and, undoubtedly, perform important functions in focussing non-official opinion and representing commercial sentiment the value of which is reflected in the recognition, varying according to their status and traditions, which they enjoy at the hands of Government. The Bengal and

Bombay Chambers of Commerce have the privilege of electing a representative each to the Council of State and 6 and 2 representatives, respectively, to the Legislative Councils of the respective Presidencies. The Madras Indian Commerce and the Indian Merchants' Chamber and Bureau (Bombay) elect a representative each to the Legislative Assembly while the Mill Owners' Associations at Bombay and Ahmedabad, and the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, the Marwari Association (Bengal) and the Bengal Mahajan Sabha enjoy the privilege in rotation of electing a representative in the Assembly.

The bulk of the commercial organizations in the country are either European or Hindu. The following list will show in what narrow limits Pakistan interests are sheltered.

The Associated Chambers of Commerce of India.

Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

All-India Organization of Industrial Employers, Cawnpore.

Indian National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore.

Indian Chamber of Commerce of Calcutta.

SOME ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN

Indian Colliery Owners' Association,  
Calcutta.

Indian Chamber of Commerce, Lahore.

Indian Jute Mills Association, Calcutta.

East India Cotton Association Limited,  
Bombay.

Indian Tea Association.

Indian Central Cotton Committee.

Indian Mining Association.

Indian Mining Federation.

Mining and Geological Institute of India.

Wine, Spirit and Beer Association of India.

Bengal Chamber of Commerce.

Bengal National Chamber of Commerce.

Marwari Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta.

*Muslim Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta.*

*Muslim Chamber of Commerce, Bihar and  
Orissa.*

Bombay Chamber of Commerce.

The Indian Merchants' Chamber, Bombay.

Maharashtra Chamber of Commerce.

Madras Chamber of Commerce.

Bihar and Orissa Chamber of Commerce.

Orissa Chamber of Commerce.

Southern India Chamber of Commerce.

Cocanada Chamber of Commerce.

Godavari Chamber of Commerce, Cocanada.

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

Tuticorin Chamber of Commerce.  
Cochin Chamber of Commerce.  
Calicut Chamber of Commerce.  
Tellicherry Chamber of Commerce.  
Nagapatam Chamber of Commerce.  
Coimbatore Chamber of Commerce, Coimbatore.  
Mysore Chamber of Commerce, Bangalore.  
Nagpur Chamber of Commerce.  
Karachi Chamber of Commerce.  
The Buyers' and Shippers' Chamber, Karachi.  
Chittagong Chamber of Commerce.  
Narayanganj Chamber of Commerce.  
Berar Chamber of Commerce.  
Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore.  
United Provinces Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore.  
Merchants' Chamber of United Provinces, Cawnpore.  
Punjab Chamber of Commerce, Delhi.  
Northern India Chamber of Commerce, Lahore.  
Burma Chamber of Commerce.  
Burma Indian Chamber of Commerce, Rangoon.

## **SOME ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN**

**Burmese Chamber of Commerce.**

**Commercial Associations.**

**Marwari Association, Calcutta.**

**Blankets and Shawl Traders' Association.**

**Calcutta Grain, Oilseed and Rice Association.**

**Calcutta Hides and Skin Shippers' Association.**

**Indian Engineering Association, Calcutta.**

**Indian Sugar Mills' Association, Calcutta.**

**Calcutta Jute Fabric Shippers' Association, Calcutta.**

**Indian Tea Cess Committee, Calcutta.**

**Bombay Millowners' Association.**

**Bombay Native Piecegoods Merchants' Association.**

**Grain Merchants, Bombay.**

**Ahmedabad Millowners' Association.**

**The Native Share and Stock Brokers' Association, Bombay.**

**Bombay Shareholders' Association, Bombay.**

**Seed Traders' Association, Bombay.**

**Bombay Shroff Association, Bombay.**

**Bombay Bullion Exchange, Ltd., Bombay.**

**Indian Sugar Producers' Association, Cawnpore.**

Southern India Skins and Hide Merchants' Association.

Karachi Indian Merchants' Association, Karachi.

Bengal Landholders' Association, Calcutta.

The Employers' Federation of Southern India.

Planters' Association.

Bihar Planters' Association.

United Planters' Association of Southern India, Coonoor, Bengal and Assam.

Traders' Association.

Calcutta Trades' Association.

The Calcutta Import Trade Association.

Bombay Presidency Trades' Association.

Madras Trades' Association.

Rangoon Trades' Association.

### *Principal Ports and Trade Centres*

Though the geographical position of India is favourable for international commerce, the littoral of the Peninsula is remarkably deficient in harbours to accommodate vessels of the draught now employed in the carrying trade. The west coast ports from Baluchistan to Gulf Comorin, with the exception of Karachi, Gulf of Cutch ports, Gulf of Cambay ports, Bombay, Mormugao and Cochin, are practically closed to traffic from the end of

May to the beginning of September by the violence of the monsoon, and the east coast is surf-bound and without any natural harbours, though Madras and Vizagapatam are artificial harbours which offer a safe berth to vessels in all weathers. Calcutta, admirably situated for trade in the rich Gangetic delta, is handicapped not by its distance from the sea but by the bars which tend to form in the Hooghly, and Chittagong, though nearer the sea, suffers in an accentuated form a similar handicap. Burma is very similarly conditioned, Rangoon, Moulmein, Bassein and Tavoy being all on estuaries at some distance from the Bay of Bengal, and the three last named suffer also from indifferent internal communications. As a result of these physical characteristics practically six-sevenths of India's foreign trade is concentrated in seven ports, Calcutta, Bombay, Karachi, Madras, Cochin and Vizagapatam to name them in order of their importance, of which Bombay, Karachi and Cochin alone are natural harbours.

The major ports of Calcutta, Bombay, Rangoon, Karachi, Madras and Chittagong are for administrative purposes placed under the control of bodies styled Port Trusts or Port Commissioners. These bodies are composed of Trustees or Commissioners partly nominated and partly elected, who, subject to control of the

Local or Imperial Government, have certain wide powers vested in them by law to levy dues and taxes in connection with the landing and shipping of goods and to utilize the amounts so realized for the betterment of the amenities of the port.

### Karachi

With the advent of Pakistan, the importance of Karachi is bound to increase.

For about a hundred and fifty years, Karachi has been the gate of foreign commerce not only for Sind but also for a great part of North-West India, Baluchistan and Afghanistan; but the value of its trade at the time of the conquest of Sind in 1843, amounted to no more than £80,000 but this was due to a temporary cause, *viz.*, the effect of the American war on the Indian cotton market, and it was not until after direct rail communication had been established with the Punjab in 1878 that this level was again touched. Though Karachi possesses large railway workshops, well-equipped modern flour mills, an optical factory and a carbon and ribbon manufacturing factory, it cannot be regarded as an industrial centre, but it is of importance as the principal market and port of shipment for the surplus produce of North-West India and as a storage depot for the manufacturers and



## SOME ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN

foreign produce which the hinterland requires in exchange for the raw products sent down. The principal exports are wheat, cotton, barley, rice, gram, oilseeds, wood, hides and skins and animal bones (bone meal, bone dust, etc.,) and the principal imports, cotton and woollen piecegoods, sugar, machinery, iron and steel, mineral oils, coal and coke (largely on Government account for the North Western Railway). This port now ranks as the third maritime port of importance in India.

With the introduction of the air mail services between India and foreign countries in the year 1929, Karachi has become the leading air port of India. It is now the headquarters of the Chief Aerodrome Officer, Civil Aviation Department.

The following table will show the value of trade of the port of Karachi and the revenue and expenditure of the Port Trust prior to the War.

Year	Import	Export	Total	Revenue	Expenditure
1932-33	19,975,062	13,524,487	33,499,549	444,139	472,322
1933-34	16,634,442	15,155,730	31,790,172	464,537	492,790
1934-35	18,783,054	18,309,946	37,093,000	512,001	496,733

The bulk of the business of import and export is in the hands of Europeans and Sindhi Hindus.

The advent of Pakistan should mean im-

provement in the business of European firms and the deterioration of Hindu firms. Pakistan will do good business with them who concede sovereign state.

### **Bombay**

The port of Bombay, which is situated on an island of the same name in latitude  $18^{\circ} 55'$  N. longitude  $72^{\circ} 54'$  E., owes its importance to its geographical position and to its magnificent natural harbour. As is well known, the island was part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, Queen of Charles II, who conferred it for an annual rent of £10 upon the East India Company in 1668. After the conquest of the Deccan 150 years later Bombay became a provincial capital, but until the middle of the 19th century it continued little more than a collecting centre for the smaller ports of the west coast and for the relatively small strip of land between the western Ghats and the sea. A period of progress was initiated by the establishment in 1838 of a regular monthly mail service to England by the overland route across Egypt and twelve years later commenced the work of linking up Bombay by railway with the cotton growing tracts above the Ghats and the wheat fields of the Punjab and the United Provinces. The American Civil War gave

Bombay cotton an unparalleled opportunity and if the reckless speculation which ensued swallowed up many private fortunes, the port itself emerged with its wharves and accommodation greatly increased and improved and its commercial potentialities unimpaired.

In the following table the total value of the trade of the port during the thirty seven years ending 1934-35 is recorded.

Year	Value of imports	Value of exports	Total
	£	£	£
1897-98	24,850,330	28,889,260	53,739,590
1902-03	38,562,000	39,104,460	77,666,460
1907-08	60,852,330	47,791,000	108,643,330
1912-13	85,471,660	56,922,660	142,394,320
1917-18	79,642,660	70,921,600	150,564,260
1922-23	123,445,332	93,571,311	217,016,643
1927-28	110,127,670	77,701,823	187,829,493
1932-33	57,308,415	84,202,931	141,511,346
1933-34	51,003,802	82,376,665	133,380,467
1934-35	59,362,458	85,236,719	144,599,177

Bombay is connected with Gujarat and Northern India by the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway and with the Deccan, Central India, the Gangetic plain, Calcutta and Madras by the Great Indian Peninsula Railway. Of the raw materials brought down to the port for export,

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

by far the most important is cotton, the other principal items being coal, hides twist and yarn, grain and seeds and manganese ore, while bullion, cotton manufactures, hardware, metals, machinery, kerosene oil, sugar and timber are the chief imports. Bombay has not the advantages possessed by Calcutta in having rich coal-fields within two hundred miles or a system of navigable rivers to bring produce down to the port, but on the other hand she boasts a natural harbour directly upon the sea, which, thanks to its situation, is open at all times of the year.

The principal shipping lines calling at Bombay are the same as those of Calcutta. There is also a large pilgrim traffic to the Hedjaz and trade with the Persian Gulf ports in which Indian merchants take a preponderating part. The coasting trade with Karachi, Kathiawar, the Malabar coast and Goa is of considerable importance. The number of vessels which entered and cleared in the foreign trade in the year 1913-14 was 1,536 with an aggregate tonnage of 3,837,111. In 1934-35, the corresponding figures were 1,282 and 5,960,555.

The following table gives a comparison between the years 1913-14 and 1934-35 of the prin-

# SOME ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN

Principal items of import and export trade dealt with at the port of Bombay.

## Trade of the Port

### IMPORTS

Quantity	Particulars of the Principal items of trade	Unit	Quantity
1913-14			1934-35
326,000	Bricks, Tiles, Churnam & sand	Tons	211,000
656,000	Coal	"	197,000
522,000	Cotton	Bales	741,000
96,000	Firewood	Tons	34,000
298,000	Grain	"	406,000
125,000	Hardware	Packages	22,000
12,000	"	Tons	20,000
238,000	Iron & Steel	"	80,000
139,000	Machinery Boilers & Rly. Materials.	"	91,000
42,649,000	{ Oil, fuel	Gallons	49,800,000
452,000	{ Oil, kerosene	Bales & Cases.	326,000
	{ Piece-goods		
225,000	Sugar	Tons	83,000
102,000	Timber	"	77,000
49,000	Twist & yarn	Bales	101,000

# EXPORTS

Quantity	Particulars of the Principal items of trade	Unit	Quantity
1913-14			1934-35
2,195,000	Cotton	Bales	1,924,000
451,000	Grain	Tons	167,000
51,000	Groundnuts	"	80,000
(404,000) nos	Hides	"	2,000
31,000	Iron	"	35,000
612,000	Manganese ore	"	54,000
31,000	Myrobalans	"	31,000
5,267,300	Oil, Kerosene	Gallons	633,000
237,000	Piece-goods	Bales & cases	364,000
822,000	Seeds	Tons	254,000
46,000	Sugar	"	14,000
529,000	Twist & yarn	Bales	105,000

Bombay has in recent years become an important centre of the Film trade. A great deal of the prosperity that has come to the port in this connection is due to the happy union of Bombay finance and Punjab good looks ! Within the Pakistan area all cinemas must absolutely be prohibited and so much of the box office takings upon which Bombay producers count so much will be substantially reduced. And as for actresses, the Laws of Pakistan will place a heavy embargo on export.

Perhaps, in this direction Bombay may find recompense from Khalistan.

### Madras

The next port of importance as one proceeds along the coast is Madras, the capital and chief port of the Presidency of that name, 1,032 miles south-west of Calcutta, which has a population exceeding half a million. Until an artificial harbour was constructed, Madras was an open roadstead with a surf-beaten coast line, communication between ship and shore being effected by masula boats and catamarans. The present harbour has been formed by two concrete walls projecting into sea so as to enclose a space of about 200 acres with an entrance from the north-east, within which as many as 14 vessels drawing up to 31' 6" can be accommodated.

There are seven wharves five of which are provided with all modern convenience for rapid discharge and loading, and alongside each one vessel can lie in 26 to 30 feet of water at low tide. There are also seven mooring berths inside the harbour and one berth outside, protected by the north arm of the harbour. Two tugs, one of 800 I.H.P. and the other of 450 I.H.P. are available at all hours for assisting in the mooring and unmooring of vessels.

Lading and shipping of cargo for vessels at moorings is effected by lighters of 20 to 100 tons capacity. These lighters are discharged and loaded at the wharves. The western face of the harbour has been quayed so that the ships can now lie alongside and work cargo direct out of and into the sheds. There are three other quays, connected up by rail with all parts of the harbour for the discharge of case oil and petrol coal, horses and cattle. Vessels can enter and leave the harbour at all times of the day and night. Oil from bulk oil steamers is pumped ashore direct through the pipes into the merchants' installations.

The harbour is connected with the broad gauge system of the Madras and Southern Mahratta Railways on one side and the metre gauge system of the South Indian Railway on the other. All sheds and quays are adequately served by railway sidings so that cargo may be discharged into or out of railway wagons directly by steamers.

The value of the trade of the port of Madras and the income and expenditure of the Port Trust over a series of years :



## SOME ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN

Year	Value of imports	Value of exports	Total	Receipts	Expenditure
1897-98	4,789,686	3,783,738	8,573,424	41,712	41,774
1902-03	5,105,249	3,622,794	8,627,043	49,224	38,237
1907-08	7,198,012	3,918,648	11,116,660	70,134	50,219
1912-13	8,438,056	6,004,815	14,442,871	83,025	56,567
1917-18	8,859,774	7,224,478	16,084,252	107,068	81,635
1922-23	15,420,770	9,152,826	24,573,596	186,950	148,904
1927-28	19,282,160	16,891,596	36,173,756	337,853	248,936
1932-33	12,721,454	8,370,126	21,091,580	223,980	240,938
1933-34	11,822,170	8,746,499	20,568,669	229,881	225,045
1934-35	13,498,566	8,576,409	22,074,975	254,547	227,380

### Calcutta

There is bound to be a tussel over Calcutta as to whether it is going to be the Eastern gateway to Pakistan or not. From every point of view it would be a very desirable asset.

But there are difficulties in the way.

*Firstly*, the city is situated in a Hindu majority area, and then in the city itself Muslims are only one-third of the total population.

*Secondly*, and unfortunately, the Lahore Resolution was so badly framed, that Calcutta and other important commercial and industrial centres do not fall within the boundaries set for Pakistan.

*Thirdly*, the Bengalee is instinctively averse

to partition. He does not hesitate to support a good argument with a good revolver.

And now for a few facts about this important city. Calcutta, situated in latitude  $22^{\circ} 33'$  N. longitude  $38^{\circ} 21'$  E. on the river Hooghly with a population, including that of Howrah, of about 1,485,582 is the premier city in India and was, until 1911, the Imperial Capital. The port serves the great jute, tea and coal industries, the wheat and seeds traffic of Bihar and the United Provinces and generally the agricultural areas tapped by the main lines of the East Indian, Bengal Nagpur and Eastern Bengal Railways and by the numerous waterways connecting the delta with the interior of Bengal and Assam. The total volume of the rail-borne traffic of Calcutta during the last pre-war year amounted to 10,389,000 tons of which 8,605,000 tons were inwards and 1,784,000 tons outwards, while river steamers and country boats brought into Calcutta during the same year an additional 1,126,000 tons. In 1921-22 the total volume for the year amounted to 7,979,000 tons, of which 6,253,000 tons were inwards and 1,726,000 tons outwards while river steamers and country boats brought in an additional 1,227,000 tons. Figures for the years 1922-23 to 1932-33 are not available as the registration of inland trade statistics remained discontinued during that

# SOME ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN

period. From 1933-34 the accounts relating to the Inland (Rail and River-borne) trade of India have been revised in a modified form. In 1933-34, the total value of rail and river-borne traffic of Calcutta amounted roughly to 7,136,900 tons inwards and 1,212,500 tons outwards. The corresponding figures for 1934-35 are 6,619,700 tons inwards and 1,616,900 tons outwards.

Total value of the trade of Calcutta in private and Government merchandise from 1897-98 :

Year	Value of imports	Value of exports	Total
	£	£	£
1897-98	24,194,456	34,115,694	58,310,150
1902-03	27,206,587	39,222,673	66,429,260
1907-08	44,745,939	52,770,448	97,516,387
1912-13	49,198,270	74,571,532	123,769,802
1913-14	56,528,746	75,000,913	131,529,659
1914-15	47,268,779	52,775,117	100,043,896
1915-16	43,575,434	63,671,836	107,247,270
1916-17	46,575,434	66,787,289	113,362,723
1917-18	47,552,767	62,141,170	109,693,937
1918-19	56,294,737	76,510,900	132,805,637
1919-20	60,167,054	93,850,336	154,017,390
1920-21	81,966,592	74,958,706	156,925,298
1921-22	70,635,859	60,955,127	131,590,986
1922-23	57,011,653	79,881,368	136,893,021
1923-24	54,580,173	83,131,409	137,711,582
1924-25	59,370,217	95,269,484	154,639,701

# CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

Year	Value of imports	Value of exports	Total
	£	£	£
1925-26	55,209,512	95,105,648	150,315,160
1926-27	55,209,512	98,105,648	153,315,160
1927-28	65,214,730	104,766,368	169,981,098
1928-29	66,789,924	103,927,367	170,717,291
1929-30	63,104,338	95,954,560	159,058,898
1930-31	38,695,733	61,400,257	100,095,990
1931-32	25,998,514	44,197,224	70,195,738
1932-33	26,332,897	39,472,075	65,804,972
1933-34	34,332,470	44,170,625	78,503,095
1934-35	26,833,826	43,146,443	69,980,269

The following table will show the quantity of volume of the principal items of import and export in the trade of Calcutta.

Principal items of trade	1934-35 quantity	Value
IMPORTS		£
Cotton piece-goods ... Yds.	497, 534,056	6,030,662
Metal and Ores ... Tons	175,702	3,149,447
Oils ... Gall.	109,627,312	3,396,286
Machinery and Millwork ...		3,306,286
Instruments, apparatus etc. ...		1,285,553
Chemical and chemical preparations ... Cwts.	1,388,186	898,711
Hardware ...		758,111

# SOME ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN

Principal items of trade		1934-35 quantity	Value £
Provision and oilman's store	... Cwt.	327,591	654,943
Paper and Paste-board	..	863,000	625,862
Motor Vehicles	... Nos.	4,433	572,840
Woollen goods	...	...	555,844
Liquors	... Gall.	1,234,064	504,504
Rice	... Tons.	572,280	2,705,843

## EXPORTS

Jute manufactures	... Tons.	798,863	18,089,720
Jute Raw	... ..	715,778	7,706,821
Tea	... ..	98,922	9,043,386
Cotton raw	... ..	6,122	225,705
Rice	... ..	106,861	789,720
Pulses	... ..	41,956	293,158
Hides and skin, raw	... ..	25 282	1,577,150
Lac	... ..	19,005	2,450,128
Manures	... ..	30,918	139,080
Coal (excluding bunker coal)	... ..	2,080,107	1,355,971
Seeds	... ..	111,618	997,688
Pig Iron	... ..	417,046	694,981
Manganese ore	... ..	208,498	267,635
Mica	... ..	4,686	458,037

If Calcutta is included in the Pakistan area it will probably be the capital of Bangistan, which is the name given to the eastern wing of Pakistan.

## Finance and Trade

The bulk of India's external trade is financed by branches of the large British Colonial and foreign exchange banks. The principal exchange banks transacting business in India are (1) the *Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China*, with branches in Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Rangoon, Karachi, Lahore, Amritsar, Delhi, Cawnpore, Chittagong, Mandalay, Tuticorin, Cochin and Aden; (2) the *Mercantile Bank of India* with branches in Calcutta, Howrah, Madras, Rangoon, Karachi, Simla and Delhi; (3) the *Eastern Bank* with branches in Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Karachi, and also in Baghdad; (4) the *P. & O. Banking Corporation* with branches at Bombay, Calcutta and Karachi, Rangoon, Delhi, New Delhi, Simla; (5) *Lloyds Bank*, Lahore, Amritsar, Rawalpindi, Murree, Srinagar and Gulmarg; the head offices of these five banks being in London; (6) the *Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation* with its head office at Hong Kong, and branches in Bombay, Calcutta and Rangoon; (7) the *Yokohama Specie Bank*, with its head office at Yokohama, and branches in Calcutta, Bombay, Karachi and Rangoon, and (8) the *National City Bank of New York*, with branches at Calcutta, Bombay and Rangoon.

There would be sufficient foreign banks in

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Pakistan to provide the finance for external trade. These would no doubt be permitted to operate but banking as a general proposition would come to an end. No truly Islamic State could encourage internal banking based as it is essentially on usury and interest.

There are at present the following more important joint stock banks in India.

	<i>(in lakhs of Rupees)</i>			
	Capital	Reserve	Deposits	Cash & Investment
Allahabad	... 35	56	2,087	1,368
Ass. Banking	... 6	...	208	127
Bank of Baroda	... 100	100	2,639	2,123
Bank of Hindustan	... 8	...	19	14
Bank of India	... 148	178	6,082	4,901
Bank of Mysore	... 20	30	822	572
Bharat	... 201	6	1,396	1,019
Bombay Prov.	... 13	3	409	269
Canara Bank	... 26	8	230	177
Canara Indust.	... 19	2	140	111
Central Bank	... 251	202	9,448	7,246
Devkarn Banking	... 50	12	723	643
Habib Bank	... 50	3	394	364
India Bank	... 33	33	1,052	806
Internat. Bank	... 12	...	188	107
National Savings	... 18	1	419	314
Punjab National	... 31	31	2,627	1,790
Union Bank	... 40	14	411	397
United Com.	... 100	7	1,722	1,144

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

From the above it will be clear that there is only one Muslim bank, the *Habib Bank Limited*. It has not established any branch, so far as is known in the Pakistan area, but will no doubt do so in the early future.

There is no doubt that the advent of Pakistan will adversely affect most Hindu banking institutions. The *Punjab National Bank* would have to become the Pakistan National Bank and dismiss its directors and staff if it is to survive the partition.

From the analysis of cheques cleared annually the measure of internal trade may be taken. The following are the figures for 1944 :

Calcutta	...	222,282 lakhs of rupees
Bombay	...	217,284           ,,
Madras	...	21,652           ,,
Karachi	...	11,693           ,,
Lahore	...	4,000           ,,

From the above it will be clear that Pakistan has a leeway to make up in trade and finance before it can rival Hindustan in these matters.

### Agriculture

The agriculture of the sub-continent of India, with its wide range of physical and climatological



conditions, varies considerably in character and scope. There is scarcely any cultivated crop of the temperate, sub-temperate or tropical zones which cannot be grown in some part of this vast country from the warm, humid coast-lands to the perennially temperate altitudes of its mountain ranges.

The total area of culturable land in India, excluding Burma is about 358 million acres, which is exclusive of a forest area of approximately 68 million acres. The total gross cropped area, sown annually, is roughly 248 million acres. Of this vast area, 187 million acres are under cereal and pulse crops of all kinds which supply food and fodder for India's human population of 400 million and her animal population of 380 million head of cattle, sheep and goats.

In Indian agriculture, the dominant climatological factor is the monsoon and, in most parts of the country, the total annual rainfall is precipitated between the months of June and October. The winter and early summer months are generally dry and high temperatures prevail in the months from March to June, prior to the break of monsoon rains. Thus the agricultural season is naturally divided into two main sub-divisions, the *kharif* season of the monsoon and the *rabi*

season of the cold weather. Each of these seasons has its own distinctive crops. The greater part of the Indo-Gangetic plain and the northern tracts of the Peninsula are served by the main monsoon which falls between June and October. During these months the average rainfall for the whole of India is about 40 inches, varying from 15 (or less) to 50 inches in the main cultivated tracts. Rainfall in the cold weather season between December and March is generally not more than 2 to 4 inches. The bulk of rainfall in the South India, including most of the Madras Province and the bulk of the territories of the two large Indian states of Hyderabad and Mysore is received from the North-East monsoon and falls during the period October to February.

*Soils.*—Four main soil groups can be recognised in India, *viz.*, (1) the red soils derived from rocks of the Archæan system which characterise Madras, Mysore and the South-East of Bombay and extend through the east of Hyderabad and the Central Provinces to Orissa, Chota Nagpur and the South of Bengal; (2) the black cotton or regur soils which overlie the Deccan trap and cover the greater part of Bombay, Berar and the western parts of the Central Provinces and Hyderabad with extensions into Central India

and Bundelkhand. The Madras regur soils though less typical are also important ; (3) the great alluvial plains, agriculturally the most important tract in India as well as the most extensive, mainly the Indo-Gangetic plain embracing Sind, Northern Rajputana, most of the Punjab, the plains of the United Provinces, most of Bihar and Bengal and half of Assam ; (4) The laterite soils which form a belt round the Peninsula and extend through East Bengal into Assam and Burma.

The increasing demands on the land from a constantly rising population have called forth greater attention to the question of a more effective land utilization. A considerable amount of scientific work is thus being done on all these groups to a greater or lesser extent throughout the country, both as regards their classification as well as their crop-producing power. Soil studies have been given a new orientation and have received fresh stimulus due to the concept of the "soil-profile" or entire vertical cut of the soil being taken as the unit of study instead of the superficial layer supporting vegetation. A notable instance of such work is the recent classification of the black cotton soils of the Bombay canals and the investigations regarding their suitability for sugarcane growing. The importance of soil

survey and soil mapping is being gradually recognised in different parts of the country. At the Imperial Agricultural Institute, Delhi, a soil map of India has been prepared on the basis of available data while an All-India scheme of soil survey has recently been launched to collect and collate further data on Indian soils. In Hyderabad and Madras large-scale soil surveys of irrigation projects have been completed whereas intensive survey of the sugarcane soils has been a special feature in the United Provinces and Bombay. In the latter Provinces soil maps are now supplied by the Departments of Agriculture on payment, wherein all the necessary informations required for the successful growing of sugarcane are indicated.

In addition to the four main groups of Indian soils mentioned above, the desert soils of India occupy a large tract in Eastern Sind extending over the whole length of that Province, along the edge of the Indus alluvium, Rajputana and the South Punjab of which, the Thar, a Rajputana desert alone occupies an area of 40,000 square miles. Alkali soils also form an important group of Indian soils which are known as *reh* or *usar* in the United Provinces, *kalar* in Sind, *rakkar* and *thur* in the Punjab and *chopau* or *karl* in Bombay Provinces. Such soils are characterised by a high

degree of impermeability and stickiness together with high alkalinity and frequent presence of large excess of free salts. They are usually poor in nitrogen and humus and unsuitable for crop growing without previous proclamation. Forest soils occupy a large part of India. Investigations on the nature of soil profiles of the Chubatia Hill in U.P. and of the Kulu forest in the Punjab indicate that these soils belong to the Brown Earth and Podsol groups.

From an examination of the figures relating to the areas under irrigation in each Province, it will be clear that the Pakistan areas would have approximately one-third of the total culturable areas. On a closer analysis of the principal crops and figures of export and internal consumption the economic prospects of Pakistan are far from rosy.

Let us examine them in turn.

### **Sugarcane**

India, until recently a large importer of sugar, is now one of the most important sugarcane growing countries in the world. The area in 1944-45 was estimated to be 4,024,000 acres as against 4,113,000 acres in 1943-44. The crop is mostly grown in the submontane tracts of Northern India, more than half the area being in

the United Provinces. The indigenous, hard, thin lowsucrose canes have now largely been replaced by seedling cane of high quality mainly the productions of the Imperial Sugarcane Breeding Stations, Coimbatore. The total area under improved varieties of cane in India in 1940-41 was estimated to be 3,529,693 acres representing approximately 74.9 per cent of the total area. The number of factories in different Provinces and States has increased from 57 in 1932-33 to 167 in 1941-42 with 151 working factories during the season of 1943-44. The production of sugar direct from cane during the season of 1943-44 totalled 1,216,400 tons as against 1,070,700 tons in 1942-43, showing an increase of 13.6 per cent. The average extraction for the whole of India was 10.02. Owing to the international situation, sugar imports were negligible during 1943-44, but the supply position continues to be satisfactory.

### **Cotton**

Cotton is one of the most important commercial crops in India. The average area under cotton in the quinquennium ending 1937-38 was 24.6 million acres and the average yield 5.5 million bales of 400 lbs. each.

During the five-year period ending 1942-43,

the average yield was 5·5 million bales of 400 lbs. each. During the five-year period ending 1942-43, the average annual acreage and yield decreased to about 23·3 million acres and 5·4 million bales respectively. In 1943-44 the estimated area and yield were 20·4 million acres and 5·1 million bales respectively. The ascertained area under improved varieties of cotton in 1943-44 was about 10·7 million acres. The consumption of Indian cotton in mills in India amounted to 4,119,900 bales in 1943-44. The principal export is of short staple cotton below 7/8" in staple but there is also in normal years an export of medium and a long staple Indian cotton of staple length 7/8" to 1-1/16" such as Punjab American. There is no Indian cotton belt. Bombay Province, the Punjab, the Central Provinces and Berar, Madras Province, Sind and United Provinces and the Indian States of Hyderabad and Baroda, all have important cotton tracts producing distinct types. Sowing and harvesting seasons are equally diverse, the former extending from May to December in different parts of the country and the latter from October to May and June. Yields vary greatly; in the best irrigated tracts the normal yield is about 200 lbs. of ginned cotton per acre and yields much above this have been recorded whilst in the poorest unirrigated tracts

60 lbs. per acre is a good crop. Of recent years, as the results of the work of the Agricultural Departments and the Indian Central Cotton Committee, the quality and yield of staple cotton have improved and also the yield and cleanliness of the produce from the short staple tracts.

The Cotton Transport Act, the Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factories Act, the Bombay Cotton Markets Act, the Central Provinces Cotton Markets Act and the Madras (Commercial Crops) Markets Act have all been passed at the instance of the Committee and are doing much to check adulteration and promote better marketing. In certain provinces, legislation has been enacted, or is under consideration, with the aim of preventing the growing of very inferior varieties and of stopping certain malpractices which affect the quality and reputation of Indian cotton. Agricultural Departments have continued their campaign of cotton improvement apart from improvement in methods of cultivation.

*Exports.*—The figures for export by sea of Indian cotton from British India to foreign countries for the five fiscal years (ending 31st March) 1937-42 are shown in the following table :



# SOME ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN

*(in thousand bales of 400 lbs. each).*

Countries	1937-38	1938-39	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42
United Kingdom ...	395	411	472	291	547
Other parts of British Empire ...	28	23	27	43	76
Japan ...	1,359	1,211	1,056	705	385
Italy ...	151	92	52	5	...
France ...	95	169	229	126	...
China (exclusive of Hongkong)...	69	193	681	754	141
Belgium ...	196	142	68	5	...
Spain ...	...	2	15	...	...
Germany ...	166	192	52	...	...
Other countries	277	268	296	239	...
Total ...	2,736	2,703	2,948	2,168	1,149

The average area under cotton in the Bombay Presidency proper, including Indian States, during the five years ending 1934-35 was 6,115,000 acres, of which the share of the British districts was 3,735,000 acres, and that of the Indian States 2,380,000 acres. In 1934-35, the estimated area in the Presidency proper was 6,267,000, of which 2,610,000 acres are in the Indian States. In Sind, the area shown in 1934-35 is estimated at 705,000 acres inclusive of 31,000 acres in the Khairpur State. Total area and yield in Bombay (including Sind and Indian

States) are estimated at 6,972,000 acres and 1,400,000 bales in 1934-35, as compared with 6,469,000 acres and 1,421,000 bales, [the corresponding estimates of the previous year.

The production of long staple (over 1 inch) cotton in India during the years 1933-34 and 1934-35 was 24,000 and 51,000 bales of 400 lbs. each, respectively.

During the five years ending 1933-34, the average area cropped with cotton was 4,544,600 acres, equivalent to about 19 per cent of the total for India. In 1934-35 the total acreage was 4,201,000.

In the total crop are included some 2,000 bales of *Chanda Jari* (*G. indicum*) and about 1,500 bales of buri which, if marketed pure, are equal to the Middling Americans. The rest with the exception of about 20,000 bales of the newly introduced medium stapled verum cottons, are all short staple cottons which are commercially classed as Oomras. The most important tracts are the four districts of Berar and the adjacent districts of Nimar, Wardha and Nagpur. The main varieties produced being (i) Berar and Central Provinces, respectively ; (ii) *roseum* in Berar and the adjoining tracts, (iii) *Chanda Jari* (*G. indicum*) as a cold weather crop in the Chanda

district and in the Hinganghat Tehsil of the Wardha district, and (iv) improved *verum* which are gradually replacing the *jaris* and *roseum* all over the provinces. The acreage under buri is also tending to increase in and around Burhanpur Tehsil. The new improved wilt resistant *verums* are marketed pure to the extent of about 5,000 bales under Departmental control and obtain an average premium of Rs. 40 (£3) over Broach.

The estimated average area under cotton in the Madras Presidency for the five years ending 1933-34 was 2,184,000 acres and the estimated average yield 441,500 bales. In 1934-35 the estimated area and yield were 2,320,000 acres and 477,000 bales, respectively. About half of the total crop comes within the Lancashire definition of long staple.

For the five years ending 1934-35, the average area under cotton in the Punjab was 2,633,913 acres inclusive of 481,840 acres returned by Indian States. The figures for 1934-35 were 2,883,563 acres (2,347,063 acres in the Punjab and 536,500 acres in Indian States). 92 per cent of the area under cotton in the British districts of the Punjab was under irrigation and nearly one-third of it was under medium staple Punjab

American cotton chiefly 4F. Long staple 289F was grown on an area of 56,000 acres.

For the quinquennium ending 1932-33 the average acreage under cotton was 773,000. In 1932-33 the area was 527,000 acres including Rampur. Practically the whole of the cotton of the Province is sold under the commercial name '*Bengala*' with the staple of 3/8" to 4/8" for ordinary Bengals and 5/8" to 7/8" for fine Bengal.

For the five years ending 1933-34 the area under cotton in the Central India Agency averaged 1,201,000 acres. In addition to this, the average acreage during the quinquennium in Gwalior was 619,000. The estimated area and yield in 1934-35 were 1,173,000 acres and 131,000 bales.

The main cotton growing tract is the southern part of the western of the two detached areas, of which the Agency is composed. Malwa cotton is grown on the Malwa plateau, and elsewhere the type known as Central India, both of which belong to the trade description Oomras.

In the Rajputana States, the average area under cotton for the five years ending 1933-34 was 475,000 acres, exclusive of 32,000 acres in Ajmer-Merwara.

The five years ending 1933-34, the average

acreage under cotton was 17,000 acres. The bulk of the crop is grown under irrigation in the Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan districts and is known in the trade as North West-Frontier Province. Its ginning percentage is 32, and as the length of its staple is only from  $5/8$ " to  $6/8$ ", it scarcely satisfies the Bombay standard of long staple.

The bulk of the shipments of raw cotton has always gone to the Far East and the Continent, but the United Kingdom in recent times is participating in an increasing degree in the trade. Whereas during the war and in its aftermath, the exports to the United Kingdom consisted on an average of 80,000 bales, in 1933-34, no less than 342,000 bales were shipped there. Her importation in that year is only next to that of Japan, the biggest consuming country of Indian raw cotton. As compared with the figures of 1932-33, China has also increased her takings though she is still far below the average of the previous five years. Japan took 37·4 per cent of the total exports as compared with 52·7 per cent in 1932-33. Great efforts were made in the early part of the last decade to extend the area under cotton in Japan and Korea but the acreage in Japan has been curtailed considerably since 1930-31. Japan's intake of American cotton has fallen

slightly. A convention and protocol regarding the commercial relations between India and Japan was concluded in 1933 and enforced with effect from the 8th January 1934 under which the imports of Japanese cotton piecegoods in India and exports of Indian raw cotton to Japan have been regulated. The main feature of the protocol is that if in any calendar year, one million bales of raw cotton are exported from India to Japan, the quantity of cotton piecegoods which may be exported from Japan to India in the corresponding fiscal year shall be a basic allotment of 325 million linear yards. Corresponding adjustments have been provided to cover shipments in excess or defect. Under the Bombay-Lancashire Textile Agreement, 1933, entered into by the British Textile Mission to India and the Millowners' Association, Bombay, further efforts have been made in the United Kingdom to popularise and promote the use of Indian cotton.

India's imports of raw cotton amounted to 42,896 tons in 1933-34 of which more than 56 per cent mainly Uganda cotton came from the Kenya Colony.

Nearly 900 tons of foreign raw cotton were exported from India in 1933-34.

With these exports must be contrasted the

estimated consumption of indigenous cotton by Indian mills which is arrived at by deducting the quantity of raw cotton imported from the gross figures of mill consumption. No exact estimate of extra mill or domestic consumption is possible, but 750,000 bales of 400 lbs. each is probably fairly accurate. The quantity of handspun cotton is not considerable as the handloom weavers generally depend for the bulk of their requirements upon yarn from the mills.

### **Cotton Manufactures**

Of the cotton produced in India it may be said in general terms that about one-half is exported raw while the balance is manufactured into yarn and cloth in Indian mills. *The chief centre of the cotton manufacturing industry as of the trade in raw cotton is Bombay.* Cotton manufactures now represent about 7 per cent of the total value of Indian manufactures exported and about 2 per cent of the total export trade of the country. The first cotton mill in India was started in 1838 at Ghosery near Calcutta and the first to be opened in Bombay dates from 1853 with 5,000 spindles. At the end of December 1933 the total number of mills in existence was 344, giving employment to 428,658 persons.

Between 1898 and 1918 the number of

spindles increased by nearly 50 per cent and the number of looms by 211 per cent but the tendency during the last twenty-five years has been more towards enlarging existing mills rather than opening new ones. Indeed India at the outbreak of war ranked as fourth among the countries of the world manufacturing cotton textiles being exceeded by Great Britain, the United States and Germany only. The Indian cotton textile industry has developed considerably since then and India now ranks third, being exceeded by the United States of America and Japan only.

Of the total number of mills in India 191 are in Bombay Presidency, 17 in Bengal, 22 in the United Provinces, 29 in Madras, 11 in the Central Provinces and Berar, 9 in the Punjab, 4 in Delhi, 4 in Ajmer-Merwara, 1 in Burma, 1 in Bihar and Orissa, 3 in French India and the rest in Indian States, chiefly in Central India and Baroda. The mills of the Bombay Presidency (chiefly situated in Bombay city and Ahmedabad) produce 53 per cent of the yarn spun and 64 per cent of the cloth woven. The statement below originally compiled by the Industrial Commission and now brought up-to-date indicates that the mill-made and foreign yarn available for handloom weavers averaged in the six years, 1908-09 to 1913-14, over 250 millions lbs. and in the last seven years



there has been a remarkable increase in this figure as well as in mill consumption.

Further facts and figures set out above, it is clearly manifest that the Pakistan area produces a very large percentage of the total of raw cotton produced in the country. It is also manifest, that except for a very small number, the bulk of the indigenous cotton mills are situated in the non-Pakistan areas and cannot either by argument or plebiscite be included in the Pakistan group.

We must, accordingly, expect the Pakistan cotton growers to be either at the mercy of the Hindustan millowners or at the mercy of Lancashire weavers.

At any rate, neither is going to buy the cotton except at "bargain" prices.

Whatever else Pakistan may or may not achieve, it will certainly have it its credit the economic downfall of the Muslim agriculturist.

### **Wheat**

Wheat is grown widely throughout Northern India as a winter crop, the United Provinces and the Punjab supplying about two-thirds of the total area, and nearly three-quarters of the total

outrun in India. This crop occupies, on an average, about 10 per cent. of the total cultivated area in the country. The majority of the varieties grown belong to the species *Triticum vulgare*. Indian wheats are generally white, red and amber coloured and are mostly classed as 'soft' from a commercial point of view. Most of the Indian wheats are soft weak wheats but there are some well-known *Maccaroni* wheats, amongst them. The largest wheat acreage of recent years was that of 1933-34, namely 35 million acres but the yield did not come up to the record harvest of 1939-40 which exceeded  $10\frac{1}{2}$  million tons. Recent crops have averaged about 9 million tons per annum which is only slightly, if anything, above internal requirements. With the development of irrigation from the Lloyd Barrage Canal in Sind and in the newer Punjab Canal Colonies, a further increase in wheat production is certain. The crop is generally grown after a summer fallow and except in irrigated tracts, depends largely on the conservation of the soil moisture from the previous monsoon. On irrigated land 2 to 4 waterings are generally given. The crop is generally harvested from February to April but threshing and winnowing may go on up till the end of May. The total area under improved varieties of wheat is now over 8 million acres. The Imperial

Council of Agricultural Research has appointed two Standing Committees to advise on problems connected with rice and wheat.

Though India produces about one-eighth of the world's wheat, this grain is an indispensable article of food to the inhabitants of the Punjab and the United Provinces only. In other Provinces extension of cultivation was dictated more by the prospects of profitable export to Europe than by internal demand. The six principal countries which export wheat are Canada, Australia, Argentina, U. S. S. R., India and the United States of America in that order, while as regards production, India occupies the third place with about a third of the Russian crop and nearly three times that of Australia.

India's participation in the world's wheat market dates from 1870, when the opening of the Suez Canal brought the wheat fields of the United Provinces, within thirty days of Europe. In the early days of the trade the wheat grown in those Provinces was railed down to Calcutta for shipment until the extension of the railway system enabled Bombay to compete, and then with the expansion of irrigation in the Punjab the trend of exports has gradually drifted north-westward and Karachi where, it is claimed, the cost of

handling and storage is lower than at Calcutta or Bombay, has now assumed a commanding position. Wheat is bought at centres up-country, such as Lyallpur, and bagged and railed down to Karachi where it is sold by the candy of 8 mds. of 82  $\frac{2}{7}$  lbs. each, manipulated and stored before shipment, chiefly to the United Kingdom. Shipment is usually made in bags of 2 cwts. nett. In Bombay wheat is sold and shipped in bags varying in weight, from 196 to 210 lbs. nett. Quotations to the United Kingdom are generally per quarter of 492 lbs. nett. Typical descriptions on the Karachi market are white, including 5 per cent barley, 3 per cent dirt, 30 per cent red, including 5 per cent barley and 3 per cent dirt and superior grades, white and red with admixtures in each case of 2 per cent barley and  $1\frac{1}{2}\%$  dirt only. Though the chief varieties of wheat exported from India fall within the definition of soft wheat commercially, there are hard wheats (red and yellow) grown in Central India which find a market in Marseilles and Italy, where they are used in the manufacture of maccaroni. In the general absence of wheat elevators, Karachi, with a rainfall that seldom exceeds five inches, has great advantages over Bombay, where the monsoon rains are heavy and the general humidity throughout the year

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much higher. The wheat awaiting shipment in Karachi can be stored at the docks in open sheds with very little risk of damage by rain.

The distribution of the exports of wheat, among the three principal ports interested, is shown in the following table. No less than 81% of the shipment in 1935-36 went from Karachi, the shares of Bombay and Calcutta in this trade having steadily declined since the World War I.

Exports of wheat in 1913-14, 1918-19 and from 1932-33 onwards :

Principal ports	1913-14	1918-19	1932-33	1933-34	1934-35	1935-36
	tons	tons	tons	tons	tons	tons
Karachi ...	893,324	410,127	615	739	9,510	7,833
Bombay ...	235,640	39,643	1,308	1,235	1,280	1,541
Calcutta ...	73,191	25,362	168	74	142	16
Total ...	1,232,155	485,132	2,091	2,048	10,932	9,390
Quantities ...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Value £ ...	6,755,571	4,502,062	28,670	24,522	79,543	71,105

The principal recipient of Indian wheat has

always been the United Kingdom. In 1935-36 72% of the total shipments went to that destination.

Wheat prices are always expressed in India by the number of seers (of 2·05 lbs.) sold for a rupee and the higher the figures the cheaper the wheat.

*Wheat flour.*—The exports of wheat flour correspond pretty closely, when uncontrolled, to those of wheat. The products of the mills are known by the vernacular names *maida*, *atta*, and *suji* which are statistically shown under the common head of wheat flour. These names represent three grades of flour in order of fineness. *Suji* is the round, granular meal of inferior quality obtained by grinding wheat which has been moistened overnight and then passing it through a sieve the bran mixed up with it being later on separated by winnowing. It is used chiefly for making a sort of coarse porridge and as a constituent in certain bazar sweetmeats. The other two qualities are obtained by regrinding *suji* and passing it through a second sieve, the finer flour resulting being called *maida*, and the coarser *atta*. While the former is the luxury of the richer classes, the latter baked into coarse cakes called *chappatis* comprises the main food of the poor in many parts of India. The chief des-

tinations for wheat flour before the war were Egypt, Asiatic Turkey, Mauritius, Aden, Ceylon, the Straits Settlements and the United Kingdom, the variety generally shipped being *atta*. Arabia, Straits Settlements, Kenya Colony and Aden are now the principal participants.

Exports of wheat flour (quantities and values) in 1913-14, 1918-19 and 1931-32 onwards :

<i>Year</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Value</i>
	tons	£
1913-14	79,412	884,068
1918-19	30,942	543,021
1931-32	42,724	434,788
1932-33	20,790	207,726
1933-34	12,536	122,812
1934-35	11,763	110,009
1935-36	18,031	167,015

It would be thus apparent that the Punjab agriculturist has in past depended on three markets for his wheat.

- (1) The home market.
- (2) The foreign market.
- (3) Indian markets other than home markets.

The fertilisation of large tracts in Sind on

account of the Lloyd Barrage has had the effect of creating serious competition to Punjab at Karachi and in foreign markets. With the success of the Barrage scheme, the Punjab grower as well as the Punjab Millowner has looked eastwards for markets. He has endeavoured to push wheat into the Calcutta and Bombay areas and to induce mills in these areas to mill Lyallpur and Sargodha crops. The matter of freight and wagons has always been a problem in both peacetime and in war but with all these handicaps the markets east of Ambala have always been welcome safety valves for excessive Punjab crops and as a price leveller.

The advent of Pakistan and consequent and inevitable tariff walls and tariff preferences must have a deleterious effect on the outlook of the wheat growers of Pakistan. Those in the Ambala area would not be confronted with these problems as they would still retain the important markets of Delhi and Rajputana and would be able to send surpluses to Bombay.

Pakistan could not possibly consume all that *Pakistan* would grow.

Export and foreign markets depend largely on the parity of world prices.

Australia has been and will always be a



serious competitor in the Egyptian and European markets.

For the wheat grower as also the cotton grower the prospects of Pakistan are precarious.

### **Sugar**

The Indian sugar industry is now the second largest industry, next in importance to only the cotton textile industry, giving employment to over 120,000 workers, in addition to about 3000 graduates and technical men and 20 million cultivators, and represents a capital investment of about Rs. 35 crores.

It may be noted also as a matter of interest that India is the largest producer of sugar (including gur) among all the countries in the world the total yield of raw sugar (gur) being 5,452,000 tons (vide the Indian Sugar Industry Annual, for 1943 and 1944, by M. P. Gandhi).

Sheltered behind adequate tariff protection, guaranteed for a period of fifteen years, ending on March 31, 1946, the Indian Sugar industry has made phenomenal progress and has achieved the position now of being the largest sugar producing country in the world. And the capital invested in the industry is variously estimated at between Rs. 30 and 33 crores.

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The following statistics show the progress in recent years :—

### Total quantity of sugar

Year	Tons
1929-30	310,913
1930-31	351,650
1931-32	478,119
1933-34	645,283
1934-35	715,059
1935-36	757,218
1936-37	1,107,167
1937-38	1,230,900
1938-39	1,072,200
1939-40	765,000
1940-41	1,373,400
1941-42	1,268,900
1942-43	941,900
1943-44	1,294,700
1944-45	1,304,000
1945-46	1,065,000

14,681,409

For this important commodity Pakistan would be almost entirely at the mercy of Hindustan, unless the ardent Pakistani agrees to go without sugar in his tea or his *shakkar* in his milk, for as the figures following will show out of the 4½ millions

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acres under sugarcane in India not more than 700,000 acres are under cultivation in Punjab, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province. A great deal of these areas are in the districts that would accede to Hindustan and Khalistan. The bulk of the northern factories are also in this area. Pakistan will have to develop a wholly indigenous sugar industry if it is not to pay fantastic prices to Hindustan growers and manufacturers. Here are the 1940-41 figures for sugarcane production in India :

<i>Provinces</i>		<i>Sugarcane Acres</i>
Ajmer Merwara	...	310
Assam	...	41,131
Bengal	...	331,100
Bihar	...	508,200
Bombay	...	116,836
Central	...	
Provinces and Berar	...	33,260
Coorg	...	12
Delhi	...	2,959
Madras	...	161,716
North-West Frontier Province		95,770
Orissa	...	35,319
Punjab	...	549,173
Sind	...	8,599
United Provinces	...	2,517,654
<b>Total</b>	...	<b>4,402,039</b>

## CHAPTER XII

### Civil War

Civil War seems implicit in Pakistan.

Some people may think that I mention this as a consequence because I am myself not in favour of Civil War. This is not, however, true. Civil War can be quite a good thing. America would never have been able to maintain the union without Civil War. It may be that the unity of India will be established only after some blood has been spilled. Some may say that Pakistan will only be established after some blood had been spilled. At any rate both sides seem pretty well convinced that the argument whether Pakistan is good or bad can only be settled by Civil War.

The Muslim League Legislators' Convention, unanimously adopted the resolution on Pakistan with great acclamation.

Winding up the session, Mr. Jinnah said that the august and historic Convention of the Muslims

nation had declared itself for Pakistan. "While we hope for the best," he said, "we are prepared for the worst. We are prepared to make any and every sacrifice for the attainment of Pakistan. Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State."

Religion, of course, played an important part in a nation's life, Mr. Jinnah declared, but there were other aspects which were vital for a nation's existence. Social, economic and political life were the main pillars which would enable them to live according to their faith. With their social life demoralised and economically ruined, and with no political power they could not defend their faith.

The issue of Pakistan to-day, Mr. Jinnah said, was not a question of minority or majority view, but it was one of unanimity. It was the Muslim minority in the Hindu majority provinces which took up the issue and, after all, it was the minority that always was a pioneer in any renaissance. There were a few who unfortunately played to the tune of their masters' voice, but the few did not count.

The Muslims in the Hindu majority provinces wanted their 70 million brethren to be free and have their own independent State. Mr. Jinnah declared that Pakistan would be the best safe-

guard for the Muslim minority than any other safeguards provided in the Constitution.

Who was there, he asked, to prevent the majority after five or ten years from destroying the safeguards provided for in the Constitution? If the majority after five or ten years changed the Constitution and removed separate electorates, who could prevent them? Safeguards would be blotted out one by one.

Mr. Jinnah went on to say that, if the minorities in Hindustan were maltreated, the Government of Pakistan could not remain passive. If Britain could go to the rescue of the Armenians during the time of Gladstone, surely Pakistan would not stand aside when the minorities were ill-treated in Hindustan.

Referring to the formation of provincial Ministries, Mr. Jinnah said that the Constitution was such that it was not possible for the League to form Ministries in the Muslim majority provinces without the help of other parties. It was for this reason that the Muslims wanted to put an end to the 1935 Act and establish Pakistan.

Concluding, Mr. Jinnah reaffirmed his faith in Pakistan and said: "They may check us. They may obstruct, but nobody can prevent us

from reaching our goal. They can only delay us for a little. With hope, courage and faith we shall win."

The Nawab of Mamdot, who was the first speaker when the Convention resumed its session, said that the recent elections were fought on the issue of Pakistan and 86 per cent of the Muslim electorate in the Punjab had voted for the League. He gave an account of the Ministry formation in the province and condemned the Congress President and the Governor of the Punjab "for doing everything in their power to find and encourage Muslim quislings to defeat the League."

Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan (N.W.F.P.) said that if "Quit India" meant that the British should quit and leave the Hindus and Muslims to decide the question among themselves, then on behalf of ten crores of Muslims he would ask the British to quit. But what puzzled him was that the Congress wanted the British to stay for a sufficiently long period so that they could consolidate their position with British bayonets.

"It cannot happen," he said. "Thank God, we have one flag, one leader, one platform and one ideal—Pakistan—to fight for. We are only waiting for the final order to whatever is con-

sidered necessary for the attainment of Pakistan."

Concluding, he said: "We are not indulging in any threats against the Congress or the Hindus. But if the British force the Muslims by the setting up of a Government of *Akhand Hindustan* type, and if they decide that there should be one Constituent Assembly, then the Muslims will have no other alternative but to take out the sword and rebel against it."

Sir Firoz Khan Noon, addressing the Convention, made an impassioned plea for Pakistan.

"If the Hindus give Pakistan," he said, "they will be our best friends. We want our freedom and we shall have it. Freedom is a thing which is more valuable than anything else in the world and, even if we have to die fighting for that freedom, we wish to see that our children are never slaves of *Akhand Hindustan*."

Sir Firoz said that, if there was any agreement between the Cabinet Mission and the "Indian *banyas*," leaving out the Muslim League, the only course left open to Muslims was to look to Russia. There was already a great movement in the Punjab, including landlords, in favour of Communism."



The Convention, which resumed its sitting at 9-30 p.m., continued till after 2 a.m.

Before the Convention was dissolved, the Muslim League party members in the Central and Provincial legislatures present took an oath, pledging "to undergo any danger, trial or sacrifice which may be demanded for the attainment of Pakistan." The oath was read by Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and was repeated by the audience.

The following is the text of the pledge : " I do hereby solemnly declare my firm conviction that the safety and security, the salvation and destiny of the Muslim nation inhabiting the sub-continent of India lie only in the achievement of Pakistan, which is the only equitable, honourable and just solution of the constitutional problem and which will bring peace, freedom and prosperity to the various nationalities and communities of this great sub-continent.

" I most solemnly affirm that I shall willingly and unflinchingly carry out all the directions and instructions which may be issued by the All-India Muslim League in pursuance of any movement that may be launched by it for the attainment of the cherished national goal of Pakistan. Believing as I do in the rightness and the justice

of my cause, I pledge to undergo any danger, trial or sacrifice which may be demanded of me."

The threat in the proceedings of the Delhi Convention was answered promptly and swiftly.

"Civil war in India will begin on the day that the British concede Pakistan and will last until the day the Pakistan areas have been reconquered and reunited with India," said Sardar Sant Singh, the Sikh leader at a meeting in London held by the India League to commemorate the incidents in Amritsar in April 1919.

"If Pakistan is granted," continued Sardar Sant Singh, "we shall either settle with Mr. Jinnah in six months, or carry on until the Pakistan areas are conquered.

"If this civil war costs the lives of one million people, I shall consider it a cheap price for the freedom, which will be ultimately gained. Why should the world be horrified at the prospect of the Hindu cutting the throat of the Muslim, in the interests of freedom ?

"Christian cut the throat of Christian in two world wars, in order to preserve freedom and American had to fight American before America could gain the prosperity which she enjoys to-day.

"The question of Hindu and Muslim is a purely domestic issue and it is the business of

Indians and not outsiders to settle it. If bloodshed is inevitable, then that is the concern of India.

“ The recent speeches of Mr. Jinnah and Sir Firoz Khan Noon should be regarded with the contempt they deserve.

“ India never looked to Russia, Germany or Japan in the past for any assistance, and we do not look anywhere for assistance now. The prospect of civil war in India troubles only the British.

“ The people of Europe and America have been proclaiming for the last 100 years that they are civilized while the orientals belong to the barbarian age. Why then, if they are a civilized people, have they killed millions and destroyed industry and property in two world wars ?

“ If Pakistan is conceded by the British, my community will not accept Muslim rule in the Punjab, and will never accept it.”

Sardar Sant Singh, amplifying his statement made at the “ Amritsar Day ” meeting, said at a press conference later that the cost of winning complete Indian independence, though it might be high in human lives, would be worth paying for.

His while-turbaned head contrasting sharply with his brown Western lounge suit, Sardar Sant Singh thumped the table vigorously to emphasise his point. Waving his rimless spectacles to and

fro he added : " The British Cabinet Mission will do well not to attach too much importance to the oath-taking ceremony of the Muslim League or the most foolish threat of their erstwhile ally, Sir Firoz Khan Noon (the former Indian High Commissioner in London) who appeals to Russia to help realise the absurd dreams of Mr. Mohammed Ali Jinnah. As regards Sir Firoz Khan Noon, reenacting the drama of Genghis Khan—leave it to the Sikhs of the Punjab to deal with him.

" If Pakistan is conceded, Civil War in India will last until these areas have been reconquered and India united again. Pakistan will be a terrible sore on the body of India. That sore will go on paining India until it has been cut out by a competent surgeon and a healthy state of affairs emerges."

Civil War will not necessarily be a bad thing generally. It will only be bad for persons like myself who would be placed in the inenviable dilemma of seeing Muslim throats being cut by Sikh *kirpans* or else fighting for the disruption of what God and history have made the common homeland.

## CHAPTER XIII

### Consequences of Pakistan

The Sikhs will have to return Masjid Shahid-gunj with good grace, if possible ; by the law of Pakistan, if necessary.

The Shariat Act will be extended to agricultural land as well. And so the sisters, daughters and widows of the *Noons* and *Tiwanas*, the *Qazilbashes* and the *Daultanas*, the *Mians* and the *Chaudhries* will get their share of ample estates, according to the laws of the *Quran*.

And thus the customary law of the province will become obsolete.

Usuary will be forbidden. Nobody will be permitted to charge or to receive or to pay interest, not even banks and certainly not the State.

Hence there will be no public borrowing by Pakistan. If money is needed urgently for defence, parcels of Pakistan will be for sale.

Industry will not be able to function as there will be no cash credit and no loans.

Banks will not be able to get time deposits and all deposits will be at call.

Private money lending will be at an end which may not be a bad thing. 'Bolaki Shahs' will be hanged.

Very probably the law of limitation will be repealed, and there should be no surprise in this as a sovereign state can do anything except turn a woman into a man.

And with the repeal of the laws of limitation, debtors will be able to recover properties sold in execution of decrees.

The penal law will no doubt be amended. Publishers of the *Satyarth Prakash* and other such literature will suffer the death penalty.

There will be no cinema houses in Pakistan, as cinemas tend to excite the emotions far more than wine and wine is *haram*.

All meat sold in Pakistan will be of the properly slaughtered variety. There will be no *jhatka*, no pork, no ham and bacon. Anybody who does not care to eat *halal* will have to be a vegetarian, which will not be harmful.

There will be plenty of beef and it will be cheap. Old and sick cattle from Khalistan will probably be secretly brought over the borders to be slaughtered in Pakistan.

In Khalistan, however, wine and *jhatka* will undoubtedly be on sale.

Muslims in Hindu areas will have to either go vegetarian or else take week-end trips to Pakistan. In certain areas of Hindustan, the slaughter of animals may be prohibited *in toto*, particularly where Jain sentiment is predominant. Here vegetarianism will no longer be a medical fad but a legal institution.

The jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore will be extended to the entire Pakistan area and perhaps one of the present Judges will be promoted Chief Justice of Pakistan. The Karachi Chief Court and the Peshawar Judicial Commissioner's Court may be liquidated and the Pakistan High Court may be centred in Karachi where the Court rooms are more airy and Judges are not obliged to take long walks between their chambers and their Court rooms.

It is certain that Khalistan will have its own Supreme Court at Amritsar. The jurisdiction of this court will probably extend to Patiala, Kapurthala and Nabha.

This Court will sit in the more salubrious hours of the morning and break off at 11-59 but this is only what the malicious say! There is probably no truth in this.

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

Some difficulty will undoubtedly arise as to certain communities and parties. What will be the position of the *Mirzais* in a free Pakistan? Will they be allowed to preach their doctrines or will they be stoned as they are in Afghanistan? Will they be allowed to have a state within the state of Pakistan? Will Muslims in general admit that *Mirzais* are Muslims or will the *Khalifa* of *Mirzais* recant that all who are not *Mirzais* are not Muslims? Will the *Khalifa* of Qadian voluntarily dissolve his order in the spirit that Krishnamurti dissolved the Order of the Star in the East?

Prices of real estate must deteriorate with the advent of Pakistan. Even if there are no mass migrations between Hindustan and Pakistan, Hindus are bound to find Pakistan a warm spot. They will no doubt transfer business and residences to more congenial environments. Those who have intention of acquiring real estate in Pakistan will do well to await the slump.

Just as there will be no cinemas in Pakistan, there will be no wine shops; restaurants will be confined to vimto and coffee. Solan will become a favourite holiday centre and austere Pakistanis would be well advised to buy the Brewery shares, now, if available.



In Pakistan who would be at the top and who would stand by the ladder ?

If a sovereign state matures in the next five years, we would of course have the *Qaid-i-Azam* as the successor of the Moghuls—His Majesty Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Emperor of Pakistan.

Like Bahadur Shah, Emperor Jinnah would be called to the throne at a ripe and venerable age. Bahadur Shah was too old to be an Emperor at 62, Jinnah will have to face the problems of an Emperor at 75. The real rulers in Bahadur Shah's time were the eunuchs of the Palace, the real rulers in Jinnah's day may be his valet.

There will probably be a scramble for power not only in Punjab, but in Sindh, the Frontier and Baluchistan.

In Punjab, there will be keen rivalry for the position of provincial *Nazim*. Will it go to the Nawab of Mamdot ? Perhaps, yes. Perhaps, no. The Nawab's claim would lie in the fact that he was nominated for the leadership of the Local League on the death of his father by Sir Sikander Hyat Khan. He is a good natured, generous but inexperienced youth, easily exploited by older men. His greatest virtue is that he will never take any step without the previous approval of the *Qaid-i-Azam*. He will, therefore, be very well

liked in the Central Councils of the League Government. Sir Feroz Khan Noon, on the other hand, is an adept at political intrigues. He has always been a 'yes' man, the show boy of British Imperialism, and the author of '*Scented Drops*,' a book primarily written to justify urination in the European manner. His interest in the Muslim community dates from the idea of an Interim Government nominated by Mr. Jinnah. During the elections he gave the public a valuable tip: "Even if you are asked to vote for a (black) dog, if he has the label of the Muslim League, give him your vote." This advice was generally accepted.

It remains to be seen whether Communists will play any part in the activities of the Cabinet of Pakistan. They were readily admitted to the League but recent events seem to indicate that there will be an internal purge before Pakistan is duly established. If, however, the communists survive, they are bound to dominate the Cabinet of Pakistan. Communist Leaders dexterously combine Marxian ideology with the ownership of large estates. They are well-known for their "Bs"—Begums, Buicks and Bungalows. Some have somersaulted into the League from other parties, but it is not unusual in India to join a winning party and drop a losing one.

But opportunism is not confined to the Communists.

Much reliability cannot, therefore, be placed to the credit of other would be prominent members of the League hierarchy in Pakistan. Begum Shah Nawaz will no doubt be the female member of the Cabinet. In her, Pakistan will have an experienced parliamentarian. In the last Assembly, she was as fanatically Unionist as she is now fanatically Leaguer. During the War she refused to obey the mandate of the League and was expelled for accepting a War job. When the job was retrenched, her enthusiasm for the League revived. She was forgiven and nominated a League candidate, as if nothing had happened.

The type of sincerity and conviction with which League members of the Legislatures are imbued was never more clearly brought out than in Sindh recently where a Muslim Leaguer ignored for the Cabinet joined the opposition as its leader only to recant and return within twenty-four hours as soon as a place for him was found in the Cabinet.

Of such stuff will Pakistan be made.

The same anxiety for office was apparent in the Punjab. While Mr. Jinnah refused to countenance a union with the Congress until Pakistan was conceded, the local party leaders dashed around

in high speed cars between the Gates of Congress President and the Portico of Sardar Baldev Singh, leader of the Panthic Party.

The Punjab Leaguers appeared prepared to concede a Khalistan and even a Pakistan subordinate to Khalistan so long as a League-Panth Government could be formed without delay. The public heard much about that there being much more in common between the Muslim and the Sikh than between the Sikh and the Hindu. The leaders of the Muslim League sworn to achieve Pakistan by all means saw no incongruity in sharing office with the Panthic Party sworn to resist Pakistan to the last man, the last *Kirpan* and the last drop of blood.

During the elections the Pakistan idea swept the Muslim countryside like a flood. Like all floods, the torrent carried with it much scum and refuse and deposited some of the rubbish in lofty places.

We have been told that if Pakistan is not conceded, there will be civil war. We have yet to see of what fibre the leaders of the Muslim League are made. The League was established about 40 years ago. There have been time and again many occasions when the interests and senti-

ments of the Muslim community have been ignored. On several occasions hundreds and thousands of Muslims have sought imprisonment and faced death. Many indeed have sacrificed their lives for Islam. Not once in these forty years has the League as such come into conflict with authority.

When Mohamed Ali and Shaukat Ali went to jail for Turkey, when Dass and Nehru gave up lucrative practices for the cause of Swaraj, Mr. Jinnah went into the political wilderness. Shafi and Fazal-i-Hussain, the other great members of the Muslim League took up ministerial office. When Muslims were laying down their lives for Masjid Shahid Gunj, Mr. Jinnah did not think it worth while even to sacrifice a second-grade practice before the Privy Council and Malik Feroz Khan Noon supported the Governor with whose connivance the mosque was demolished. There have been other occasions. The Muslim League has never to this day organised any movement whereby a single member has had to court arrest for the cause of the League. It remains, therefore, to be seen whether the threat of civil war is anything more than a brave threat.

But before rivers of blood fertilise the plains of Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah will have to discard his starched collars and Sir Feroz Khan Noon

may have to spend a summer in the Multan Central. Whether these sacrifices will bring Pakistan or not, they will certainly convince the British Government better than the oath of the Legislators at the Delhi Convention.

And whatever be the future, whether Pakistan be realised or not, whether it would end and die with Mr. Jinnah or grow to be a sovereign state, God alone knows. But if, human understanding can mean anything, Pakistan appears to be a dream far-fetched from the domains of reality. The true Islamic State will not and cannot be Pakistan. Pakistan will divide India, it will alienate the sons of the soil from the land of their birth; it will create an effete and defenceless State, the envy of its neighbours and of foreign exploiters. It will enslave the Muslim community to foreign capitalists for a century; it will drive prosperity away from the Punjab countryside. It will spell unemployment for the martial races of the Punjab. It will put the clock back by a hundred years.

These are some of the consequences of Pakistan. There may be others.

## **Appendices**

### **APPENDIX A**

The Secretary of State for India, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, broadcast from New Delhi, May 16, 1946.

“ Nearly two months ago, I as Secretary of State for India, and my two Cabinet colleagues, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. A. V. Alexander, were sent out by His Majesty's Government to India to assist the Viceroy in setting up in India the machinery by which Indians can devise their own constitution.

“ We were at once confronted with a major obstacle. The two principal parties, the Muslim League, who won the great majority of the Muslim seats in the recent elections, and the Congress, who won the majority of all the others, were opposed to one another as to the kind of machinery to be set up. The Muslim League claimed that British India should be divided into two completely separate sovereign States and refused to take part in constitution-making unless this claim was conceded in advance. The Congress insisted on one single united India.

“ During our stay in India we have tried by every means to secure such an accommodation between the parties as would enable constitution-making to proceed. Recently we were able to bring them together at Simla in a conference with ourselves, but, though both sides were prepared to make substantial concessions, it was not found possible to reach complete agreement. We have, therefore, been compelled ourselves to seek for a solution which, by securing the main objects of both

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parties, will enable a constitution-making machinery to be brought into immediate operation.

"While we recognise the reality of the fear of the Muslim League, that in a purely unitary India their community, with its own culture and way of life, might become submerged in a majority Hindu rule, we do not accept the setting up of a separate Muslim sovereign State as a solution of the communal problem.

"Pakistan," as the Muslim League would call their State, would not consist solely of Muslims. It would contain a substantial minority of other communities, which would average over 40 per cent. and in certain wide areas would even constitute a majority, as, for instance, in the city of Calcutta, where the Muslims form less than one-third of the population.

"Moreover, the complete separation of Pakistan from the rest of India would, in our view, gravely endanger the defence of the whole country by splitting the army into two and by preventing that defence in depth which is essential in modern war. We, therefore, do not suggest the adoption of this proposal.

"Our own recommendations contemplate a constitution of three tiers, at the top of which would be the Union of India with an Executive and a Legislature empowered to deal with these essential subjects of external affairs, defence and communications and the finance necessary for these services. At the bottom would be the provinces, which would have, apart from the subject I have just named, complete autonomy.

"But we contemplate further that provinces will wish to unite together in groups to carry out in common services covering a wider area than that of a single province, and these groups may have if they wish, Legislatures and Executives which in that event will be intermediate between those of the provinces and those of the Union.



## APPENDIX A

"On this basis, which makes it possible for the Muslims to secure the advantages of a Pakistan without incurring the dangers inherent in the division of India, we invite Indians of all parties to take part in framing a constitution. The Viceroy will, accordingly, summon to New Delhi representatives of British India, who will be elected by the members of the provincial Legislatures in such a way that as nearly as possible for each one million of the population there will be one representative and that the proportion between the representatives of the main communities will be on the same basis.

"After a preliminary meeting in common, these representatives of the provinces will divide themselves up into three sections, the composition of which is laid down and which, if the provinces ultimately agree, will become three groups. These sections will decide upon provincial and group matters. Subsequently they will reunite to decide upon the constitution for the Union. After the first elections under the new constitution, provinces will be free to walk out of the group into which they have been provisionally placed.

"We appreciate that this machinery does not of itself give any effective representation to other than the principal minorities, and we are therefore providing for a special committee to be set up in which the minorities will play full part. The business of this committee will be to formulate fundamental and minority rights and to recommend their inclusion in the constitution at the appropriate level.

"So far I have said nothing about the Indian States, which comprise a third of the area of India and contain about one-quarter of the whole population. These States at present are each separately governed and have individual relationships with the British Crown.

"There is general recognition that when British India attains independence, the position of these States cannot remain unaffected and it is anticipated that they

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will wish to take part in the constitution-making process and be represented in the All-India Union. It does not, however, lie within our province to decide these matters in advance, as they will have to be the subject of negotiation with the States before action can be taken.

"During the making of the constitution the administration must be carried on and we attach, therefore, the greatest importance to the setting up at once of an interim Government having the support of the major political parties. The Viceroy has already started discussions to this end and he hopes to bring them shortly to a successful issue.

"During the interim period the British Government, recognising the significance of the changes in the Government of India, will give the fullest measure of co-operation to the Government so formed in the accomplishment of its tasks of administration and in bringing about as rapid and smooth a transition as possible.

"The essence of statecraft is to envisage the probable course of future events, but no statement can be wide enough to frame a constitution which will adequately meet all the requirements of an unknown future. We may be confident, therefore, that the Indians, on whom falls the responsibility of creating the initial constitution, will give it a reasonable flexibility and will make provision for it to be revised and amended as required from time to time.

"In this short talk you will not expect me to go into further details regarding our proposals, which you can read in the statement which has been released for publication this evening. But in conclusion I will repeat and emphasise what to me is the fundamental issue.

"The future of India and how that future is inaugurated are matters of vital importance not only to India herself, but to the whole world. If a great new

## APPENDIX A

sovereign State can come into being in a spirit of mutual goodwill, both within and without India, that of itself will be an outstanding contribution to world stability.

“ The Government and the people of Britain are not only willing, they are anxious, to play their full part in achieving this result. But the constitution for India has to be framed by Indians and worked by Indians when they have brought it into being.

“ We appreciate to the full the difficulties which confront them in embarking on this task. We have done, and we will continue to do, all that lies in our power to help them overcome these difficulties. But the responsibility and the opportunity is theirs and in their fulfilment of it we wish them godspeed.

## APPENDIX B

The following is the full text of the statement by the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy :

1. On March 15 last just before the despatch of the Cabinet Delegation to India Mr. Attlee, the British Prime Minister, used these words :

“ My colleagues are going to India with the intention of using their utmost endeavours to help her to attain her freedom as speedily and fully as possible. What form of Government is to replace the present regime is for India to decide ; but our desire is to help her to set up forthwith the machinery for making that decision.

“ I hope that India and her people may elect to remain within the British Commonwealth. I am certain that they will find great advantages in doing so.

“ But if she does so elect, it must be by her own free will. The British Commonwealth and Empire is not bound together by chains of external compulsion. It is a free association of free peoples. If, on the other hand, she elects for independence, in our view she has a right to do so. It will be for us to help to make the transition as smooth and easy as possible.”

2. Charged in these historic words we—the Cabinet Ministers and the Viceroy—have done our utmost to assist the two main political parties to reach agreement upon the fundamental issue of the unity or division of India. After prolonged discussions in New Delhi we succeeded in bringing the Congress and the Muslim League together in Conference at Simla. There was a full

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exchange of views and both parties were prepared to make considerable concessions in order to try and reach a settlement but it ultimately proved impossible to close the remainder of the gap between the parties and so no agreement could be concluded. Since no agreement has been reached we feel that it is our duty to put forward what we consider are best arrangements possible to ensure a speedy setting up of the new constitution. This statement is made with the full approval of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

3. We have accordingly decided that immediate arrangements should be made whereby Indians may decide the future constitution of India and an Interim Government may be set up at once to carry on the administration of British India until such time as a new Constitution can be brought into being. We have endeavoured to be just to the smaller as well as to the larger sections of the people ; and to recommend a solution which will lead to a practicable way of governing the India of the future, and will give a sound basis for defence and a good opportunity for progress in the social, political and economic field.

4. It is not intended in this statement to review the voluminous evidence that has been submitted to the Mission ; but it is right that we should state that it has shown an almost universal desire outside the supporters of the Muslim League, for the unity of India.

5. This consideration did not, however, deter us from examining closely and impartially the possibility of a partition of India, since we were greatly impressed by the very genuine and acute anxiety of the Muslims lest they should find themselves subjected to a perpetual Hindu-majority rule.

This feeling has become so strong and widespread amongst the Muslims that it cannot be allayed by mere paper safeguards. If there is to be internal peace in India it must be secured by measures which will assure to

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the Muslims a control in all matter vital to their culture, religion, and economic or other interests.

6. We therefore examined in the first instance the question of a separate and fully independent sovereign State of Pakistan as claimed by the Muslim League. Such a Pakistan would comprise two areas; one in the north-west consisting of the provinces of the Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier, and British Baluchistan, the other in the north-east consisting of the Provinces of Bengal and Assam. The League were prepared to consider adjustment of boundaries at a later stage, but insisted that the principle of Pakistan should first be acknowledged. The argument for a separate State of Pakistan was based, first, upon the right of the Muslim majority to decide their method of Government according to their wishes, and secondly, upon the necessity to include substantial areas in which Muslims are in a minority, in order to make a Pakistan administratively and economically workable.

The size of the non-Muslim minorities in a Pakistan comprising the whole of the six Provinces enumerated above would be very considerable as the following figures show :

	Muslim	Non-Muslim
<i>North-Western</i>		
<i>Area—</i>		
Punjab	... 16,217,242	12,201,577
N.-W.F. Province	... 2,788,797	249,270
Sind	... 3,208,325	1,326,683
Br. Baluchistan	438,930	62,701
	<hr/> 22,653,294	<hr/> 13,840,231
	<hr/> 62.07%	<hr/> 37.93%

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		Muslim	Non-Muslim
<i>North-Eastern</i>			
<i>Area—</i>			
Bengal	...	33,005,434	27,301,091
Assam	...	3,442,479	6,762,254
		<u>36,447,913</u>	<u>34,063,345</u>
		51.69%	48.31%

The Muslim minorities in the remainder of British India number some 20 million dispersed amongst a total population of 18 millions.

These figures show that the setting up of a separate sovereign State of Pakistan on the lines claimed by the Muslim League, would not solve the communal minority problem; nor can we see any justification for including within a sovereign Pakistan those districts of the Punjab and of Bengal and Assam in which the population is predominantly non-Muslim. Every argument that can be used in favour of Pakistan, can equally in our view be used in favour of the exclusion of the non-Muslim areas from Pakistan. This point would particularly affect the position of the Sikhs.

7. We therefore considered whether a smaller sovereign Pakistan confined to the Muslim majority areas alone might be a possible basis of compromise. Such a Pakistan is regarded by the Muslim League as quite impracticable because it would entail the exclusion from the Pakistan of (a) the whole of Ambala and Jullundur Divisions in the Punjab; (b) the whole of Assam except the district of Sylhet; and (c) a large part of Western Bengal, including Calcutta, in which city the Muslims form 23.6 per cent of the population. We ourselves are also convinced that any solution which involves a radical partition of the Punjab and Bengal, as this would do would be contrary to the wishes and interests of a very large proportion of the inhabitants of these Provinces,

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Bengal and the Punjab each has its own common language and a long history and tradition. Moreover, any division of the Punjab would of necessity divide the Sikhs leaving substantial bodies of Sikhs on both sides of the boundary. We have therefore been forced to the conclusion that neither a larger nor a smaller sovereign State of Pakistan would provide an acceptable solution for the communal problem.

8. Apart from the great force of the foregoing arguments there are weighty administrative, economic and military considerations. The whole of the transportation and postal and telegraph system of India have been established on basis of a united India. To disintegrate them would gravely injure both parts of India. The case for a united defence is even stronger. The Indian armed forces have been built up as a whole for the defence of India as a whole, and to break them in two would inflict a deadly blow on the long traditions and high degree of efficiency of the Indian Army and would entail the gravest dangers. The Indian Navy and Indian Air Force would become much less effective. The two sections of the suggested Pakistan contain the two most vulnerable frontiers in India and for a successful defence in depth the area of Pakistan would be insufficient.

9. A further consideration of importance is the greater difficulty which the Indian States would find in associating themselves with a divided British India.

10. Finally there is the geographical fact that the two halves of the proposed Pakistan State are separated by some seven hundred miles and the communications between them both in war and peace would be dependent on the goodwill of Hindustan.

11. We are therefore unable to advise the British Government that the power which at present resides in British hands should be handed over to two entirely separate sovereign States.



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All population figures in this statement are from the most recent census taken in 1941.

12. This decision does not however blind us to the very real Muslim apprehensions that their culture and political and social life might become submerged in a purely unitary India, in which the Hindus with their greatly superior numbers must be a dominating element. To meet this the Congress have put forward a scheme under which Provinces would have full autonomy subject only to a minimum of Central subjects, such as Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications.

Under this scheme Provinces, if they wished to take part in economic and administrative planning on a large scale, could cede to the Centre optional subjects in addition to the compulsory ones mentioned above.

13. Such a scheme would, in our view, present considerable constitutional disadvantages and anomalies. It would be very difficult to work a Central Executive and Legislature in which some Ministers, who dealt with compulsory subjects, were responsible to the whole of India while other Ministers, who dealt with optional subjects, would be responsible only to those Provinces which had elected to act together in respect of such subjects. This difficulty would be accentuated in the Central Legislature, where it would be necessary to exclude certain members from speaking and voting when subjects with which their Provinces were not concerned were under discussion.

Apart from the difficulty of working such a scheme, we do not consider that it would be fair to deny to other Provinces, which did not desire to take the optional subjects at the Centre, the right to form themselves into a group for a similar purpose. This would indeed be no more than the exercise of their autonomous powers in a particular way.

14. Before putting forward our recommendation we

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

turn to deal with the relationship of the Indian States to British India. It is quite clear that with the attainment of independence by British India, whether inside or outside the British commonwealth, the relationship which has hitherto existed between the Rulers of the States and the British Crown will no longer be possible. Paramountcy can neither be retained by the British Crown nor transferred to the new Government. This fact has been fully recognised by those whom we interviewed from the States. They have at the same time assured us that the States are ready and willing to co-operate in the new development of India. The precise form which their co-operation will take must be a matter for negotiation during the building up of the new constitutional structure and it by no means follows that it will be identical for all the States. We have not therefore dealt with the States in the same detail as the Provinces of British India in the paragraphs which follow.

15. We now indicate the nature of a solution which in our view would be just to the essential claims of all parties, and would at the same time be most likely to bring about a stable and practicable form of constitution for All-India.

We recommend that the constitution should take the following basic form :—

(1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British India and the States, which should deal with the following subjects : Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications ; and should have the powers necessary to raise the finances required for the above subjects.

(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from British Indian and States' representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a majority of all the members present and voting.

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(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers should vest in the Provinces.

(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union.

(5) Provinces should be free to form Groups with executives and legislatures, and each Group could determine the Provincial subjects to be taken in common.

(6) The constitutions of the Union and of the Groups should contain a provision whereby any province could, by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of 10 years and at 10 yearly intervals thereafter.

16. It is not our object to lay out the details of a constitution on the above lines, but to set in motion the machinery whereby a constitution can be settled by Indians for Indians.

It has been necessary however for us to make this recommendation as to the broad basis of the future constitution because it became clear to us in the course of our negotiations that not until that had been done was there any hope of getting the two major communities to join in the setting up of the constitution-making machinery.

17. We now indicate the constitution-making machinery which we propose should be brought into being forthwith in order to enable a new constitution to be worked out.

18. In forming any assembly to decide a new constitutional structure the first problem is to obtain as broad-based and accurate a representation of the whole population as is possible. The most satisfactory method obviously would be by election based on adult franchise ; but any attempt to introduce such a step now would lead to a wholly unacceptable delay in the formulation of the new Constitution. The only practicable alternative is to utilize the recently elected Provincial Legislative Assem-

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

blies as the electing bodies. There are, however, two factors in their composition which make this difficult. First, the numerical strengths of the Provincial Legislative Assemblies do not bear the same proportion to the total population in each Province. Thus, Assam with a population of 10 millions has a Legislative Assembly of 108 members, while Bengal, with a population six times as large, has an Assembly of only 250. Secondly, owing to the weightage given to minorities by the Communal Award, the strengths of the several communities in each Provincial Legislative Assembly are not in proportion to their numbers in the Province. Thus the number of seats reserved for Muslims in the Bengal Legislative Assembly is only 48 per cent of the total although they form 55 p.c. of the Provincial population. After a most careful consideration of the various methods by which these inequalities might be corrected, we have come to the conclusion that the fairest and most practicable plan would be—

(a) to allot to each Province a total number of seats proportional to its population, roughly in the ratio of one to a million, as the nearest substitute for representation by adult suffrage ;

(b) to divide this provincial allocation of seats between the main communities in each Province in proportion to their population ;

(c) to provide that the representatives allotted to each community in a Province shall be elected by the members of that community in its Legislative Assembly.

We think that for these purposes it is sufficient to recognise only three main communities in India : General, Muslim, and Sikh, the "General" community including all persons who are not Muslims or Sikhs. As the smaller minorities would, upon the population basis, have little or no representation since they would lose the weightage which assures them seats in the Provincial Legislatures, we have made the arrangements set out

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in paragraph 20 below to give them a full representation upon all matters of special interest to the minorities.

19. (i) We therefore propose that there shall be elected by each Provincial Legislative Assembly the following numbers of representatives, each part of the Legislature (General, Muslim or Sikh) electing its own representatives by the method of proportional representation with the single transferable vote :—

### TABLE OF REPRESENTATION

#### *Section A.*

Province	General	Muslim	Total
Madras ...	45	4	49
Bombay ...	19	2	21
United Provinces...	47	8	55
Bihar ...	31	5	36
Central Provinces...	16	1	17
Orissa ...	9	0	9
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	167	20	187

#### *Section B.*

Province	General	Muslim	Sikh	Total
Punjab ...	8	16	4	28
North-West Frontier Province ...	0	3	0	3
Sind ...	1	3	0	4
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	9	22	4	35

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### *Section C.*

Province	General	Muslim	Total
Bengal	27	33	60
Assam	7	3	10
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	34	36	70
Total for British India			292
Maximum for Indian States			93
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total			385

*Note.*—In order to represent the Chief Commissioner's Provinces there will be added to Section A the member representing Delhi in the Central Legislative Assembly, the member representing Ajmer-Merwara in the Central Legislative Assembly, and a representative to be elected by the Coorg Legislative Council.

To Section B will be added a representative of British Baluchistan.

(ii) It is the intention that the States should be given in the final Constituent Assembly appropriate representation which would not, on the basis of the calculations adopted for British India, exceed 93, but the method of selection will have to be determined by consultation. The States would in the preliminary stage be represented by a Negotiating Committee.

(iii) The representatives thus chosen shall meet at New Delhi as soon as possible.

(iv) A preliminary meeting will be held at which the general order of business will be decided, a Chairman and other officers elected, and an Advisory Committee (see paragraph 20 below) on the rights of citizens, minorities, and tribal and excluded areas set up. Thereafter the provincial representatives will divide up into the three sections shown under A, B, and C, in the Table of Representation in sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph.

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(v) These sections shall proceed to settle the Provincial Constitutions for the Provinces including in each section, and shall also decide whether any Group Constitution shall be set up for those Provinces and, if so, with what provincial subjects the Group should deal. Provinces shall have the power to opt out of the Groups in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (viii) below.

(vi) The representatives of the Sections and the Indian States shall reassemble for the purpose of settling the Union Constitution.

(vii) In the Union Constituent Assembly resolution varying the provisions of paragraph 15 above or raising any major communal issue shall require a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities.

The Chairman of the Assembly shall decide which (if any), of the resolution raise major communal issues and shall, if so requested by a majority of the representatives of either of the major communities, consult the Federal Court before giving his decision.

(viii) As soon as the new constitutional arrangements have come into operation, it shall be open to any Province to elect to come out of any Group in which it has been placed. Such a decision shall be taken by the new legislature of the Province after the first general election under the new constitution.

20. The Advisory Committee on the rights of citizens, minorities, and tribal and excluded areas should contain full representation of the interests affected, and their function will be to report to the Union Constituent Assembly upon the list of Fundamental Rights, the clauses for the protection of minorities, and a scheme for the administration of the tribal and excluded areas, and to advise whether these rights should be incorporated in the Provincial Group, or Union Constitution.

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

21. His Excellency the Viceroy will forthwith request the Provincial Legislatures to proceed with the election of their representatives and the States to set up a Negotiating Committee. It is hoped that the process of constitution-making can proceed as rapidly as the complexities of the task permit so that the interim period may be as short as possible.

22. It will be necessary to negotiate a Treaty between the Union Constituent Assembly and the Union Kingdom to provide for certain matters arising out of the transfer of power.

23. While the constitution-making proceeds, the administration of India has to be carried on. We attach the greatest importance therefore to the setting up at once of an interim Government having the support of the major political parties. It is essential during the interim period that there should be the maximum of co-operation in carrying through the difficult tasks that face the Government of India. Besides the heavy task of day-to-day administration there is the grave danger of famine to be countered ; there are decisions to be taken in many matters of post-war development which will have a far-reaching effect on India's future ; and there are important international conferences in which India has to be represented. For all these purposes a Government having popular support is necessary. The Viceroy has already started discussions to this end, and hopes soon to form an Interim Government in which all the portfolios, including that of the War Member, will be held by Indian leaders having the full confidence of the people. The British Government recognising the significance of the changes in the Government of India, will give the fullest measure of co-operation to the Government so formed in the accomplishment of its tasks of administration and in bringing about as rapid and smooth a transition as possible.

24. To the leaders and people of India who now



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have the opportunity of complete independence we would finally say this. We and our Government and countrymen hoped that it would be possible for the Indian people themselves to agree upon the method of framing the new constitution under which they will live. Despite the labours which we have shared with the Indian Parties, and the exercise of much patience and goodwill by all, this has not been possible. We therefore now lay before you proposals which, after listening to all sides and after much earnest thought, we trust will enable you to attain your independence in the shortest time and with the least danger of internal disturbance and conflict. These proposals may not, of course, completely satisfy all parties, but you will recognise with us that at this supreme moment in Indian history statesmanship demands mutual recommendation.

We ask you to consider the alternative to acceptance of these proposals. After all the efforts which we and the Indian Parties have made together for agreement, we must state that in our view there is small hope of peaceful settlement by agreement of the Indian Parties alone. The alternative would therefore be a grave danger of violence, chaos, and even civil war. The result and duration of such a disturbance cannot be foreseen; but it is certain that it would be a terrible disaster for many millions of men, women and children. This is a possibility which must be regarded with equal abhorrence by the Indian people, our own countrymen, and the world as a whole.

We therefore lay these proposals before you in the profound hope that they will be accepted and operated by you in the spirit of accommodation and goodwill in which they are offered. We appeal to all who have the future good of India at heart to extend their vision beyond their own community or interest to the interests of the whole four hundred millions of the Indian people.

We hope that the new independent India may choose

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

to be a member of the British Commonwealth. We hope in any event that you will remain in close and friendly association with our people. But these are matters for your own choice. Whatever that choice may be we look forward with you to your ever increasing prosperity among the great nations of the world, and to a future even more glorious than your past.

## APPENDIX C

### **What Prominent Muslims think of Pakistan as a Sovereign State.**

*A.—Malik Barkat Ali*, who until his death was always a strong Muslim Leaguer, and a loyal lieutenant of Mr. Jinnah, expressed the following view of Pakistan as Chairman of the Reception Committee of Muslim Conference held at Lahore :

“ The conception of a divided India, which Sir Mohammad Iqbal put forward in the course of his presidential utterance from the platform of the League, is at a time when that body has virtually become extinct and ceased to represent free Islam. I am glad to be able to say that Sir Mohammad Iqbal has since recanted. It must not therefore delude anybody into thinking that it is Islam's conception of the India to be. Even if Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal had not recanted it as something which could not be put forward by any sane person, I should have emphatically and unhesitatingly repudiated it as something foreign to the genius and the spirit of the rising generation of Islam, and I really deem it a proud duty to affirm today that not only must there be no division of India into communal provinces but that both Islam and Hinduism must run conterminously with the boundaries of India and must not be cribbed, cabined and confined within any shorter bounds.”

*B.—Dr. Syed Abdul Latif* who has been one of the earliest and most thoughtful exponents of Pakistan idea has not disguised his apprehensions to the idea of the Sovereign State presently envisaged by Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League. In *The Pakistan Issue*, (pp. viii to xiii)

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Dr. Latif expressed himself on the subject in the following terms :

Mr. Jinnah insists that Pakistan States should remain in isolation and should have no constitutional relation with the rest of India. I, on the other hand, hold that such an attitude will prove suicidal to the Pakistan State. I firmly believe that in the abiding interests of these states themselves and of the thinly distributed Muslim minorities in Hindu Zones, they should, while enjoying perfect freedom or autonomy in their internal affairs, link themselves to the rest of India to administer with others on terms of equality a minimum of subject indispensably common to the whole of India.

I have examined the implications of isolation, particularly its economic and geographical, with every care and concern. The irresistible conclusion that has forced itself on me is that the proposed states, when isolated from the rest of India, will soon or late find themselves unable to maintain their independence, and in consequence will either lapse into the position of a dependency or protectorate of some foreign power or return chastened in spirit to the Indian Union. That is a prospect I have shuddered against.

Under the principle of the Lahore Resolution, you will have for your Pakistan States only those areas where the Muslims are in real or predominant majority. You will thus have to forego in the North-West nearly a half of the Punjab, the Ambala division and the Kangra valley, and confine yourself to the west of Lahore. In the North-East, you cannot claim much beyond the Eastern Bengal and the Sylhet district of Assam. If you wish to carve out for any reason larger states, you can only do so either by absorbing the Muslim population of the entire North by means of exchange of population and on that basis asking for additional space, or by the free consent of the adjoining non-Muslim areas which you would like to include in the new states. Exchange

## APPENDIX C

of population is somehow disagreeable to you. You are earth-rooted unlike the Muslims of old. The only alternative for you is to obtain the consent of the non-Muslims to promote your purpose. If you succeed in your attempt, you will certainly have larger states to administer but they will not possess the requisite features of a Muslim state properly so called. They will be composite states and not 'Pakistan' and will have naturally to be governed by composite governments. You cannot, as is your dream and hope, establish therein *Hakumat Elahi* or the 'Rule of God' or of the *Shariyat* and cannot treat the non-Muslims as Zimmis or protected subjects. And then you will have to bear in mind.

If, however, the Muslim League is in earnest to have a real 'Pakistan' it will have to give up every idea of ruling over areas in the North-West and North-East which are predominantly populated by non-Muslims. That will be insisted upon by the other parties, when the time comes for you to exercise the right of self-determination which you have asked for. Under that right, you will not get for your realm anything beyond the two poverty-stricken patches which I have delineated above and where alone you are truly in the majority patches torn from each other by vast spaces of land and sea, and incapable of evolving between them any unified life or federal administration. Some wise heads among the Leaguers have suggested a corridor between the two wings of Pakistan, a long corridor running through a territory populated predominantly by non-Muslims. Is such a claim tenable? Does the Lahore Resolution allow it? The sea is no doubt God's sea. It can certainly link the two States together, as it does the British Empire. But can you develop a powerful navy to preserve that linkage, especially in times of stress and war?

Further, can you run a modern state with your economic resources so limited and undeveloped? Can

## CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

you meet the cost of defence unaided under modern conditions? Do you possess all the raw materials required by heavy industries, and other natural resources so essential to National self-sufficiency? And why should you deny yourselves the larger resources of India when they are yours by every natural right?

Geographical and economic considerations apart, of what use will your 'Pakistan' state in isolation be to the millions of Muslims, who will, on your account, be left eternal orphans in an independent Hindu India? The Lahore Resolution seeks to provide "mandatory safeguards" for them. But who is to be the mandatory authority? Britain? Pakistan? What are the sanctions to be applied? Will they be applied every time the Muslim minorities are in trouble? Will an independent Hindu India agree at all to an external mandate. There are some spirited people in the Camp of the League who recommend retaliation for a remedy. "Crush the Hindu minority in Pakistan if the Muslim minority is crushed in Hindustan." Suppose the Hindus of Pakistan are a law-abiding people and are devoted citizens of the State. Will you still have the heart to crush them? Does Islam permit it?

Take the cultural implication of isolation into consideration. We talk of a single Muslim nation of India. Where will that nation be, if it is parcelled out among several independent states or dominions having no organic relationship with one another? Will we be able to retain or develop our cultural unity? Will not some of us who will be left in Hindu Zones slowly succumb to the impact of a vivified and dominating non-Muslim culture zealously fostered by an independent and powerful non-Muslim state and cut themselves off for ever from the main current of Islamic life in India? Are the words of Hali then to prove prophetic in their case, words uttered in anguish in his *Shikwa i-Hind*?

And then what to be the future of the Muslim Indian States, most of which are surrounded on all sides by

Hindu zones and are predominantly populated by Hindus? Are they to live on terms of dependence in Hindustan, or shall they occupy an honourable place in a Commonwealth of the whole of India?

*Nawab Dr. Nazir Yar Jang, M.D., LL.D.*, a retired Judge of the High Court of Hyderabad Deccan and a member of the Senate of the Osmania University and of the Court of the Muslim University, Aligarh, in a foreword to "The Pakistan Issue" by Dr. Abdul Latif endorsed the view-point of Dr. Latif:

"At the present moment when the League is fully committed to a policy of Pakistan in isolation, it may not be easy for its leaders to openly rescue the League from an impossible position and give its outlook a coherence by linking Pakistan to the rest of India. But the time is drawing close when the League will be obliged to revise its attitude and restate its case in terms of a larger and further life for the Indian Muslims than what is possible under the idea of 'Pakistan in isolation.'"

Sir Syed Sultan Ahmed is opposed to the formation of independent Muslim Zones as envisaged by the Muslim League resolution. In his recent book *A treaty between India and the United Kingdom* he has adduced cogent arguments against Pakistan while looking from the point of view of the Muslims themselves. He has proposed a scheme of his own which is based on the "Draft of Declaration."

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## APPENDIX D (CENSUS 1941)

Province.	Total population British Territory.	Hindus Ex- cluding Scheduled castes.	Scheduled castes.	Muslims.	Other principal minority.
1. United Pro- vinces.	55,020,617	34,094,511	11,717,158	8,416,308	289,422 (Tribes)
2. Punjab	28,418,819	6,301,737	1,592,320	16,217,742	3,757,401 (Sikhs)
3. N.-W. F. P.	3,084,334	1,97,631	...	2,810,865	62,411 (Sikhs)
4. Bihar	36,340,151	22,173,890	4,340,379	4,716,314	5,055,647 (Tribes)
5. Orissa	8,728,544	5,594,535	1,238,171	146,301	1,721,006 "
6. Bengal	60,306,525	17,680,054	7,378,970	33,005,434	1,889,389 "
7. Assam	10,204,733	3,535,932	676,291	3,442,479	2,484,986 "
8. Madras	49,341,810	34,731,330	8,068,492	3,896,452	2,001,082 (Indian Christians)
9. Bombay	20,849,340	14,700,242	1,855,148	1,920,368	1,614,298 (Tribes)
10. Sind	4,535,008	1,038,292	191,634	3,208,325	31,011 (Sikhs)
11. C. P. and Be- nar	16,813,584	9,880,583	3,051,413	783,697	2,937,364 (Tribes)
12. Baluchistan	501,631	39,521	5,102	438,930	11,918 (Sikhs)
13. Delhi	917,939	444,532	122,693	304,971	16,157 (Sikhs)
14. Ajmere-Mer- wara	588,693	376,481	...	89,899	91,472 (Tribes)
15. Coorg	168,726	105,013	25,740	14,730	19,723 "
16. Andamans & Nicobar	33,768	8,427	...	8,005	11,076 "



# APPENDIX E

District or State	Percentage in total population of	
	Muslims	Non-Muslims
<b>BENGAL</b>		
1. Burdwan ... ..	17.8	81.0
2. Birbhum ... ..	27.4	72.8
3. Bankura ... ..	2.3	95.5
4. Midnapore ... ..	7.7	22.2
5. Hoogly ... ..	15.1	84.9
6. Howrah ... ..	19.9	79.9
7. 24 Parganahs ... ..	32.4	66.4
8. Calcutta ... ..	23.5	73.6
9. Nadia ... ..	61.2	38.1
10. Murshidabad ... ..	56.5	43.3
11. Jessore ... ..	60.1	39.8
12. Khulna ... ..	49.3	50.4
13. Rajshahi ... ..	74.6	25.2
14. Dinajpur ... ..	50.2	49.4
15. Jalpaiguri ... ..	23.0	76.2
16. Darjeeling ... ..	2.4	
17. Rangpur ... ..	71.4	28.5
18. Bogra ... ..	83.9	16.0
19. Pabna ... ..	77.1	22.9
20. Malda ... ..	56.7	43.1
21. Dacca ... ..	67.3	32.4
22. Mymensingh ... ..	77.4	22.5
23. Faridpur ... ..	64.8	34.8
24. Bakarganj ... ..	72.3	27.0

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District or State				Percentage in total population of	
				Muslims	Non-Muslims
25.	Tippera	...	...	77.1	22.8
26.	Noakhali	...	...	81.4	18.6
27.	Chittagong	...	...	74.6	21.6
28.	" Hill Tract	...	...	...	...
	States				
29.	Tripura	...	...	24.0	74.2
30.	Coochbihar	...	...	37.9	61.8
	ASSAM				
1.	Cachar	...	...	36.3	62.5
2.	Sylchch	...	...	60.7	39.1
3.	Khasi Jantia Hills	...	...	1.3	98.0
4.	Naga hills	...	...	0.3	99.6
5.	Lushari hills	...	...	...	97.8
6.	Goalpara	...	...	46.2	53.7
7.	Kamrup	...	...	29.1	70.8
8.	Darrang	...	...	11.5	82.6
9.	Nowgong	...	...	35.2	64.0
10.	Sibsagar	...	...	4.8	93.5
11.	Lakshmipur	...	...	5.0	93.5
12.	Garo Hills	...	...	4.7	95.2
	SIND				
1.	Dadu	...	...	84.8	15.0
2.	Hyderabad	...	...	67.0	32.4
3.	Karachi	...	...	64.1	31.3
4.	Larkana	...	...	81.8	17.8
5.	Nawabshah	...	...	75.2	24.1
6.	Sukkur	...	...	71.2	28.2
7.	Thar Parkar	...	...	50.2	49.2
8.	Upper Sind Frontier	...	...	90.5	9.5

# APPENDIX E

District or State	Percentage in total population of	
	Muslim	Non-Muslim
<b>N.-W. F. P.</b>		
1. Hazara ... ..	95.1	3 8
2. Mardan ... ..	95.4	2.2
3. Peshawar ... ..	90.3	6.2
4. Kohat ... ..	92.1	5.9
5. Bannu ... ..	87.2	10.5
6. D. I. Khan ... ..	85.9	13.1
<b>BALUCHISTAN</b>		
1. Baluchistan States ...	87.3	9.1
	97.2	2.8

District or State		Percentage in total population of		
		Muslims	Sikhs	Rest
PUNJAB				
1.	Hissar	28.2	6.0	64.8
2.	Rohtak	17.2	0.1	81.7
3.	Gurgaon	33.5	...	66.8
4.	Karnal	30.6	2.0	67.0
5.	Ambala	31.6	18.4	48.7
6.	Simla	18.2	2.7	74.3
7.	Kangra	5.1	0.6	94.3
8.	Hoshiarpur	32.5	16.9	49.8
9.	Jullundur	45.2	26.4	27.6
10.	Ludhiana	36.9	41.7	21.4
11.	Ferozepore	45.1	33.7	20.2
12.	Lahore	60.7	18.3	16.8

# CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

District or State		Percentage in total population of		
		<i>Muslims</i>	<i>Sikhs</i>	<i>Rest</i>
13.	Amritsar	46.5	36.1	15.4
14.	Gurdaspur	50.2	19.1	25.2
15.	Sialkot	62.1	11.7	19.4
16.	Gujranwala	70.4	10.9	11.9
17.	Sheikhupura	63.6	18.9	10.5
18.	Gujrat	85.6	6.4	7.7
19.	Shahpur	83.7	4.8	10.2
20.	Jhelum	89.5	3.9	6.5
21.	Rawalpindi	80.0	8.2	10.5
22.	Attock	90.5	3.0	6.4
23.	Mianwali	86.2	1.4	12.4
24.	Montgomery	69.1	13.9	15.9
25.	Lyalpur	62.8	18.8	14.6
26.	Jhang	82.6	1.5	15.8
27.	Multan	78.0	4.2	16.9
28.	Muzaffargarh	86.5	0.8	12.8
29.	Dera Ghazi Khan	88.9	0.2	11.7
<b>PUNJAB STATES</b>				
1.	Kapurthala	56.4	25.9	16.3
2.	Faridkot	30.7	57.7	10.9
3.	Patiala	22.6	47.3	30.9
4.	Jind	14.1	11.3	74.2
5.	Nabha	20.7	36.0	42.9

# APPENDIX E

## Indian Fighting Forces 1930-1943 1930

Communities		Excluding Gurkhas	Percentage in Infantry including Gurkhas	Percentage in Cavalry
Hindus	...	66.5%	50.55%	61.92%
Gurkhas	...	...	16.4%	...
Muslims	...	35.79%	29.97%	30.08%

Dr. Ambedkar's book on "Thoughts on Pakistan."  
Figures as they stood on 1st September, 1943

		Combatant I. O. Rs. & V.C.Os.	R.I.N. Officers	I.A.F. Officers	R.I.N.	I.A.F. other ranks
Hindus	...	47%	32.3%	47.6%		59.5%
Muslims	...	32%	18.1%	16.6%		17.0%
Sikhs	...	7%	...	...		...
Gurkhas	...	5%	...	...		...
Christians	...	5%	...	...		...
Others	...	2%	...	...		...

		Artillery	Indian Infantry	R.I.A.S.C.
Hindus	...	57%	41%	55%
Muslims	...	28%	25%	36%
Sikhs	...	10%	7%	5%
Gurkhas	...	10%	24%	...
Others	...	5%	3%	4%

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THE AUTHOR

\* Not Mr. Jinnah but Mr. Rehmat Ali

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